Contested time: family-friendly working time policy in Germany and the United Kingdom by Warth, Lisa Christina
 The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
Contested Time: Family-Friendly Working Time Policy in Germany 
and the United Kingdom (1997-2005) 
 
 
Lisa Christina Warth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London School of 
Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
London, March 2008 
2 
 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than 
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without the prior written consent of the author. 
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party. 
 
Lisa C. Warth 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
Access to family-friendly working time arrangements is unequally spread both within 
and between workplaces, leaving many working parents with difficulties in combining 
employment with family responsibilities. The British and German governments have 
started to address this problem, but have done so in different ways. Focusing on time 
allocation in the work/family interface and its implications for gender and employment 
relations, this thesis explores the differences between the British and German 
government strategies to improve access to family-friendly working time arrangements 
for working parents, and how variation can be explained. As the flexibility 
requirements of employers and employees often diverge and can be in conflict, the 
thesis further investigates to what extent the German and British policy strategies were 
designed to empower working parents to access the time flexibility they need. It 
applies an empowerment perspective to the analysis of policy choice and design and 
draws on the policy making literature to analyse cross-national variation. 
Between 1997 and 2005, the incoming centre-left New Labour and ‘Red-Green’ 
governments both introduced information campaigns and employment rights to 
improve access. The lack of economic incentives for the provision and take-up of 
family-friendly working time arrangements reduced the overall empowering potential 
of the British and German strategies. Although similar at the level of policy choice, 
employment rights and information campaigns varied at the level of policy design with 
different implications for access. The thesis concludes that family-friendly working 
time policy did not achieve a significant redistribution of control over working time to 
employees in either of the two countries. This can be in part explained by a strong 
employer lobby and opportunities to influence policy choice and design, but also by 
the ‘competitive advantage’ of childcare services over family-friendly working time 
policy, directing government resources to more ‘employer-friendly’ reconciliation 
policies.  
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1. Introduction 
European welfare states face the challenge of how to maintain and improve economic 
competitiveness in the face of rapid globalisation and technological change and at the 
same time ensure the welfare of their citizens. Demographic change is one of the main 
challenges European societies are facing in the 21st century. Low fertility rates and 
longer life expectancies lead to populating ageing. Predictions expect a fall in the size 
of the working-age population (15-64 years) of the 25 EU Member States by 48 
million by 2050. The dependency ratio is expected to double and to reach 51 per cent 
by 2050, which means that the European Union will change from having four to only 
two persons of working age for each citizen aged 65 and above (COM (2006) 571 final 
p.4). In response to the demographic challenge, the European Commission has 
advocated to promote demographic renewal in Europe by encouraging families to have 
the number of children they desire (Ibid.). Demographic change requires:  
efforts to allow those men and women who wish to work and to raise families 
to have children without having to sacrifice their careers, by promoting gender 
equality and by facilitating the reconciliation of work, family and private life, 
taking into consideration the equal participation of fathers in family tasks 
(Council of the European Union 2007 p.2). 
The example of demographic change illustrates that while it is in the long-term interest 
of welfare states to promote the reconciliation of work and family life, it is not 
necessarily in the immediate interest of employers, whose managerial decisions tend to 
be directed by short-term objectives. In theory, there are benefits to employers that 
have been associated with the provision of workplace support for working parents, 
such as improved recruitment and employee retention and a reduction in casual 
absenteeism (Bevan et al. 1999). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) doubts however that the ‘business case alone can be relied upon 
to spread family-friendly workplaces more widely’ (OECD 2007 p.170). There is 
concern that ‘if the provision of workplace support were left to individual and 
collective bargaining, such support will be restricted to a few measures [...] and groups 
of workers in certain sectors’ (Ibid.). This creates access inequalities, which, if left 
unaddressed by government policy, constrain working parents in their attempt to 
reconcile work and family life and might discourage them from having the number of 
children they desire.  
Introduction 
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The aim of this thesis is to explore how this problem of unequal access has been 
addressed by government policy. On the basis of qualitative research on national 
government policy in two European Member States, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, the formulation and design of government strategies to improve access to 
family-friendly working time arrangements is analysed. Family-friendly working time 
policy - as such policy strategies are referred to in this thesis – is a showcase of the 
tensions between family and business interests as control over working time is 
contested. Employers want to retain managerial freedom over the organisation of work 
in order to be able to flexibly respond to market fluctuations. Working parents on the 
other hand wish to have greater flexibility in their working hours in order to be able to 
adjust their work and family schedules.  
The family-friendly organisation of working time – as an issue for government policy 
– therefore provides an interesting platform to analyse the way governments deal with 
the challenge of accommodating conflicting interests while pursuing their own policy 
goals. Governments further face the challenge of having only limited capacity to 
directly influence the organisation of working time. Unlike financial transfers to 
families or services, which can be directly provided through the welfare state system, 
flexible working hours are subject to negotiation between employers and employees 
and are therefore beyond the direct control of government. Governments wanting to 
increase access to family-friendly working time arrangements thus face the challenge 
of steering from a distance, by trying to persuade employers to provide flexibility, or 
by empowering employees to negotiate the flexibility they need with their employer.  
The following sections of this chapter outline the growing importance of work-family 
reconciliation on political agendas (I), and discuss the role of government policy in the 
distribution of time, money and services to working parents (II). Working time 
flexibility is very important to parents trying to reconcile work and family life. 
However, flexible working arrangements can be employer-driven. Therefore a certain 
degree of control over working time flexibility by the employee is a necessary criterion 
for family-friendly working time arrangements, which are defined in the third section 
(III), followed by a discussion the research questions, scope of the study and research 
design (IV). The final part of the chapter presents the thesis structure (V).   
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I. The reconciliation of work and family life on government agendas 
The need to reconcile work and family responsibilities has been defined as a ‘new 
social risk’ in post-industrial, mature welfare states (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Bonoli 2005; 
Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). Those unable to juggle work and care are at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion. Policy measures improving the compatibility of work 
and care have moved to the core of social policy agendas, and from feminist 
scholarship to the mainstream of social policy research (Korpi 2000; Esping-Andersen 
2002; Bonoli 2006). In the early 2000s, the compatibility of paid employment and care 
has been a crucial issue on both European Union and domestic policy agendas. In the 
past, the British and German governments considered the negotiation of working time 
flexibility as the responsibility, and right, of management and labour, whose collective 
bargaining autonomy over the terms and conditions of employment was institutionally 
protected (O'Reilly and Spee 1998; Anxo and O'Reilly 2000). Governments did not 
consider it their appropriate role to interfere. Since the mid 1990s, however, this 
attitude has changed. Both governments have started to promote a more family-
friendly organisation of work in the broader context of creating a supportive 
infrastructure for the reconciliation of paid work and family responsibilities. In 
attempting to interfere in the realm of working time, they were faced with employer 
resistance, institutional constraints and ideational conflict over the neo-liberal claim 
that state interference in (labour) market mechanisms has a negative impact on 
employment, economic growth and global competitiveness (DIHK 2001; Lea 2001). 
What triggered the reconceptualisation of working time flexibility from an issue best 
left to management and labour to agree on, to an issue that governments should also 
address? Why did the issue of family-unfriendly working time practices become a 
‘problem’ on policy agendas? 
One answer to these questions lies in the pressures created by social, demographic, and 
economic developments (Hantrais 2004). Over the past decades, women’s education 
and professional qualification levels in Europe have increased strongly. Female labour 
market participation rates have risen continually since the 1960s aided by the 
progressive dismantling of formal institutional constraints to women’s educational and 
professional opportunities relative to men’s through the outlawing of sex 
discrimination in education and employment (Hakim 2000). Women’s growing share 
in employment, rising educational attainment, effective control of their fertility and 
Introduction 
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growing career aspirations has been paralleled by a decline in birth rates, rising divorce 
rates, and changing family structures (OECD 2007). These developments are 
accumulating in child-poor and ageing societies, particularly in Germany (Pack et al. 
2000). In the UK, growing numbers of children are affected by poverty, many of 
whom are growing up in single-parent families (Sutherland 2002). These social and 
demographic developments in turn have led to political scares of ‘demographic time 
bombs’ looming over shrinking future generations. These are faced with problems 
such as high dependency ratios, labour shortages, and rising pension and health care 
costs that are associated with ageing societies, threatening the sustainability of the 
welfare state. Child poverty and labour market barriers for parents, especially single 
parents lacking access to a breadwinner in the family, have increased concerns about 
social exclusion in the UK (DSS 1999). In both countries, these developments have 
both fuelled and necessitated the continuously growing number of women in 
employment. 
The use of women’s human capital and labour force is of growing economic and 
political importance as their inclusion in the national labour and talent pool is called 
for in response to demographically anticipated labour shortages (Rürup and Gruescu 
2003). Their contribution to national social security and insurance funds is needed in 
the face of rising dependency ratios (Barr 2001). Women’s own career aspirations and 
desire for economic independence have grown (Hakim 2000). A minority of families 
express a preference for the traditional ‘male breadwinner’ family arrangement (OECD 
2001a). With falling wages and rising living standard aspirations, many families 
cannot afford the income of a single breadwinner. In consequence, the proportion of 
dual-earner families has continually grown over the years, increasing the number of 
workers with substantial care responsibilities. 
Despite women’s attraction to employment, and attractiveness as workers, 
comparatively little has changed in the unequal distribution of family care 
responsibilities (Gershuny et al. 1994; Gershuny and Sullivan 2003). Women still 
shoulder a disproportionate share of unpaid family care and household chores (Sullivan 
2000). The unequal sharing of paid employment and unpaid family work between men 
and women, long identified as a fundamental barrier to gender equality by feminist 
scholars, was for a long time considered a private family decision by the British and 
German governments (Daly 2000; Scheiwe 2000; Daly and Rake 2003). The 
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importance of women’s labour force participation raised the question of what 
governments can do to facilitate the reconciliation of paid work and family care 
responsibilities increasingly preoccupies policy makers at the European and national 
level. The ‘problem’ of work-family reconciliation has moved from being considered a 
private problem solved by the family, to being defined as a societal problem, which, if 
left unaddressed, will incur significant societal costs. These include a growing 
dependency ratio through falling birth rates, strain on social security systems, social 
exclusion and child poverty. While the recognition of the problematic of unsupportive 
framework conditions and the prevailing unequal gender division of labour are not new 
revelations in the political sphere, the issues had hitherto largely been confined to the 
social justice (gender equality) agenda and remained marginal to mainstream politics. 
The economic dimensions of the reconciliation problem, however, which have 
received growing attention since the late 1990s, have helped to push the reconciliation 
of paid work and family responsibilities to the centre stage of political agendas (Rürup 
and Gruescu 2003; Stratigaki 2004). The policy goal of increasing the provision of 
family leaves and childcare services, for instance, has been incorporated into European 
Employment Guidelines and National Action Plans (European Commission 1998). 
The reconciliation of paid work and family responsibilities can be at once defined as a 
policy goal in its own right, and as a means to reaching other societal goals (OECD 
2002). In its own right, successful work-family reconciliation enables individuals to 
‘increase the living standard for their family, fulfil individual aspirations to have both a 
career and family, and to give their children the care and support they need’ (OECD 
2002 p.3). Its importance to policy makers lies in the fact that the reconciliation of 
work and family life is instrumental to reaching a number of other policy goals. In the 
UK, for instance, it was fundamental to New Labour’s social inclusion and poverty 
reduction agendas (HM Treasury 2004a). In Germany, gender equality considerations 
and later demographic change, in particular growing childlessness among qualified 
women and the related macro-economic implications, were major policy justifications 
for government intervention for an improvement of work-family reconciliation (Rürup 
and Gruescu 2003; Bertram et al. 2005). How government policy can provide support 
through the allocation of resources, providing both ‘time to care’ and ‘time to work’ is 
subject of the following section.  
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II. The role of government policy in facilitating work-family reconciliation 
Government policies aimed at facilitating the reconciliation of paid work and family 
life, referred to hereafter as ‘reconciliation policies’, address two essential functions of 
the family: to provide economic security and care for its members. In modern welfare 
states, the dual function of economic provision - in today’s society mainly through the 
engagement in paid employment - and the provision of care for children, the sick, 
disabled and the elderly are shared between members of family units on the one hand, 
and between individuals, the state, the market and civil society on the other hand 
(O'Connor et al. 1999). Reconciliation policies can provide the resources needed in 
order to combine paid work with family care. The comparative welfare state literature 
focusing on the work/family interface commonly includes financial transfers (Daly 
2000; Dingeldey 2000; Montanari 2000), entitlements to family leaves (Bruning and 
Plantenga 1999; Leitner 2003b), the provision or funding of child and elder care 
services (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996; Lewis 1998; Mahon 2002; Bettio and Plantenga 
2004) and the regulation of working time (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Gornick and 
Heron 2006) as key elements of reconciliation policy. These elements can be 
summarised under three resource categories: ‘time’, ‘money’, and ‘services’. These 
resources have been identified as crucial dimensions in securing an individual’s 
‘genuine choice’ to engage in paid work and/or unpaid care (Lewis 2006 p.111).  
By modifying the availability of resources to families, reconciliation policies can 
influence the choices individuals make with regard to how much time they allocate to 
care and to work (Gornick and Meyers 2003). ‘Time’ is a useful analytical tool for the 
analysis of the work/family interface (Pillinger 2000). In the context of work-family 
reconciliation, time can be conceptually divided into ‘time to work’ and ‘time to 
care’ (Knijn and Kremer 1997; Gornick and Meyers 2003). At one extreme of 
providing ‘time to care’ stand family leave policies which imply a temporary 
withdrawal from work and the re-allocation of time from paid work to family care. At 
the other extreme, ‘time to work’ is provided through the externalisation of care from 
the parent to someone else, enabling employment on a full-time basis. Family-friendly 
working time policy is located in between those two solutions, as it aims to provide 
both ‘time to care’ and ‘time to work’ for working parents through the reduction of 
working time and/or flexible working time scheduling, thereby enabling a flexible 
adjustment of work and care responsibilities. This conceptualisation makes it possible 
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to indicate the degree to which either the unpaid care within the family or the 
employment participation of individuals with family responsibilities is prioritised. 
Figure 1 illustrates alternative policy options along a continuum ranging from ‘time to 
care’ to ‘time to work’ orientations. Although both ‘time to care’ and ‘time to work’ 
resources are necessary for genuine choice in the allocation of time to working and 
caring, in the practice of policy making, they often are competing rather than 
complementary policy solutions to the problem of work-family reconciliation. 
Government resources are rarely allocated equally across the continuum, leading to 
certain work-family arrangements to be more facilitated than others. 
Figure 1: Alternative policy solutions to address the problem of work-family 
reconciliation 
Policy orientation ‘Time to care’  ‘Time to work’ 
Policy example Family leave Family-friendly 
working time 
policy 
Care Services 
Associated work-
family arrangement 
Breadwinner/family 
carer model 
Dual-earner / 
dual-carer 
model 
Dual-earner/ 
externalised care 
model 
 
The distinction between ‘time to care’ and ‘time to work’ policy orientations is 
associated with different models of work-family reconciliation which are distinguished 
in the comparative feminist gender regime literature (Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1994a; 
Crompton 1999; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Leitner 2003b). The literature commonly 
distinguishes between a strict gender division of labour at one extreme, where women 
assume full responsibility for family care in the home supported by the financial 
income of a full-time male breadwinner, and an adult worker model (Lewis 2001a; 
Lewis and Guillari 2005), or dual-breadwinner model (Crompton 1999), at the other 
extreme, where family care is externalised to such an extent that individuals with care 
responsibilities are able to engage in full-time employment. Between these two 
extremes lies the ‘dual-earner/dual-carer’ model in which both men and women 
assume both earning and caring responsibilities (Crompton 1999). This work-family 
arrangement makes the equal sharing of work and care responsibilities between men 
and women, and a more equal allocation of time possible, and therefore represents an 
ideal-typical reconciliation scenario viewed from a gender equality perspective (Fraser 
1997; Rubery et al. 1998). Family-friendly working time policy can serve this ideal-
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typical gender arrangement if it is aimed at increasing men’s share in family care. 
Where is it targeted solely at enabling women’s labour market participation through 
the externalisation of care rather an equal sharing of care between men and women, 
family-friendly working time policy serves a shift towards the dual-earner/externalised 
care model, thereby failing to address gender equity in family care (Threlfall 2000). 
The way resources are distributed indicates which option is encouraged. 
Time as a ‘resource’ needed for both paid work and unpaid care does not exist 
independently. It is created by being backed up either by money or by care for 
individuals within the family unit enabling reallocation of time from one to the other. 
A worker who through her or his gainful employment provides economically for the 
family can only ‘afford’ to divert some or all of the time otherwise engaged in paid 
work towards unpaid care, if the financial needs of the family are otherwise met. The 
dedication of time to unpaid family care can be supported through the division of 
responsibilities within the family unit, if another family member provides the financial 
income needed (spouse or parent), through financial transfers from insurance funds 
(health or care insurance), employers (work-related benefits), or the state (via the 
benefit and taxation channels). The state is only one of many resource providers within 
the complex net of family-state-employer-market relations. However, in its ability to 
allocate resources universally, irrespective of family constellations, employment 
relations, and market provisions, government policy can go some way to redress 
structural constraints on choice based on the unequal access to resources.  
This thesis focuses on the role of government policy in improving individual access to, 
and employer provision of, family-friendly working time arrangements. Although there 
has been a trend towards a more flexible organisation of working time over the past 
decades, this development has not always been to the benefit of employees, 
particularly for workers with care responsibilities. The following section explores the 
role of working time flexibility in the reconciliation of work and family life. It 
highlights the contested nature of working time flexibility between employer and 
employee interests and derives a definition of family-friendly working time 
arrangements. 
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III. Family-friendly working time arrangements: a definition 
Working time flexibility is important for parents as it can provide both time to meet 
family responsibilities and flexibility to adjust working hours to the particular timing of 
family schedules, synchronising with the opening hours of day care facilities, doctor 
appointments, school plays, or family emergencies (Rürup and Gruescu 2005). In a 
German study on the expectations of working parents towards their employers, 36% of 
women and 28% of men with care responsibilities saw the greatest need for action in 
terms of providing family-friendly flexible working hours (Klenner 2004a). The 
possibility of starting work half an hour later in the mornings to be able to drop the 
children at the nursery before driving to work prevents what could otherwise be an 
insurmountable time clash of work and care demands. The possibility of working part-
time hours in the mornings allows large numbers of mothers of school age children to 
be at home when their children come home from school. While the focus here lies on 
working parents and their time needs in reconciling work with family responsibilities, 
flexible working time arrangements also benefit workers without caring 
responsibilities who want to reduce work stress for health reasons or in transition to 
retirement, or who want to have time for other activities such as education or training, 
voluntary work and their social life (Jones 2003). 
Working time flexibility can be defined in relation to the given working time norm, 
such as a standard, full-time, ‘9-5’ working day, or a ‘Monday to Friday’ working 
week. What is considered the norm, or working time standard, has varied over time, 
and also differs between industrial sectors, workplaces and across countries (Linne 
2002; DIHK 2004). The European Working Conditions Survey 2000 defined a 
'standard weekdays' work schedule as daytime, under 10 hours and excluding week-
end work (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 2003). Even though the notion of 'normal' working time cannot be 
generalised across industrial sectors and societies, it serves as a heuristic reference 
point for defining 'flexible' working time arrangements. Flexible working time 
arrangements deviate from this norm either in terms of length of working hours, that is 
working more, or less, hours than what is defined as the standard amount, or in terms 
of the distribution of working hours, for instance where the regular number of hours is 
worked, but at different times of the day, or on different days of the week, month or 
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year. Figure 2 provides an overview of the types of flexible working time 
arrangements1. 
Figure 2: Examples of flexible working time arrangements 
VARIATION IN THE LENGTH OF 
WORKING TIME 
VARIATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
WORKING TIME 
Overtime 
Temporary reduced hours working 
Job sharing  
Part-time work 
Flexible start and finishing times 
Staggered working hours 
Time off in lieu 
Compressed working week 
Shift work 
Week-end working 
Annualised hours (Term-time working) 
 
While the increase in flexibility in both length and distribution of working hours 
creates opportunities for work-family reconciliation, these flexibility gains have not 
always been in the interest of employees. Working time practices have undergone a 
transition to increasingly flexible working hours over recent decades, ranging from 
very short to very long hours, and a flexible distribution of working hours across the 
day, week, month or even year. The growth in part-time employment over the past 
decades has been an important development in terms of providing individuals with 
caring responsibilities with the option of entering employment or re-allocating time 
from employment to family care. However, the shift from full-time to part-time 
employment often implies a ‘part-time penalty’ that goes beyond the pro-rata reduction 
in income (Equal Opportunities Commission 2005b). Compared to full-time workers, 
part-time workers face penalisations in terms of career progression, and until recent 
statutory reforms, part-time workers did not have the same access as full time workers 
to occupational pensions, and other benefits such as access to training (O'Reilly and 
Fagan 1998; Ginn et al. 2001). The availability of part-time employment predominates 
in low-status, low-paid jobs and is still relatively rare in management and the 
professions, with the result that many working parents who decide to reduce the time 
dedicated to paid work have to quit their jobs and work under their potential and 
qualification (Equal Opportunities Commission 2005a). Part-time employment is 
heavily gendered as it has predominantly been adopted in female-dominated job areas 
                                                 
1 For definitions for each form of flexible working time arrangements consult Appendix G. 
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while male-dominated sectors rely on overtime and new shift patterns for working time 
flexibility (see for example Smith et al. 1998 p.52; O'Reilly and Bothfeld 2002; Equal 
Opportunities Commission 2005b). Where women’s part-time opportunities come at 
the cost of low earnings, the loss of earnings is often compensated by very long hours 
worked by men assuming the primary bread-winning role in the family.  
Flexible work schedules which involve shift working, evening, nights and week-end 
work can in some cases facilitate care arrangements within the family by enabling 
‘split-shift’ parenting where parents work alternating shifts and take turns in childcare 
(Presser 1999). However, where family members are not available for childcare, shift, 
evening and week-end workers can face incompatibility between their work schedules 
and the operation hours of childcare providers (Le Bihan and Martin 2004). Further, a 
growing body of research is pointing to the detrimental effects on marriage and family 
life where work increasingly intrudes the traditional periods of ‘family’ or ‘social’ time 
(La Valle et al. 2002; Presser 1999, 2003).  
The growing flexibility of business and working hours has also increased expectations 
towards employees to be flexibly available for work (Perrons 1999). This has a 
negative impact on the predictability of working time, and also blurs the boundaries 
between work and non-work time (Rubery et al. 2005). New technologies such as 
email, remote desktop access via the internet, and mobile phones, allows work to 
increasingly intrude into private life at the same time as creating opportunities for 
working from home or away from one’s usual place of work. One of the consequences 
is that employees are increasingly 'on call' and expected to keep up with their emails 
during their free time or to answer work-related phone calls. The timing of the 
intrusion of work demands becomes unpredictable (Everingham 2002). The advance 
planning of care arrangements, however, requires the predictability of working hours 
(European Commission 2000; Le Bihan and Martin 2004). 
The literature reviewed indicates that flexibility gains in working practices are a mixed 
blessing for working parents. Individuals may choose to work very short or long hours, 
at unsociable times if these working time patterns allow them to better adjust 
employment responsibilities with their care responsibilities. Overtime and atypical 
work schedules can however have a detrimental effect on work-family compatibility if 
the length and distribution of working hours is not oriented at the reconciliation needs 
of employees but dictated by business needs. Long working hours, 'unsocial schedules' 
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(long days or working during the evening/night) and high work intensity have been 
shown to have a negative effect on work-family reconciliation (Fagan and Burchell 
2002). The ambiguous role of working time flexibility for working parents is due to the 
fact that working time flexibility is not always conducive to the reconciliation of 
employment and care responsibilities. As Pärnänen and colleagues put it:  
To an individual, flexibility can mean both desirable and undesirable working 
time arrangements. At best, it offers the employee the possibility to adjust 
his/her working hours to suit personal and family needs. At worst, it means that 
one has to be flexible – work harder, longer and at inconvenient times – to meet 
the demands of the employer, without having a say oneself (Pärnänen et al. 
2005 p.11) 
The flexibility requirements of employers and employees often diverge and can be in 
conflict (European Commission 2000). It is therefore important to define the criteria 
which distinguish employee-oriented from employer-oriented working time flexibility2 
to arrive at a definition of family-friendly working time arrangements. Employer-
oriented flexibility, which is adjusted to market fluctuations, operational requirements, 
and client needs rather than the time preferences of the employee, is beyond the control 
of employees and does not take their time needs into consideration. In contrast, 
employee-oriented working time flexibility implies that working time is arranged to 
meet the time needs of the employee. It implies that employees have a certain degree 
of control over the type of variation from the standard working time (Berg et al. 2004), 
be it in terms of the number of hours (working more or less hours) or in terms of their 
distribution (for example flexible start and finishing times, flexible distribution of 
working hours over the working week, month or year). Working time predictability, as 
well as flexibility, is an important issue to consider when defining employee-oriented 
working time arrangements (Le Bihan and Martin 2004; Rürup and Gruescu 2005). 
Predictability of working hours means that work schedules do not change at short 
notice and are known to the employee well in advance (Pärnänen et al. 2005).  
Based on these defining characteristics, family-friendly working time arrangements 
shall be defined as: employee-oriented working time arrangements that provide 
working parents with the time, flexibility, and predictability needed in their effort to 
reconcile employment with family responsibilities. 
                                                 
2 From the perspective of employees, Pärnänen et al (2005) distinguish between positive and negative 
flexibility where positive flexibility refers to the possibility of using flexible working time for one's own 
needs, whereas negative flexibility is dictated by one's tasks or supervisor. 
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Family-friendly working time arrangements include reduced working hours (part-time, 
term-time working, school hours working, voluntary reduction of hours, job sharing) 
and changed work schedules (flexi-time, compressed working week, annualised hours, 
staggered working hours, shift working, time off in lieu). Discussions of family-
friendly working time arrangements often include alternative work locations (home or 
tele-working) as these also contribute to employee control over their working time as 
well as periods of family-related leave. Family leaves are for the purpose of  this thesis 
excluded from the definition of family-friendly working time arrangements as they 
represent a temporary exit from employment rather than facilitating the simultaneous 
combination of employment with care responsibilities.    
In this thesis, the term family-friendly working time is used to highlight the particular 
relevance of employee-oriented working time arrangements for working parents. The 
use of the term ‘family-friendly’ has become subject to debate in the literature. 
Increasingly, it is being replaced by the term 'work-life balance' which refers more 
broadly to a balance between work and private life, irrespective of the presence of 
caring responsibilities (DfEE 2000a), or ‘work/personal life integration’ (Rapoport et 
al. 2002), which is being advocated to replace the misleading term ‘balance’. This 
more holistic approach is associated with the growing demand for universal access to 
flexible working arrangements and a concern for both work-family 'backlash' and the 
marginalisation of flexible workers through ‘mommy tracks’ (Lewis 1997; Young 
1999). As the time needs of working parents are of concern in this thesis, the term 
'family-friendly' seems more suitable than work-life balance.  
The discussion of the diverging time interests between employers and employees has 
highlighted that in addition to gender arrangements in the allocation of time to earning 
and caring, power relations in the workplace play a key role in determining individual 
access to family-friendly working time arrangements. Family-friendly working time 
arrangements are a key resource facilitating the reconciliation of work and family life. 
However, access is constrained by a number of factors, not all of which are always or 
adequately addressed by government policy.  
Within the context of work-family reconciliation, the focus of this thesis lies on the 
policy strategies pursued by the German and British governments to increase access to 
family-friendly working time arrangements, the design of which can have important 
implications for both gender and employment relations. The next section specifies the 
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research questions of this thesis and the analytical approach chosen to address them. 
This is then followed by a section on data collection. Finally, the choice of a cross-
national two-country comparison, the choice of countries and the time frame of 
analysis are explained.  
IV. Research Design 
Research question and analytical approach 
The research presented in this thesis has been guided by the following research 
question: 
What policy strategies did the British and German governments pursue to improve 
access to family-friendly working time arrangements, in what ways did they differ, and 
why? 
The first component of the research question is exploratory. As family-friendly 
working time policy developed as a new policy field in both Germany and the United 
Kingdom, the first objective of the thesis was to explore how the two governments 
addressed the problem of insufficient and unequal access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements in the face of conflicting interest group demands. In the policy 
debates preceding policy formation and implementation, the question of the 
appropriate policy strategy used to achieve greater family-friendliness was contested. 
The choice between regulating change through legislation or encouraging voluntary 
change through information and persuasion, rather than coercion, was subject to fierce 
policy debate and polarised interest group positions (CBI 2001; TUC 2001; Wilson 
and Harris 2001). Drawing on the instrument choice literature (Woodside 1986; Linder 
and Peters 1989; Vedung 2003), policy strategies were explored by surveying the 
government resources employed, differentiating, following Vedung (2003), between 
legislative reforms (regulation), financial incentives (economic means) and 
information campaigns (information) (see Chapter Three).  
Through allocating reconciliation resources of ‘time’, ‘money’, and ‘services’, 
government policy facilitates either male-breadwinner/female carer, dual-earner/dual-
carer or dual-earner/externalised care arrangements (Crompton 1999; Lewis 2001a). 
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Within the wider context of reconciliation policy packages of which family-friendly 
working time policy was part, the thesis explores: 
What work-family arrangements were facilitated by family-friendly working time 
policy? 
The second component of the research question, which aims to analyse the ways in 
which the British and German policy strategies differed, is comparative. Given the 
contested nature of working time flexibility between business and family time 
demands, the comparative analysis seeks to find out the potential of the different 
approaches to enable working parents to exert more control over working time 
flexibility. The difference between the two strategies is analysed in terms of their 
empowering potential: 
What were the differences in the empowering potential to working mothers and 
fathers? 
Five comparative indicators were developed to enable a systematic comparison of the 
‘empowering potential’ of individual policy measures indicating the degree of ‘family-
friendliness’ of family-friendly working time policy (see Chapter Three). These five 
Empowerment Criteria explore who benefits (breadth of coverage), whether policies 
address working parents directly or via intermediary actors (precision of targeting), the 
degree to which working parents have control over the type of flexibility of their 
working time arrangements (scope of employee control over working time flexibility), 
whether employee preferences can be enforced in the face of employer opposition 
(enforceability), and finally, whether policies address the opportunity costs attached to 
flexible working time arrangements, such as detrimental treatment or financial loss 
(opportunity costs). The framework is applied to two comparative case-studies of 
policy design. Chapter Six analyses the empowering potential of the design of German 
and British employment rights followed by the comparative analysis of information 
campaigns in Chapter Seven. These cases were chosen because they fall into distinct 
instrument categories - regulation and information - and they represent two distinct 
targeting strategies. Employment rights are directly targeted at working parents, 
whereas the information campaigns were addressed at employers, encouraging 
voluntary provision of family-friendly working time arrangements. 
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The third component of the research question which aims to find out why the policy 
strategies differed is explanatory. It seeks explanations for variation in the empowering 
potential of family-friendly working time policy strategies. Over-time changes in the 
‘empowering potential’ of policy strategies as well as cross-national variation are 
explained with reference to the ideas and interests of actors involved in the policy 
process, and the nature of interactions between them. Policy makers mediate between 
conflicting societal interests which either favour or oppose empowering interventions. 
Yet, they are not neutral but share the wider ‘normative and cognitive frames’ with 
societal actors, with whom they interact (Surel 2000). Two propositions derived from 
the policy making literature guide the analysis of policy choices: first, policy makers 
are assumed to be more likely to opt for policy instruments which are congruent with 
their wider normative and cognitive frames, and second, policy makers are assumed to 
be more likely to accommodate interest group demands if they are in a relationship of 
interdependence. While policy choices are driven by the ideas and interests of actors, 
they are mediated by first, the policy context within which choices are made, which 
consists of both the policy legacies on which new policy builds and the policy goals 
which it serves, and second, the institutional context within which actors operate and 
which shapes the opportunities of different actors to influence policy (Heclo 1974; 
Immergut 1992).  
Scope of the study 
There are limits to the scope of this investigation which need to be clarified. The 
analysis focuses on government policy aimed at improving access to family-friendly 
working time arrangements at the workplace level. It is limited to national government 
policy. Although regional and local governments play an important role in advancing 
family-friendly workplace policies through information services and cooperation with 
local employers, a differentiated analysis of these levels of government would have 
gone beyond the manageable scope of this thesis and was therefore excluded. The 
analytical focus lies on policy formulation and design. The investigation of policy 
implementation at the workplace level and access implications for working parents in 
terms of policy outcomes are not subject of this study.  
The analysis of family-friendly working time policy focuses on policies directed at 
parents. Flexible working time arrangements are important to all workers with care 
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responsibilities including caring for ill and frail relatives, friends and neighbours. 
Many of the arguments made in this thesis have broader relevance for these groups of 
carers. However, in order to contain the scope of reconciliation policies for 
comparative analysis, only those policies targeted at parents were included. The 
primary concern of this thesis relates to the time needs of employed parents. Policies 
directed at parents who are currently excluded from employment due to the lack of 
flexible working time arrangements and childcare services were not included in the 
policy analysis. Having formulated the research questions and clarified the scope of 
this study, the next section discusses the data base of this research.  
Research methods and data collection 
The primary research conducted for this thesis consisted in documentary analysis 
complemented by 32 expert interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, 16 in each 
country. In order to increase the validity and reliability of the interpretations made, a 
number of different data sources were used, following the principle of research 
triangulation (Bryman 2001).  
Access to data sources varied strongly by policy type, linked to the different policy 
processes associated with their development. In both countries, the development of 
regulation through the parliamentary process was formally documented. Parliamentary 
minutes, Bills and regulations, select committee reports, and public hearings were 
available for download from government websites3. The use of economic means, such 
as tax allowances or benefits was traceable through the publications of annual budgets 
as well as government publications on family policy developments. More difficulty 
was encountered in accessing information on the development of information 
campaigns. Contrary to statutory legislation, information campaigns were developed 
by civil servants at the level of government departments. Documentary evidence on the 
development process was internal and not released for research purposes. Personal 
interviews with civil servants and stakeholders were used to obtain information on the 
process of policy development as well as its content, which was then complemented by 
the analysis of government publications such as consultation papers, policy statements 
and press releases.  
                                                 
3 For Germany, www.bundestag.de and www.parliament.uk for the United Kingdom. 
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A multitude of actors both within and outside government were involved in the process 
of policy formulation, instrument selection and design. Different policy making 
practices in each country led to different constellations of actors to be involved in the 
policy making process. I identified actors who were involved in the development of 
family-friendly working time policy on the basis on their documented involvement in 
the policy making process. This included civil servants in charge of developing policy 
programmes in the relevant government departments, ministers and members of 
parliament who participated in parliamentary debates, select committees, and public 
consultations. Interest groups and experts involved in the process were identified on 
the basis of their documented contributions such as consultation responses, policy 
positions, research reports, policy recommendations, and oral evidence during the 
process. Actors were further identified on the basis of their participation in various 
advisory committees, taskforces, and alliances (Appendices C-F).  
Actor perceptions and policy preferences were analysed through a wide range of 
documentary data sources. Web site materials, press releases, newsletters, position 
statements, discussion papers, consultation responses and oral and written evidence to 
parliamentary hearings were analysed in view of identifying the respective policy 
preferences of political parties and interest groups. Discourse oriented analysts have 
emphasised the strategic use of political discourse which can mask real underlying 
intentions (Fischer 2003). Therefore, the strategic context within which policy 
preferences were expressed, and consistency of preferences across several sources, was 
carefully considered in the analysis.  
Expert interviews were conducted with two categories of actors involved in the policy 
making process: first, government actors (civil servants, Members of Parliament) who 
were involved in the policy making process either in the relevant government 
departments or parliamentary committees and second, non-governmental actors 
(experts, interest group representatives) who were involved in the process of policy 
formulation and design through participation in advisory committees, taskforces, and 
alliances.  
Relevant parliamentary actors were identified through parliamentary minutes and 
select committee reports, including members of the governing and opposition parties. 
Civil servants were identified by contacting the relevant government departments. 
Relevant non-governmental actors were identified through consultation responses, and 
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participation in advisory committees which included the main business organisations, 
trade unions, and family and women organisations. Interview partners in the UK were 
chosen among those individuals who were directly involved in the policy making 
process. The UK Government set up the Advisory Committee on Work-Life Balance 
and the Work and Parents Taskforce representing key interest groups. As membership 
on those groups was published, it was possible to identify the participants. In 
Germany, the interest groups involved in the relevant policy measures could be 
identified through joint statements and press releases. The respective work-life 
balance/flexible working experts were contacted for interview by e-mail with follow-
up phone calls.  In the UK, none of the politicians contacted were available for 
interview. The analysis of their policy preferences was consequently based on 
transcripts of speeches and parliamentary minutes. In Germany, two Members of 
Parliament were available for interview, but in neither country government ministers 
could be interviewed. Interviews with policy makers therefore covered primarily civil 
servants who had participated in the design of policy measures. Overall, three civil 
servants were available for interview in the UK, and 13 interest group representatives 
compared to two Members of Parliament, one political party representative, six civil 
servants and seven interest group representatives in Germany. The full list of 
interviews is included in Appendix A. 
Interviews were conducted between July 2005 and October 2006 either face-to-face (in 
25 cases) or over the telephone, where this was more convenient to interviewees (in 
seven cases). The length of interviews varied from twenty minutes to over two hours.  
All interviews were semi-structured with customised interview guidelines. Interviews 
were recorded and in the majority transcribed, coded and organised for analysis using 
the qualitative research and data analysis software NVivo. In order to protect the 
anonymity of the interviewees, I have treated the information obtained through 
interviews primarily to close gaps in my understandings and to verify the plausibility 
of my interpretations based on documentary evidence and the secondary literature. As 
far as possible I have refrained from directly quoting interviewees, as their identity 
could be easily traced even if not directly named in the text. Therefore I have largely 
treated my interview data for triangulation purposes citing as far as possible from 
published sources. All interviewees were assured anonymity in the text and have 
agreed to be listed in the list of informants in Appendix B. 
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Background research on the organisation of care and working time in comparative 
perspective included European labour force data (Eurostat New Cronos), the European 
Employment Options of the Future and Working Conditions surveys (Fagan et al. 
2001; Bielenski et al. 2002; Fagan and Burchell 2002) and work-life balance surveys 
(Hogarth et al. 2001; Flüter-Hoffmann and Solbrig 2003; Woodland et al. 2003; Flüter-
Hoffmann and Seyda 2006; Riedmann et al. 2006). Aggregate data on the coverage of 
employee representation was drawn from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
series in the UK, from 1998 and 2004, which has included more questions on work-life 
balance and family-friendly employment measures in the recent round (Cully et al. 
1999; Kersley et al. 2006). For the German case, data from establishment surveys by 
the Institute for Labour Market and Employment Research (IAB) and the Works and 
Staff Council surveys by the Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) were 
used (Klenner and Lindecke 2003). The European Industrial Relations Observatory has 
produced a number of comparative surveys which provided a useful data source for 
better understanding of the role trade unions and other structures of employee 
representation in the promotion of family-friendly working conditions 
(www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro).  
Having discussed the analytical and methodological approach pursued to address the 
research questions guiding this research, the following section outlines the rationale for 
adopting a comparative, cross-national research perspective and explains the choice of 
countries as well as the time frame considered. 
The comparative framework and choice of countries 
Cross-national comparisons have become increasingly popular in social policy 
research. Comparative studies tend to either cover a small number of cases in 
reasonable depth, or a large number of cases. In the latter case, comparisons are 
generally based on statistical methods, conceptualising countries as representing a 
particular set of quantifiable variables such as levels of GDP, social spending or 
income inequality rates (Clasen 2003 p.94). With reference to Ragin (1991) Clasen 
points out that the analyses within such 'large-n' studies are constructed as co-
variations between generally few variables, while countries as entities beyond these 
variables tend to disappear.  
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In contrast, 'small-n' studies tend to treat countries as multi-dimensional 
backgrounds for comparing the content of, or change within, particular social 
policy programmes or welfare states as a whole. In other words, the latter type 
of research conceptualises national social policies as embedded within 
different, and not always quantifiable, social, political, economic, cultural and 
ideological contexts which impinge on the shape and impact of particular 
policies (Clasen 2003 p.95).  
This is the approach chosen for the present study, focusing on two national case 
studies. 
The merit of a two-country framework as it is applied in this thesis deserves emphasis. 
Working with a small set of units allows the researcher to examine national patterns in 
greater detail and to focus attention on the complexities of small scale as well as large-
scale variations (Daly 2000 p.12).  In the context of research on the welfare state, 
studying two cases in detail is a release from the constraints of 'ideal types' and allows 
to be ‘less concerned with neatness of fit and more with the messy and stubborn 
practices encountered in social reality’ (Ibid.). While allowing the comparison to be 
detailed, a two-country framework retains the advantages of cross-national 
comparison, ‘adding a certain degree of rigour by forcing concepts to travel across 
national frontiers, and compels us to develop a more complex argumentation’ (Ibid.). 
The cross-national comparison of policy design permits the researcher to point to 
variations along certain analytical dimensions such as, in the present study, the policy 
orientations towards certain gender arrangements in the allocation of time to paid work 
and unpaid care, and the relative empowerment of employees to negotiate flexible 
working time arrangements.  
One of the most prominent problems with the 'many variables, small n' design, 
however, is the problem of having to face a multiplicity of possible explanatory 
variables with only a limited set of evidence, leading to the problem of over-
determination (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Findings of small-n studies cannot easily 
be generalised. A cross-national perspective also adds to the methodological problems 
of comparative research generally, such as generating comparable data, identifying 
appropriate concepts which can be applied across countries and achieving a sufficient 
sensitivity towards the different historical and cultural contexts in which national 
social policies are embedded (Clasen 2003). 
Why compare Germany and the UK specifically? When choosing cases for 
comparative research, researchers are confronted with the need to justify their choices 
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(Mau 2003 p.55). The selection of a limited number of cases often follows the logic of 
a 'most similar systems' design based on the belief that systems as similar as possible 
with respect to as many features as possible constitute the optimal sample for 
comparative inquiry. Such a design anticipates that if some important differences are 
found among those otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors that can be 
attributed to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms 
of those differences alone (Przeworski and Teune 1970 p.3). In this ideal conception, 
common systemic variables are conceived of as 'controlled for' whereas inter-systemic 
differences are viewed as explanatory variables.  
To the extent to which variables across systems can be ‘controlled for’, there are a 
number of interesting parallels between Germany and the UK, which make these two 
countries attractive cases for the present comparison. First, both countries are members 
of the European Union and subject to provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
European Union policy directives and guidelines influence employment, working time, 
and equal opportunities policies at the national level (Hantrais 2000).  
Second, both countries have been classified as strong male breadwinner regimes which 
are currently transforming (Lewis 1992; 2001a; Annesley 2003). Whilst classified as 
corporatist and liberal welfare regimes in Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), they have been, albeit for different reasons:  
similarly residual […] as regards family services. Liberals view servicing as a 
natural market activity, as an individual responsibility; conservatives insist that 
it be the prerogative of the families (Esping-Andersen 1999 p.83).  
In the absence of comprehensive day care provision many British and German women 
work part-time (Fagan et al. 2001). In European comparison, both countries are 
characterised by significant gender gaps in working time, due to an above-average 
female part-time employment share and above-average male working hours (Bielenski 
et al. 2002).    
Third, the two countries show political parallels in the recent past. Family policy in 
both countries has recently started to shift from implicitly assuming the male 
breadwinner family model, with a policy focus on financial support, towards actively 
supporting dual-earner families through policy packages in support of work-family 
reconciliation. Work-family reconciliation is no longer considered a private family 
matter, but is now explicitly supported by government policy, such as through the 
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creation and funding of childcare places and an emphasis on reducing employment 
barriers through family-friendly working arrangements. Both countries have recently 
introduced employment rights to working time reduction to increase access to family-
friendly working time arrangements (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Hegewisch 2005; 
Fagan et al. 2006), making them useful case studies for comparison. This shift in 
policy orientation has broadly coincided with the coming to power of centre-left 
parties in 1997 (UK) and 1998 (Germany), in both cases succeeding four legislative 
periods of Conservative/Liberal governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Both Tony 
Blair's New Labour Government and Gerhard Schröder's ‘Red-Green’ Coalition 
Government were re-elected in 2001 and 2002 respectively.  
The parallel change in government in the two countries ‘controls’ for temporal factors 
such as the high reform urge which can be expected from both incoming parties 
following 18 and 16 years in opposition boosted by high expectations for new policy 
reforms by the electorate towards the incoming parties (Bonoli 2005). In this respect, 
the general elections in 1997 and 1998 represent a ‘critical juncture’ in both countries 
opening a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1995) for policy reform. The change in 
government from the political centre-right to the political centre-left allowed for new 
party ideas on the family, care and employment, to shape policy agendas. The much 
discussed Blair/Schröder paper in 1999 outlining the 'new centre/third way' approach 
illustrates the shared understanding regarding the overall direction of welfare reform in 
the two countries (Clasen 2005). This is the broader ideational context within which 
reconciliation policies, including family-friendly working time policy, were pursued 
since the late 1990s. 
Germany and the UK differ, however, when compared on the basis of their national 
political economies, industrial relations systems and working time regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Crouch 1992; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1998; Rubery et al. 1998; Anxo and O'Reilly 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001; Pierson 
2001; Clasen 2005). Hall and Soskice characterised the UK as a liberal market 
economy, whereas Germany represents the prototype of a coordinated market economy 
(Hall and Soskice 2001). With particular reference to working time regimes, O’Reilly 
and Spee distinguished Germany and the UK by their different responses to the 
challenge created by the growth of working time flexibility. Germany was classified as 
a system of ‘negotiated flexibility’ involving the social partners where ‘a moderate 
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level of statutory regulation [...] leaves room for a strong tradition of ‘free’ collective 
bargaining’ (O'Reilly and Spee 1998 p.265). The UK in contrast was classified as a 
system of ‘externally constrained voluntarism’ on the basis of its historically inherited 
industrial relations institutions emphasising free collective bargaining and a minimal 
but universal benefits system (O'Reilly and Spee 1998 p. 270-71), which has 
responded to the challenge of flexibility in a more liberal tradition. This liberal 
tradition, it appears, is associated with longer working time regimes. Rubery and 
colleagues classified countries according to how different aspects of working-time 
regulation and practices constitute a tendency for long working hours and high levels 
of unsocial hours working in a given country. Based on working time data from the 
mid-1990s, they classified Germany as having a moderate working time regime, 
whereas the UK was classified as a particularly long working time regime (Rubery et 
al. 1998). Chapter Two further elaborates on the differences in employment relations 
and working time negotiation and their impact on access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements.  
The time frame delimited for the comparative analysis of government policy spans 
over the two first terms of the New Labour Government between 1997 and 2005 and 
the two terms of the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government from 1998 to 2005. Although 
family-friendly working time flexibility was a subject of political debate throughout 
the 1990s, it was under New Labour and the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition governments that 
significant policy reforms were brought underway, notably the introduction of 
employment rights in 2001 (Germany) and 2003 (UK). Furthermore, it was in 1997 
that the UK agreed to end the opt-out from the European Social Policy Protocol so that 
EU policy provisions applied to both countries during the time span considered. Due to 
the change in government in Germany in 2005, it was decided to place the cut-off 
point there to control for the influence of the ideas of political parties. In order to place 
the policy developments since the change of governments in the late 1990s in historical 
context, relevant policy developments throughout the 1980s and 1990s were included 
in the analysis.  
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V. The structure of the thesis 
Chapter Two discusses concerns of access inequality arising from the uneven spread of 
family-friendly working time arrangements between and within workplaces, drawing 
on an interdisciplinary literature review. The chapter further provides an account of the 
different policy legacies in the areas of working time regulation, employment relations 
and reconciliation policies in the two countries, providing different starting points for 
policy development under the incoming New Labour and ‘Red-Green’ governments in 
the late 1990s. 
Chapter Three develops the comparative framework for the analysis of family-friendly 
working time policy, which revolves around the concept of empowerment. It is 
structured in two parts: the first part explains the method of comparison, deriving five 
criteria from the literature which are used to indicate the ‘empowerment potential’ of a 
given policy strategy. The second part of the chapter discusses the explanatory 
approach for the analysis of cross-national variation in policy choice and design 
derived from the political science literature. Particular explanatory relevance is 
attributed to the ideas and interest of actors and the policy goals which family-friendly 
working time policy is intended to serve, varying opportunities for actors to influence 
policy choice and design within nationally specific institutional settings, and the 
different policy legacies into which new policy developments are integrated.  
Chapters Four and Five provide a chronological analysis of the development of family-
friendly working time policy over time, contextualising policy choices within their 
wider policy agendas, particularly within the wider policy packages developed to 
improve the reconciliation of work and family life. They trace the process of agenda 
setting and policy formation, analyse the policy preferences of policy makers and 
stakeholders, and trace the choices between persuasion and regulation, cooperative and 
authoritative state-business relations between 1997 and 2005.  
While similar policy instruments are used to promote the provision and use of family-
friendly working time arrangements, there are considerable variations in policy design 
which are analysed in depth in Chapters Six and Seven. Using the case studies of 
employment rights in Chapter Six and information campaigns in Chapter Seven, 
differences in policy design and implications for the empowering potential are 
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systematically compared through the five Empowerment Criteria developed in Chapter 
Three. Similarities and differences between policy measures identified in the first part 
of the chapters are then explained in the second part.  
Chapter Eight recapitulates the research questions and discusses the main findings of 
the thesis. The usefulness of the comparative framework applied in this thesis is 
reflected upon and the implications for further research and policy are discussed. 
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2. Access to family-friendly working time arrangements in Germany 
and the United Kingdom  
Access to family-friendly working time arrangements is an important resource for 
working parents trying to combine earning and caring responsibilities. Control over 
working time flexibility however is contested between employers and employees 
whose time needs can be in conflict (Berg et al. 2004). In the absence of universal state 
regulation, access to family-friendly working time arrangements is primarily subject to 
negotiations between employers and employees, and their representatives. 
Asymmetrical power relations in the employment relationship imply that flexibility in 
working patterns is predominantly directed by business needs. Workplace practices 
that do not flexibly accommodate the time needs of working parents represent a 
structural barrier to the successful reconciliation of work and family life, as not all 
working parents who need flexible working hours to accommodate care needs have 
access to them. Access inequalities result in some parents withdrawing from 
employment due to incompatibility of their jobs with the time requirements of their 
children, and other parents experiencing work-family conflict, where the time 
requirements of employment negatively affect family life and child well-being (La 
Valle et al. 2002). The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the access problematic 
within the British and German national and temporal contexts in the late 1990s in order 
to provide an overview of access inequalities in the two countries and of the different 
starting points for policy development under New Labour in the UK and the ‘Red-
Green’ Coalition Government in Germany who took office in 1997 and 1998 
respectively.  
The chapter is structured in two parts. Following a brief discussion of the gendered 
nature of work-family reconciliation patterns of parents in Germany and the UK, the 
first part of the chapter reviews the policy legacies inherited by the incoming 
governments. This policy review traces the origin of family-friendly working time 
policy within the wider policy approaches to work-family reconciliation by the British 
and German Conservative/Liberal governments in the 1980s and 1990s. Neither 
approach proactively encouraged the labour market participation of mothers. Although 
the importance of family-friendly working practices for parents was recognised by 
both governments, policy interventions were limited to information dissemination 
through brochures and conferences. Neither of the two countries universally regulated 
Chapter 2 
39 
 
access to family-friendly working time arrangements, and access inequalities between 
and within workplaces were not systematically addressed.  
The second part of the chapter explores the nature and origin of access inequalities in 
the German and British working time regimes, moving beyond the structuring role of 
government policy to understand how access to family-friendly working time 
arrangements is determined in the absence of universal state regulation. Working time 
regulation and negotiation spans across different levels at which a range of actors are 
involved and interact with each other. In order to gain an understanding of the nature 
and determinants of access inequality, the relative role of these different levels and 
actors in providing access to family-friendly working time arrangements is discussed, 
drawing on the industrial relations literature and work-family research. The discussion 
moves from the European Union policy level, via national regulation and sectoral 
collective bargaining down to the level of the workplace and points to the relative role 
of each level and negotiation practice in shaping access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements. Drawing on the secondary literature, research evidence on the 
cultural and structural causes of access inequalities both between and within 
workplaces is presented.  
I. Reconciliation choices and government policy in the late 1990s 
The gendered allocation of time to earning and caring 
Men and women differ in their time allocation to caring and earning and have different 
time needs. Women are less likely to be in employment than men, and those in 
employment work fewer average hours (Fagan 2001). Women take on the primary 
responsibility for family care and dedicate more time to family care than men (Sullivan 
2000). Family responsibilities therefore affect their labour market participation 
patterns more strongly than men's. In European comparison, the gender gap in working 
hours for both German (9.9) and British (12.0) employees is above European average 
(of 8.5 hours) (Bielenski et al. 2002). Women tend to reallocate time from employment 
to unpaid care when they become mothers, whereas fathers are more likely to remain 
employed, and to work long hours to assume the main breadwinning role for the 
family. Many women (temporarily) leave employment to care for their children full-
time, especially when these are young. This traditional gender arrangement is clearly 
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illustrated by the stark difference of over 30 percentage points in the gender 
employment gap between childless employees and parents of children under three 
(Table 1). Many women return to work as their children grow older, but their 
employment rates remain lower than those of childless women and significantly lower 
than those of fathers. As many mothers in Germany and the UK return to employment 
on a part-time basis, the time allocation between work and care remains highly 
gendered among working parents. Men, who assume the main breadwinning role, 
compensate women’s reduced contribution to earnings through longer working hours. 
Table 1: Women's employment rates and gender employment gap by the presence 
and age of child, 1998 
 No children Child (0-2) Child (3-5) Child (6-14) 
 Employ. 
Rate 
Gender 
Gap 
Employ. 
Rate 
Gender 
Gap 
Employ. 
Rate 
Gender 
Gap 
Employ. 
Rate 
Gender 
Gap 
DE 76.5 3.8 55.7 34.6 59.1 30.3 69.9 18.2 
U
K 
81.5 1.5 60.0 32 61.9 26.4 73.3 13.2 
Base: Persons aged 20-49; Source: European Labour Force Survey, Eurostat New Cronos 1998 
 
A complete exit from employment to care for their children full-time is for many 
women not the preferred family arrangement. The gap between actual and preferred 
time allocation and reconciliation patterns has been highlighted by data from the 
European Employment Options for the Future Survey, conducted in 1998. Table 2 
indicates that many parents are dissatisfied with the strong gender polarisation in 
working time associated with the traditional male breadwinner/female carer model. 
Table 2: Actual and preferred employment patterns among couple families with a 
child under six, 1998 
 UK actual UK preferred Germany 
actual 
Germany 
preferred 
Man FT, Woman FT 24.9 21.3 15.7 32.0 
Man FT, Woman PT 31.9 41.8 23.1 42.9 
Man FT, Woman not 
employed  
32.8 13.3 52.3 5.7 
Other Combination 10.4 23.6 8.9 19.4 
Source: European Employment Options for the Future survey (OECD 2001b Table 4.3, p.136); FT= 
full-time; PT= part-time 
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Over 40 per cent of families would prefer a ‘modernised’ male breadwinner 
arrangement with women working part-time rather than not being employed. The 
discrepancy between actual and preferred reconciliation choices is strongest in 
Germany. In 52.3 per cent of couple families with a pre-school child, mothers were not 
employed, which was the preferred reconciliation choice for only 5.7 per cent of 
families. Although working women still shoulder the bulk of unpaid household and 
care work (Gershuny et al. 1994; Sullivan 2000; OECD 2001a; Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2003), pressure on men to increase their share in unpaid work has grown, 
and the gender time gap in unpaid family work has slightly narrowed over time 
(Gershuny 2000; Sullivan 2000; Yeung et al. 2001). The actual gender division in time 
allocation, however, still lags behind more gender egalitarian attitudes (Beckmann 
2002). Increasingly, fathers desire to play a more active part in the upbringing of their 
children and to participate more fully in family life (Lewis 2000). Table 3 illustrates 
that fathers would prefer significantly shorter working hours than they currently work. 
Table 3: Actual and preferred hours of work of men and women with and without 
children in the same household, 1998 
 With children in the same 
household 
Without children in the same 
household 
 Current 
hours 
Preferred 
hours 
Difference Current 
hours 
Preferred 
hours 
Difference 
UK (men) 46.9 38.3 -8.5 40.6 36.6 -4.1 
UK 
(women) 
28.3 25.8 -2.7 34.3 30.8 -4.2 
DE (men) 43.4 37.4 -6.1 40.8 36.2 -4.7 
DE 
(women) 
28.9 27.8 -1.2 35.4 32.2 -3.3 
Base: Dependent Employees; Source: Employment Options of the Future Survey 1998, Bielenski et al. 
2002, p. 61 
 
The gender division of responsibility for earning and caring is associated with gender 
differences in the type of flexible working time arrangements working parents prefer. 
Mothers tend to request and use shorter working time arrangements that are compatible 
with school and day care operating hours, such as term-time working in the UK, and 
‘half-day’ morning hours matching school hours in Germany. Fathers’ demand for 
Chapter 2 
42 
 
flexibility tends to focus on the distribution, rather than length, of working hours, in 
line with their breadwinning responsibilities. O’Brien and Schemilt’s analysis of 
parents’ demand using data from the UK Work-Life Balance Baseline Study in 2000 
found that fathers were most likely to want access to flexitime (52 per cent), a 
compressed working week (46 per cent) and working at home (40 per cent), compared 
to a much lower proportion of fathers being interested in working time arrangements 
that involve reduced hours and lower earnings (14 per cent job sharing, 22 per cent 
temporary reduced hours working and 22 per cent part-time work). In contrast, 42 per 
cent of mothers wanted term-time working and 44 per cent were interested in working 
part-time (O'Brien and Shemilt 2003). These working time preferences reflect 
structural circumstances favouring the male breadwinner/female part-time earner 
arrangement. 
In international comparative research on work-family reconciliation patterns based on 
variations of the ‘male breadwinner’ model (Lewis 1992), both German and British 
gender work patterns fall within the category of male breadwinner/female part-time 
earner arrangements, in which often low paid, part-time employment is taken up by 
mothers whose earnings contribute to the family income, which depends in its 
substantial part on a male breadwinner (Fagan et al. 2001). This gender time 
arrangement reflects cultural as well as structural contexts. Pfau-Effinger uses the 
concept ‘gender culture’ to refer to ‘common assumptions about the desirable, 
‘normal’ form of gender relations and the division of labour between women and men’ 
(Pfau-Effinger 1998 p.178). The gender culture is reflected by prevailing attitudes 
towards maternal employment of mothers of pre-school children. In 1996, 72 per cent 
of West German women and 80 per cent of West German men fully agreed or agreed 
with the statement that ‘small children would suffer if their mother was employed’4 
(Klammer and Klenner 2003b). In the UK, in 1994, 48.1 per cent of women and 38.1 
per cent of men disagreed with this statement (Scott et al. 1996). Social values and 
norms on gender roles, care and employment partly shape individual preferences 
(Pfau-Effinger 1998; Duncan and Edwards 1999). Individual preferences may also be 
mediated by structural determinants5 (Crompton 2006). 
                                                 
4 Only 49 per cent of East German men and women agreed with this statement, reflecting the socialist 
norm of female employment.  
5 There is a vivid debate in the literature on the significance of individual choice versus social structure 
in decisions about work and care. See for example Catherine Hakim’s Preference Theory (Hakim 2000). 
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The structural context shaping gender time arrangements includes a variety of 
individual characteristics such as educational attainment and employment status and 
income (Crompton 2006). Against the backdrop of prevailing gender wage gaps in 
both countries, women’s income in most families is lower than men’s (Corneließen 
2005). Women’s working time reduction from full to part-time employment or even to 
full-time care therefore incurs a lower relative loss in family income compared to 
men’s (O'Brien and Shemilt 2003). The financial implications of working time 
reduction and unpaid leave, especially, has been cited in numerous studies as a major 
deterrent to take-up (see for example Vaskovics and Rost 1999; Yeandle et al. 2002). 
Especially men, who still assume the main breadwinning role in families, may feel 
unable to reduce their working time if this involves a loss in their earnings. 
Government policy can redress or reinforce these structural determinants. 
Government policy and work-family arrangements 
Government policy contributes to the structuring of reconciliation choices by 
mediating the financial, time, and care resources that are available to families, 
providing parents with ‘time to work’ as well as providing access to ‘time to care’ and 
making it financially affordable. A key structural determinant for women’s 
employment is access to affordable, good quality childcare, as the externalisation of 
care enables mothers to remain in employment after childbirth and to return after a 
period of family leave (Beckmann 2001a). Childcare provision was low in both 
Germany and the UK in the late 1990s when New Labour and the Social Democrats 
came to power. Time to care is provided through statutory entitlements to family leave 
or working time reduction and financial resources for parents towards childcare costs 
are provided through nationally specific benefit, tax and social insurance structures 
(Fagan 2000; Garhammer 2000) (Dingeldey 2002). In the following section, 
reconciliation policies of the 1980s and 1990s will be briefly reviewed, providing the 
backdrop for policy developments discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Reconciliation policies in the United Kingdom 
In the UK, the role of government in providing a resource infrastructure for the 
reconciliation of paid work and family responsibilities was minimal until the late 
1990s based on a liberal understanding of the residual welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
1999) and the historical view that the problem of reconciling work and family was a 
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private decision (Lewis 2003). In the absence of an explicit family - or work-family 
reconciliation - policy, financial support directed at families through the tax and 
benefit system, such as the Family Income Supplement introduced in 1970, and later 
replaced by the Family Credit in 1988, was in the majority aimed at poverty reduction 
and targeted at low income families. Child Benefit, replacing previous family 
allowances and tax exemptions in 1977 formed the main source of general financial 
family support, paid irrespective of parental employment status to the main carer 
(Clasen 2005).  
Public child day-care provision under the Conservative governments over the 1980s 
and 1990s was minimal (Randall 1999). The Conservative Government saw its 
responsibility in 'ensur[ing] acceptable standards of service and general guidance on 
good practice and standards' (UN CEDAW 1995), but not in the provision of a public 
care service infrastructure. Service provision for working parents was led by the 
private and voluntary sectors (Cohen 1990). Public service provision by local 
authorities was reserved for children in need (Randall 2000). A policy shift towards a 
somewhat more employment-facilitating child care policy started to emerge from the 
mid-1990s. In April 1993, the Government launched an Out-of-School Childcare 
Initiative with the overall aim of offering parents of school age children the chance to 
participate more fully in the labour market, by increasing the quantity and quality of 
out of school childcare provision. Between 1993 and 1998, 81,000 out-of-school 
childcare places were created under the initiative (UN CEDAW 1999 p.12). In October 
1994, a Childcare Disregard for registered day care for working parents claiming in-
work social security benefits was introduced, followed in the same year by the 
Conservative Government committing to providing a pre-school place for every four-
year-old whose parents wanted it. A childcare voucher system was introduced in 1996 
for part-time early education (Lewis 2003).  
The Conservative Party had a liberal, non-interventionist interpretation of the role of 
the state with regard to employment relations which also determined the British 
approach to family-friendly working time policy during this era. Family-friendly 
employment rights were restricted to minimal maternity protection. Prompted by the 
European Pregnant Workers Directive, the UK introduced 14 weeks of maternity leave 
in the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993. Mothers who had 
worked for their employer for more than two years additionally received the right to 
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return to work any time until 29 weeks after birth. Most of this Additional Maternity 
Leave was however unpaid. Mothers qualifying for Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) 
received an earnings-related benefit for six weeks (at 90 per cent of previous earnings) 
followed by a flat-rate benefit (£52.50 per week in 1994) for a maximum of 12 weeks. 
There was no equivalent leave entitlement for fathers or carers of adults. 
The Conservative Government recognised the supportive function of family-friendly 
working time and family leave arrangements in parents’ effort to reconcile work and 
family responsibilities and ideationally encouraged such practices. In the early 
nineties, two government booklets on the topic were produced: ‘The Best of Both 
Worlds’ in 1991 and ‘Be Flexible’ in 1993, highlighting the advantages to employers 
and employees alike of such working arrangements as flexible working hours, part-
time jobs and job-sharing. It was not however considered the state's responsibility to 
regulate employment conditions to this purpose, nor was such intervention considered 
desirable. In their report to the UN CEDAW Committee in 1995, the UK Government 
stated on the subject of parental leave that it: ‘should remain, like most other terms and 
conditions of employment, a matter for agreement between parties concerned and not 
for statutory intervention’ (UN CEDAW 1995 p.16). The Conservative Government’s 
position on family-friendly policies was further laid out by Cheryl Gillian, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education and Employment, in a 
parliamentary debate on family-friendly employment in July 1996:  
We believe that businesses should arrive at voluntary arrangements because 
they make economic sense for them. We do not want to burden business with 
excess legislation [...] to attempt to legislate for the introduction of such 
policies would be neither appropriate nor practicable (HC Deb 9 July 1996 vol 
281 c 248).  
In sum, in the late 1990s, there was no general statutory framework in place regulating 
the length or distribution of working hours. Family-oriented government intervention 
in the employment relationship was very minimal and limited to the entitlement to 
maternity leave and pay and the ideational support of voluntary employer-provided 
family-friendly arrangements. When New Labour took office in 1997, the policy 
legacy they inherited from their predecessors was one of minimal statutory provision 
in support of working parents and a strong liberal orientation of minimal government 
intervention in the employment relationship. In Germany, a more explicit family policy 
tradition was in place. 
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Reconciliation policies in Germany 
The German reunification in 1990 brought together two very different reconciliation 
ideals, the male breadwinner/female carer model of West Germany and the dual-earner 
model of East Germany. The post 2nd World War separation of East and West 
Germany between 1961 and 1990 into different political regimes had led to strongly 
diverging paths with regard to the reconciliation of paid work and family 
responsibilities. West German reconciliation choices largely followed the male 
breadwinner/female carer family model with women typically leaving the labour 
market for extended periods of time when becoming mothers to care full time for their 
children. Long career breaks and short part-time work, when the children were older, 
characterised the employment biography of most West German mothers. The state's 
role in the care for, and socialisation of children, in the Federal Republic of Germany 
was conceptualised as subsidiary to the family, in line with Article 6, Section 2 of 
German Basic Law6. Due to the interpretation of Basic Law that the care for children 
was a parental responsibility, combined with the predominant view that young children 
were best cared for in the family, a comprehensive infrastructure of public child care 
provision was not developed (Gerlach 2004b). The public education system was 
developed on a part-time basis complementing the child's socialisation in the family, 
based on an underlying assumption of stay at home mothers. This implied that even 
when children had reached school age, full-time employment was difficult to achieve 
due to part-time, unreliable, school hours and the common practice of sending school 
children home for lunch (Scheiwe 2000). Parents were supported in their responsibility 
for the care and socialisation of children in the form of comparatively generous 
(general) financial transfers through the tax and benefit system 
(Familienlastenausgleich). The spousal income splitting system (Ehegattensplitting) 
introduced in the 1950s provided further financial benefits for married male 
breadwinner families (Dingeldey 2000). In the German Democratic Republic in 
contrast, female labour market participation was explicitly desired and supported by 
the state (Gerlach 1996). Reconciliation choices followed a dual-earner/externalised 
care model and over 91 per cent of women participated in employment (BT-Drs. 
12/7560 1994). This high participation rate was made possible by a comprehensive 
system of public childcare provision and full-day schooling.  
                                                 
6 ‘The care and socialisation of children are the natural right of the parents and their duty…’, Article 6 
(2) German Basic Law, author’s translation. 
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Article 31 of the Unification Treaty (Einigungsvertrag), signed in May 1990, took 
account of theses systemic differences and obliged the unified Government to adjust 
the statutory framework with regards to the reconciliation of paid work and family 
responsibilities. The Child and Youth Support Act passed in 1990 (KJHG) postulated 
that sufficient childcare services should be provided to meet the demand for care 
services for the under-threes and children of school age. Provision should be designed 
in a way as to facilitate the reconciliation of family and employment responsibilities. A 
year later, a further reform introduced a statutory entitlement for childcare for every 
child between the age of three and school age. It was triggered by the need for a new 
regulation of abortion law and the idea that unborn life could be more effectively 
protected by providing pregnant women with a support framework that facilitated their 
decision in favour of the child. It was passed under the Pregnancy and Family Support 
Act (Schwangern-und Jugendhilfegesetz) coming into force in 1996. Due to 
Germany’s federal governing structure, according to which childcare and education 
fall under the responsibility of the Länder, the responsibility for funding and 
implementation of demand-oriented child care services was located at the local level 
(Evers et al. 2005). Financial constraints delayed the full implementation of the 
statutory entitlement for kindergarten places until 1999, and provision was developed 
predominantly on a part-time basis, which offered only limited time for parental 
employment (Scheiwe 2000; Auth 2002).   
Government support for parental care was highlighted by the introduction of parental 
leave in 1986, which was extended to East German parents after reunification. The 1st 
Federal Child Raising Benefit Act in 1986 introduced up to one year of protected 
parental leave, for which, in contrast to British leave entitlements, both fathers and 
mothers were eligible. In order to qualify for the child raising benefit and employment 
protection, the parent on leave could only work up to 18 hours per week, to ensure that 
sufficient time was allocated to the care of the child. This threshold was increased to 
19 hours per week in the 1990 amendment of the Act which also saw the leave 
entitlement extend to 24 months. A second amendment to the Act in 1992 further 
extended the leave entitlement to a total of 36 months up to the child’s third birthday 
(Bothfeld 2005). Parental leave was granted per child. It was not an individualised 
entitlement. Employees, whose partners were not working, were for example not 
entitled to take parental leave, as it was assumed that their partners would be available 
for child care in the home. This assumption was consistent with the male breadwinner 
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logic of the Conservative-led Coalition Government under which it was designed 
(Falkner et al. 2002). If both parents were working, the leave could be taken by either 
the mother or the father of the child, or shared between them by taking up to three 
turns over the three years. Although parents were entitled to work part-time during the 
leave up to the 19 hour threshold, there was no statutory right to a reduction in working 
time in the same job. These regulations promoted a strict division of care and 
employment following the male breadwinner logic and discouraged a flexible 
combination of care and work by both parents.  
Parental leave was complemented by leave entitlements to care for a sick child, 
introduced in 1992, which entitled parents to paid leave of ten days per parent per year, 
and up to 25 days per parent of several children, to care for sick or disabled children 
under the age of 127. Parents taking the leave were fully paid, either by their employer 
or by their health insurance scheme (Pettinger 1999). The European Framework 
Agreement on Parental Leave in 1996, which introduced an individual, non-
transferable right to three months of parental leave, to be taken until the eighths 
birthday of the child stimulated a renewed debate on the issue of parental leave in 
German Parliament. Opposition parties seized the opportunity to introduce motions for 
a far reaching reform, calling for a more flexible design of the parental leave scheme. 
A central demand was a statutory right to reduce one's working time and the 
introduction of flexible time accounts. The Social Democrats (SPD) wanted a time 
account of 60 hours per week to be shared by both parents (BT-Drs. 13/6577). The 
Green Party proposed a time account of three years of leave to be taken flexibly until 
the child's eight's birthday, including a statutory right to working time reduction (BT-
Drs. 13/711; BT-Drs. 13/4526). Both motions were however outvoted in Parliament 
only months before the general election in 1998 (BT-Pl. 13/241). 
In addition to parental leave entitlements, the issue of reconciling work with family 
responsibilities started to be addressed by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs 
through a number of awareness raising initiatives in the early 1990s. In 1991, the first 
nationwide conference on equal rights between men and women (1990) was succeeded 
by a conference on the reconciliation of paid work and family responsibilities and on 
flexible working hours in 1992. Research on family-friendly working practices was 
commissioned and in 1993, family-friendly employers were awarded for the first time 
                                                 
7 Lone parents can take up to 20 days for one child, up to 50 days if they have several children. 
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following a nation-wide competition. In 1994, the Federal Government also launched a 
nation-wide campaign for the promotion of part-time work as part of its employment-
creation and economic growth agenda (UN CEDAW 1996). The issue of family-
friendly working was on the Government’s agenda but similar to the UK, it was dealt 
with through information campaigns rather than regulatory intervention.  
Summing up the findings so far, reconciliation choices of parents with young children 
in both Germany and the UK in the 1980s and 1990s predominantly followed the male 
breadwinner/female carer family arrangement, which was also the family model 
supported by government policy at the time, especially in Germany (Gottschall and 
Bird 2003; Morgan and Zippel 2003). Family leave entitlements in both countries 
illustrate this bias. While both men and women were eligible for parental leave 
entitlements in Germany, the scheme was based on a strict division of labour with only 
one parent at a time entitled to take the leave. Eligibility was limited to mothers in the 
UK. The generosity of these entitlements differed significantly. The UK provided 14 
weeks of maternity leave with a right to return to work within 29 weeks of childbirth 
and no entitlements for fathers, compared to 36 months of protected leave after 
childbirth, which could be shared by both parents in Germany.  
Both the British and German governments in the 1980s and 1990s implicitly or 
explicitly assumed that care responsibilities were a private matter (Lewis 2003). Care 
services were to be either purchased on the market and/or provided within the family 
(Lohkamp-Himmighofen and Dienel 2000). The British and German welfare states 
have respectively relied on the market and families as providers of family services, in 
line with their classification by Esping-Andersen as liberal and conservative welfare 
states (Esping-Andersen 1999). The low levels of state provision that existed could be 
conceptualised as a response to market or family failure, such as childcare services in 
the UK, which were targeted at children at risk (Randall 2000), and day care in 
Germany, which provided priority access to lone parents needing to work. Low levels 
of public care service provision or financial transfers in support of care externalisation 
meant that the dual-earner family arrangement was not actively supported in either 
country in the 1990s. This is in line with the finding that the improvement of access to 
family-friendly working time arrangements was not an actively pursued policy 
strategy. 
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Many parents were dissatisfied with the traditional division of labour and would have 
preferred a ‘modernised’ breadwinner arrangement with mothers working part-time 
(Bielenski et al. 2002). The discrepancy between actual and preferred reconciliation 
arrangements indicates a latent demand for family-friendly working time arrangements 
allowing mothers to return to employment while their children are young. In the 
absence of statutory entitlements for working time reduction and other family-friendly 
working time arrangements, parents wanting to adjust their working hours to family 
demands depended on collectively agreed and voluntarily provided flexibility by 
employers. The second part of the chapter explores access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements within the British and German working time regimes, and draws on 
industrial relations and management research to address equity concerns arising from 
unequal access to family-friendly working time flexibility both between and within 
workplaces. 
II. Access inequality in the British and German working time regimes    
National working time regimes, following Rubery and colleagues, refer to the ‘set of 
legal, voluntary, and customary regulations which influence working time practice’ 
(Rubery et al. 1998 p.72). Working time is regulated by a range of actors at different 
levels, ranging from the European Union level to national government; collective 
bargaining at sectoral and employer level; and between employers and employees at 
the workplace level (Anxo and O'Reilly 2000). This part reviews the different levels of 
working time negotiation and regulation with specific reference to the German and 
British cases in the late 1990s when New Labour in the UK and the ‘Red-Green’ 
Coalition in Germany came to power. The purpose is to explore the structural and 
cultural determinants of access to family-friendly working time arrangements and 
access inequalities both between workplaces and within workplaces. It is structured in 
four sub-sections. The first discusses the influence of policy developments at the 
European Union level on domestic working time policy. This is followed by a brief 
review of national working time regulation. The third section then turns to consider the 
role of collective bargaining structures and practice at the sectoral as well as workplace 
levels in increasing access to family-friendly working time arrangements. The final 
part focuses on the workplace level and discusses the main determinants for the 
introduction of family-friendly working time arrangements by employers; why some 
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employers are more likely to introduce them than others, and the barriers to access at 
the workplace level.  
European working time policy 
Domestic working time policies in Germany and the UK are subject to the influence of 
European policy developments. As members of the European Union, they are 
contractually bound to implement Council Directives into national law as stipulated by 
the Treaty of Rome. In the 1990s, the European Council passed four directives that 
impacted on the organisation of working time. Based on Article 118a of the EC Treaty, 
which allows the Council to regulate, by means of directives, minimum requirements 
for the protection of the safety and health of workers, the Pregnant Workers and 
Working Time Directives were passed in the early 1990s. On the basis of the Social 
Policy Agreement passed in 1992, the Parental Leave and Part-time Work Directives 
followed in 1996 and 1997. The Pregnant Workers Directive (92/85/EEC) provided 
that pregnant workers should not be obliged to work nights and should be offered 
alternative daytime work or leave from work. Furthermore, the Directive introduced 14 
weeks of maternity leave, protection from maternity-related dismissal, and the right to 
time off for ante-natal examinations. The Working Time Directive (93/104/EC) laid 
down minimum requirements for periods of daily and weekly rest, annual leave, breaks 
and maximum weekly working time; as well as regulating certain aspects of night 
work, shift work and patterns of work. The Parental Leave Directive (96/34/EC) 
introduced a non-transferable, individual entitlement to 3 months parental leave as well 
as time off work for family emergencies on the grounds of force majeure (sickness or 
accident) (Falkner et al. 2002). The Part-time Work Directive (97/81/EC) passed in 
June 1997 introduced the principle of non-discrimination stipulating that workers 
should not be treated less favourable than comparable full-time workers (Clause 4) and 
encouraged better access to part-time work opportunities (Clause 5) (97/81/EC). As 
both the Parental Leave and the Part-Time Work Directives were passed under the 
Social Policy Agreement from which the UK Government had opted out, they did not 
apply to the UK until the incoming New Labour Government ended the British opt-out 
in 1997 (Kilpatrick and Freedland 2004). The British Government had also fiercely 
opposed the introduction of the Working Time Directive which counteracted its 
deregulation objectives. Despite concessions for the UK, such as a voluntary opt-out 
from the restriction of weekly working hours, the Major Government fought for the 
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annulment of the Directive before the European Court of Justice. It lost its case in 
November 1996, passing on the duty of implementation on to the incoming Labour 
Government. In sum, until New Labour came to power in 1997, the European 
influence on working time regulation in the UK had been minimal compared to 
Germany.  
Statutory regulation of working time at the national level 
When New Labour and the ‘Red-Green’ Government took office in the late 1990s, 
they inherited distinctly different legacies of working time regulation. By the late 
1990s, following two decades of labour market deregulation policies by the 
Conservative Thatcher and Major governments, there was no general statutory 
framework regulating the length of the working day or week, or the number of rest 
days and holidays in place in the UK as the implementation of the European Working 
Time Directive had been delayed. In line with de-regulation objectives pursued by the 
Conservative/Liberal Thatcher and Major governments throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, the state had largely withdrawn from statutory working time regulation by the 
late 1990s, with the exception of limited regulation applying to select industries, such 
as transport, based on health and safety concerns (Deakin 1990; Hepple and Hakim 
1997; Fagan 2000).  
In Germany, by contrast, comprehensive health and safety protection regarding the 
length and distribution of working time, and minimum rest periods were statutorily 
regulated in the late 1990s. The Working Time Act (Arbeitszeitgesetz) passed in 1994, 
replacing previous legislation dating back to 1938, harmonised working time 
regulations across Germany following reunification and it implemented the 
requirements of the European Working Time Directive. Compared to early protective 
regulation, the reform loosened a number of regulatory constraints on the flexible 
organisation of working time (Jacobi et al. 1998). Restrictions on maximum working 
hours, normally set at 40 hours per week distributed over an eight-hour day and a five-
day week could be averaged over a six month period allowing employers to operate ten 
hour days or 60 hour weeks without special justification. Even longer working hours 
can be agreed via collective agreement (Jacobi et al. 1998). The Act also facilitated a 
more flexible distribution of working time over the working week. Sundays and public 
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holidays as days of rest are protected by German Basic Law8. While a general 
prohibition of work on Sundays and holidays was maintained, it was liberalised 
through a long catalogue of exceptions. For instance, industrial production work can be 
allowed ‘to avoid considerable losses’, ‘to safeguard employment’ and ‘to preserve the 
ability to compete with foreign countries’ (Jacobi et al. 1998).  The Working Time Act 
was predominantly oriented at the flexibility needs of employers. It did however 
contain certain provisions oriented at time needs of working parents. Article 6, relating 
to night and shift work for instance stipulates that employers should accept requests of 
day shifts from parents of children under twelve, and carers of adults, who cannot rely 
on another carer in the household (Weiss 1997).  
In sum, in the UK, there was no statutory framework regulating the length and 
distribution of working hours for the general population in the late 1990s. Germany, in 
contrast, had a direct working time regulation in place, which set maximum daily 
working hours and protected rest periods (including Sundays off). The health and 
safety of workers was the predominant raison d’être for statutory (protective) 
restrictions, which were, compared to earlier decades, loosened by the Working Time 
Act. In Germany, working parents enjoyed limited protection in relation to night and 
shift work. No such protective provisions for working parents were in place in the 
British context. In the late 1990s, neither country had a general family-oriented 
flexible working time policy in place, although throughout the 1990s, voluntary 
employer provision was ideationally supported and encouraged through information 
materials and events. In the absence of state regulation, the introduction of family-
friendly working time arrangements was subject to collective agreements or unilateral 
employer decisions. 
Collective bargaining over family-friendly working time arrangements 
This sub-section reviews collective bargaining structures and practices in Germany and 
the UK, and explores the relative role of trade unions and works councils in 
negotiating employee access to family-friendly working time arrangements.  
                                                 
8 Article 140 of German basic law in combination with Article 139 of the Weimar Constitution protects 
‘Sundays and holidays recognized by the Land shall remain under legal protection as days of rest from 
work and for the promotion of spiritual purposes’ (Article 139 of the Weimar Constitution) 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt (13/02/07). 
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Due to systemic differences in collective bargaining practice, employee coverage of 
the terms and conditions negotiated by unions differed widely between the two 
countries, although a very similar proportion of workers were unionised. While 29.6 
per cent of British employees and 32 per cent of German employees were unionised in 
1998, just over one third (34 per cent) of British employees were covered by collective 
agreements compared to three quarters (74 per cent) of German employees (Bland 
1999; Schulten 1999a). This difference can be largely explained by the prevailing 
dominance of multi-employer bargaining in Germany’s highly centralised system of 
employment relations compared to the predominance of single-employer bargaining in 
a strongly decentralised system of employment relations in the UK9 (Zagelmeyer 
2004). Collectively agreed working time regulations have a wider reach in the German 
context than they do in the UK, where agreements tend to apply to individual 
employers rather than entire sectors. 
Working time negotiations in Germany and the UK are shaped by different legal 
frameworks of industrial and employment relations, which give German unions more 
procedural influence over working time regulation than unions in the UK. The 
institutional foundation of British industrial relations is commonly described as a 
‘voluntary system’ or ‘voluntarism’ (Thomson 1996). Industrial relations have 
traditionally been based on a system of informal rather than legally codified rules and a 
laissez-faire approach to free collective bargaining between management and labour 
without state interference (O'Reilly and Spee 1998). The recognition of trade unions 
for collective bargaining purposes by employers was voluntary and where trade unions 
are recognised and collective agreements concluded, these are binding ‘by honour 
only’ unless included in individual employment contracts (Fagan 2000). In the late 
1990s, British employees did not enjoy a statutory right to representation nor a 
statutory framework which facilitated representation. In contrast, industrial relations in 
Germany are legally regulated through the Collective Agreements Act 
(Tarifvertragsgesetz 1949) based on which collective agreements are legally binding to 
all members of the organisations that concluded them. Trade unions in the UK have a 
comparatively weaker bargaining position than in Germany, following a step-by-step 
                                                 
9 The impact of centrally negotiated agreements is larger as it affects working time of many workers at 
once. Decentralised bargaining in contrast is usually limited to the workforce of one employer or 
establishment where trades unions or works councils directly negotiate with a given employer. The 
agreements resulting from decentralised collective bargaining therefore only apply to a comparatively 
smaller number of workers. 
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programme of reform of industrial relations law and deregulation pursued by the 
British Thatcher and Major governments between 1979 and 1997 (Zagelmeyer 2004). 
By restraining the ability of trade unions to extend membership and mobilise for 
industrial action, trade union influence was weakened by one-sidedly shifting the 
balance of power in favour of employers.  
At the level of the workplace, German employees have a statutory right to interest 
representation which in the UK is subject to management discretion. In Germany, the 
Works Constitutions Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) provides employees in 
establishments with five or more employees with the right to elect works councils, 
which in turn have the statutory right to information, consultation and co-
determination (Mitbestimmung) of certain aspects of the employment relationship, 
including the organisation of working time. This means that German employers cannot 
make any decisions on working time in the establishment, including breaks, short-time 
working, overtime, and annual holidays, without the agreement of the works council, 
and works councils can take initiative with regard to the re-organisation of working 
time. In practice, however, only around 10 per cent of eligible workplaces in the 
private sector had works councils in place in 1998, covering 48 per cent of private 
sector employees (Ellguth 2003 p.194). There is strong variation of employee access to 
representation across workplaces. Works councils are more likely to be found in large 
workplaces. While only six per cent of small workplaces with less than 50 employees 
had a works council in 1998, this applied to 95 per cent of establishments with more 
than 500 employees (Ibid.). Hence, the legal framework in place in Germany provides 
employee representatives with a much stronger negotiation position than the voluntary 
system in the UK, where employers can unilaterally determine aspects of working time 
organisation. Any involvement of employees or their representatives in the 
organisation of working time, such as consultation through joint consultative 
committees10, is subject to management discretion (Cully et al. 1999). 
The research evidence on the role of unions and works councils in promoting the 
introduction of family-friendly working time arrangements is mixed. While a positive 
contribution by unions is noted in the literature, the overall prevalence of collectively 
agreed provision was low. Bond et al. (2002), based on research in seventeen UK 
based companies found that where unions were recognised, there was greater evidence 
                                                 
10 In 1998, in 53 per cent of workplaces with 25 or more employees, a joint consultative committee was 
in place at workplace or higher level (Cully et al 1999, p.99). 
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of codification of work-family policies, and the establishment of joint forums for 
representative participation by employees. It appeared that unions, in a strong labour 
market and with the support of legislation, were able to raise family-friendly issues 
through consultative and other joint bodies. However, there was little evidence of 
negotiated agreements: the pattern was for unions to raise or pursue a matter and for 
management to respond according to its priorities. Analyses of the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS) in the UK have found recognition of trade unions 
and higher involvement of employees in decision making to correlate with the 
provision of family-friendly working arrangements in the UK (Dex and Smith 2002). 
However, while employees in workplaces with at least one recognised union are 
statistically significantly more likely than non-union workplaces to report the provision 
of parental leave, special paid leave, child care and job sharing, they were, in 1998, 
statistically less likely to report the availability of flexible hours and work at home 
options (Budd and Mumford 2004).  
In Germany, survey evidence also indicates a positive effect of collective bargaining 
on the introduction of family-friendly arrangements: 29.3 per cent of employers 
surveyed in 2003 reported that they had introduced family-friendly measures as a 
consequence of collective agreements (Tarifvertrag) compared to 13.5 per cent, who 
had introduced such measures on the basis of management guidelines (Flüter-
Hoffmann and Solbrig 2003). The analysis of 110 collective agreements in 30 sectors 
between 1998 and 2004, however found that collective agreements relating to the 
reconciliation of paid work and family life are still rare. There were predominantly 
found in those industrial sectors in which women represent a large proportion of the 
workforce, or where there was a shortage in qualified employees such as the chemical 
industries, banking and IT sectors. Collective agreements made provisions to facilitate 
the change between full and part-time employment, the adjustment of working hours to 
day care provision and the protection of working parents from family-unfriendly 
working schedules such as evenings and week-ends if child care needs made this 
necessary. However, only 17 of the 115 collective agreements analysed contained such 
protective clauses (Klenner 2005).  
In addition to trade unions, German works councils contribute to the improvement of 
working conditions at the workplace level. 12.4 per cent of companies surveyed in 
Germany had introduced family-friendly measures on the basis of a workplace 
Chapter 2 
57 
 
agreement in 2003 (Flüter-Hoffmann and Solbrig 2003). Klenner and Lindecke, 
reporting on a special works and staff council survey on equal opportunities and work-
family reconciliation conducted by the Institute of Economic and Social Research in 
the Hans-Böckler-Foundation (WSI) in the summer of 2003, found evidence of 
increasing attention to work-family issues by employee representatives: 67 per cent of 
works agreements on family-friendliness that were in place in 2003 had been agreed 
between 2000 and 2003.  This in turn indicated that in the late 1990s, works councils 
had still been significantly less pro-active in this area. Nevertheless, although work-
family issues were being addressed only in a minority of firms, it was most likely 
works councils who had taken the initiative in those firms where the problem was 
addressed (Klenner and Lindecke 2003). 
There are several possible reasons why family-friendliness was not a high priority on 
German and British bargaining agendas in the late 1990s. One explanation is that the 
interests of workers with care responsibilities, many of whom are women in part-time 
employment, are under-represented on bargaining agendas (McCann 2004). In both 
Germany and the UK, only around one third of trade union members were women 
(Carley 2004). In the UK, only one in five part-timers are organised in trade unions 
compared to one in three full-timers (Bland 1999). Lack of representation leaves many 
without a collective voice to communicate and negotiate their working time needs. 
Women also form the minority of employee representatives. In 1998, two thirds (64 
per cent) of union representatives in UK workplaces were male and one third (36 per 
cent) female (Cully et al. 1999). In Germany, only a quarter (25.4 per cent) of works 
councillors elected in 1998 were women (Zagelmeyer 1998). Women’s minority on 
representative bodies may in part explain the marginal role of ‘women’s issues’ on 
bargaining agendas. Another reason for family-friendly working time organisation 
taking a backseat is the relative priority accorded to other issues, notably job 
maintenance in time of high unemployment. A prominent trend in German collective 
bargaining rounds throughout the 1990s was the acceptance of increased employer-
oriented time flexibility in return for job security (EIROnline 1998). 
The structural characteristics of the employment relations systems in the two countries 
allow employee representatives in Germany considerably more influence over the 
organisation of working time, both at the sectoral and establishment level, than 
employee representatives in the UK. Due to the low priority accorded to family-
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friendly working time arrangements on bargaining agendas in both countries, the role 
played by unions and works councils in improving provisions is relatively small. In the 
relative absence of collective bargaining for family-friendly working time 
arrangements at the sectoral or workplace level, the introduction of family-friendly 
working time arrangements is either unilaterally decided by the employer, or 
negotiated at the individual level between individual employees and their employers.  
Family-friendly working time arrangements at the level of the workplace 
Access to family-friendly working time arrangements is unequally spread across 
workplaces, as some employers are more likely to provide employee-oriented 
flexibility than others. Within workplaces where family-friendly policies are offered, 
there are access inequalities among the workforce, with some employees gaining 
access more easily than others. This section reviews evidence from the organisational 
literature to explore determinants and barriers to the provision and take-up of family-
friendly working time arrangements at the level of the workplace. 
Management interest in flexible working time organisation has grown over the past 
decades in the context of globalisation and the associated need for cost containment 
and the effective use of (human) capital to remain competitive in global markets 
(Linne 2002). In a recent establishment survey covering 20,000 companies in 
Germany, the main motivation for the choice of future working time strategy was for 
57 per cent of companies to adjust to fluctuations in work volume and client needs, for 
53 per cent to reduce costs, and for 29 per cent to make better use of their qualified 
staff. The working time wishes of employees, however, were considered a main motive 
by only 16 per cent of surveyed companies (DIHK 2004). Given that the working time 
preferences of employees do not always correspond to the working time prerogatives 
imposed by variations in work volume, client needs and other operational 
requirements, this raises the question under which circumstances employers do provide 
family-friendly working time arrangements voluntarily.  
Variation in provision across workplaces 
A growing body of organisational research on the work/family interface has pointed 
out that there is great variation in provision of family-friendly working arrangements, 
leading to unequal access to such flexibility across workplaces (see for example Dex 
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and Smith 2002). Based on data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
in the UK, Dex and Smith (2002) found that family-friendly or flexible working 
arrangements11 were more common in larger and public sector organisations. They 
were also more common where there were lower degrees of competition; recognised 
unions; human resource specialists; and good performance. Further, they were 
associated with management practices aimed at motivating employees to give high 
levels of commitment; more involvement of employees in decision making; equal 
opportunities policies that were implemented and monitored; larger proportions of 
women in the workforce; and a highly educated workforce using discretion. The main 
drivers for the introduction of family-friendly measures that have been identified in the 
organisational literature are discussed in turn. 
Firms with a high female workforce tend to be most 'exposed' to work-family conflict 
and its consequences as women are more likely than men to assume responsibility for 
family care. Milliken and colleagues associated the provision of family-friendly 
working arrangements with the ‘resource dependency’ assumption that, as the 
percentage of women in the labour force grows, organisations become increasingly 
dependent on them and thus more likely to be responsive to their needs (Milliken et al. 
1998). Empirical findings support this argument. In the service sector, in which women 
form the majority of the workforce, work-family arrangements are more prevalent than 
in manufacturing, which is male dominated (Dex and Smith 2002). Twenty per cent of 
service sector companies in Germany orient their working time strategy to the time 
wishes of employees compared to eight per cent in the male-dominated construction 
industry (DIHK 2004). Research has found that women tend to be more aware of 
family-friendly working options available to them (Meager et al. 2002a), and to 
request them more often than men (Holt and Grainger 2005). According to WERS 
2004 data, managers were less likely to think that it was up to the individual to balance 
their work and family responsibilities where women made up more than half of the 
workforce, compared with managers in workplaces where women were not in the 
majority (60 per cent compared to 71 per cent). Employees in female dominated 
workplaces were more likely to report to have understanding managers (Kersley et al. 
                                                 
11 The flexible or family-friendly arrangements covered by the WERS are: parental leave, job sharing, 
working only during term-time, working at or from home during normal working hours, a change from 
full-time to part-time hours, workplace or other nursery provision, help with the costs of child care, 
flexitime, paternity leave for all employees, and time off for emergencies for all employees (Dex and 
Smith, 2002). 
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2006). In Germany, Krell and Ortlieb, based on a survey with 500 establishments, 
found that systematic efforts of finding out about the work-family concerns of 
employees in the first place were more likely when women made up more than half of 
the workforce. Were this was the case, 52.4 per cent of employers consulted with their 
employees on work-family issues compared to 37.6 per cent of establishments where 
women formed less than 20 per cent of the workforce (Krell and Ortlieb 2003). 
Employees in female-dominated workplaces are more likely to have access to family-
friendly working options than employees in male-dominated workplaces. 
While the degree of organisational exposure is an important factor determining 
whether or not management ‘notices’ work-family challenges, Milliken et al. have 
shown that managers play an important role in determining how organisations respond 
to these pressures (on the role of line managers see also Yeandle et al. 2003). This 
depends on whether the issue is interpreted as relevant to the organisation (Milliken 
1990). Accordingly, an organisation’s work-family responsiveness would at least in 
part be a function of whether these issues had been noticed by key decision makers, 
and whether these managers perceived the issues as likely to have an impact on the 
organisation’s functioning, if not addressed (Goodstein 1995; Milliken et al. 1998). 
Supporting this line of argument, a higher proportion of women in decision-making 
has been associated with a higher degree of sensitisation to the relevance of work-
family reconciliation and a higher prevalence of family-friendly measures (Flüter-
Hoffmann and Seyda 2006). Employee access to family-friendly working time policies 
is dependent on manager awareness and appreciation of the benefits of such policies to 
employees and organisations. 
Organisational size and sector are associated with the likelihood of provision (Hogarth 
et al. 2001). Large firms have been found to be more likely to provide work-family 
arrangements than small firms12 (Dex and Smith 2002). One explanation, as proposed 
by Goodstein, is that large firms are more visible and exposed to the public eye, and 
are therefore assumed to be more compelled to conform to societal pressures than 
small firms (Goodstein 1994). Another explanation is that they have more financial 
means and operational capacities than small firms to provide costly arrangements such 
as childcare provision or career breaks (Dex and Scheibl 2001). Larger workplaces 
                                                 
12 Dex and Scheibl (2001) found that small and medium-sized organisations also provide flexible and 
family-friendly working arrangements, which tend to be less formalised than in large firms and might 
therefore escape survey questions. 
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more commonly have formal, written policies on family-friendly working practices, as 
they are more likely to have human resource specialists managing procedures (Cully et 
al. 1999). Public sector employers are more likely to provide family-friendly working 
time arrangements than private sector employers (Woodland et al. 2003). 
Organisational responsiveness to expectations for more family-friendliness is higher if 
the content of these expectations is consistent and congruent with an organisation’s 
existing goals and policies (Oliver 1991). In the work-family domain, this factor has 
been identified as especially strong for public sector organisations as governments can 
use their power to authorise and legitimise policies and structures, and lead by good 
example (Scott 1987).  
The ability to formulate a business-case for work-family arrangements is a determining 
factor in whether or not employers implement family-friendly working practices. Den 
Dulk theorised that implementation follows a cost-benefit evaluation in which the 
anticipated gains outweigh the costs (Dulk 2001). Cost benefits are associated with the 
reduction of stress among working parents, reduce absenteeism and unwanted 
turnover, and contribute to motivation, flexibility and productivity of the workforce 
(Bevan et al. 1999; Gray 2002; Prognos AG 2003; Nelson et al. 2004). The research 
evidence on the effects of family-friendly measures on business outcomes is mixed 
(Bloom and van Reenen 2006), leading the OECD to conclude that ‘it is probably 
unrealistic to expect such practices to become quasi-universal’ (OECD 2007 p.188). In 
the absence of state regulation, voluntary provision of family-friendly measures varies 
between workplaces and is mediated by structural and organisation factors such as 
employer size and sector and the gender composition of the workforce as well as 
management awareness and attitudes. Many employers did not offer family-friendly 
working time arrangements. The next section discusses some of the barriers to their 
introduction that have been identified in organisational research. 
Barriers to the provision of family-friendly working time arrangements  
Barriers to employer provision can be summarised under ‘lack of awareness’, ‘lack of 
willingness’, and ‘lack of ability’13. A key barrier to the introduction of more family-
friendly working time flexibility is lack of awareness that there is a need for it. One 
reason for limited awareness might be that employers do not communicate with 
                                                 
13 As systematic research on employer provision was not available for the late 1990s, this section draws 
on more recent data.  
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employees about their work-family reconciliation needs and working time preferences. 
Krell and Ortlieb reported that less than half (47 per cent) of German establishments 
indicated that they systematically asked employees about their working time 
preferences (Krell and Ortlieb 2003). In addition to awareness of employee needs, 
employers may lack awareness of the benefits associated with family-friendliness and 
therefore lack the incentive of introducing relevant measures (Evans 2001).  
Secondly, non-provision can be ascribed to the lack of willingness. Even if employers 
are aware of their employees’ working time wishes, they may not think that it is their 
responsibility to address them, or that the benefits of doing so would outweigh the 
costs. Among managers surveyed in the 2nd Work-life balance Study in 2003 in the UK 
the large majority agreed (63 per cent) or strongly agreed (21 per cent) that ‘employers 
should make a special effort to accommodate the particular difficulties parents of 
young and disabled children face in balancing their work and family life’ but a 
significant minority (29 per cent) thought that it was ‘not employers' responsibility to 
help people balance their work with other aspects of their life’ (Woodland et al. 2003). 
In Germany, 70.1 per cent of employers admitted that family-friendliness was not one 
of their first priorities (Flüter-Hoffmann and Solbrig 2003) and only 46.5 per cent 
thought in 2003 that family-friendly measures were important for their company 
(Flüter-Hoffmann and Seyda 2006). While there are examples of employers who report 
business benefits related to family-friendly measures such as a reduction in 
absenteeism or better recruitment and retention rates (DTI 2005), not all employers are 
convinced that such benefits would apply to their own business. Organisations with 
few women in the workforce and low rates of unwanted turn-over or absenteeism 
might lack the pressure of taking the time needs of their employees into account. Lack 
of organisational need has been cited by 66.7 per cent of German employers as a 
barrier to the introduction of flexible working time arrangements and tele-work 
(Flüter-Hoffmann and Solbrig 2003). A change in work organisation incurs 
administration costs and management time, which employers might not be willing to 
invest.  
Finally, even when employers are aware of their employee's time needs and willing to 
address these, they might lack the ability to do so, either because operational 
constraints and costs oppose flexibility, or because they lack the know-how of 
introducing and managing flexible working patterns. The main reason for non 
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provision of flexible working arrangements, provided by just over two-thirds of 
employers (69 per cent) in the 2nd Work-Life Balance Employer Survey in 2003 was 
that such arrangements were not compatible with the nature of the business. Around 
three quarters of HR managers found operational pressures (78 per cent) and custumer 
and service requirements (73 per cent) to be an important or very important constraint 
on the implementation of flexible working practices (Woodland et al. 2003). A CIPD 
survey found that the lack of senior level support was considered an important 
implementation constraint by 45 per cent of HR managers. Two thirds (67 per cent) 
considered the attitudes of line managers a primary constraint on implementation and 
68 per cent saw a relevant constraint in the ability of line managers to effectively 
manage flexible workers (CIPD 2005b). Yeandle and colleagues, based on the analysis 
of over 100 line manager interviews in over 30 workplaces, point to the lack of 
adequate training in work-family issues leaving line managers struggling with the 
management of family-friendly working time arrangements (Yeandle et al. 2003).  
Low levels of provision and variability between workplaces constrain employee access 
to family-friendly working time arrangements. However, even where family-friendly 
policies are formally offered, not all employees within a given workplace necessarily 
gain access. Unsupportive workplace cultures can further undermine employee’s 
perceived access to family-friendly working practices. 
Access variation within workplaces and the role of workplace culture 
Even where family-friendly working time arrangements are formally provided, access 
can be hampered by discretionary organisational practices. The Work-Life Balance 
Baseline Study 2000 in the UK analysed the extent to which flexible working practices 
are restricted to certain types of staff and found that around two thirds of employers 
placed restrictions on eligibility to annualised hours, compressed working weeks, and 
part-time working (Hogarth et al. 2001). Widespread management discretion to 
negotiate flexible working on a case-to-case basis, in the absence of formal policies 
and/or training in how to interpret existing guidelines, has raised concern about the 
fairness of distribution (Yeandle et al. 2003). In the absence of formal entitlement, 
work-family arrangements tend to be conceptualised as ‘benefits’ (Dex and Scheibl 
2001) or a ‘perk for some members of staff rather than a right for all employees’ (Kodz 
et al. 2002 p.29). Equity concerns are accentuated when provision is informal and 
based on management’s assessments of individuals ‘giving’ to the firm (Dex and 
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Scheibl 2001 p.426). When such ‘giving’ is interpreted in terms of long hours and 
flexible availability to the job, working parents are at a disadvantage (Böhm et al. 
2002). As caring responsibilities reduce both their time availability and flexibility, they 
are not on an equal playing field with non-carers (MacInnes 2005). The reliance on 
long working hours constitutes a barrier to equal opportunities for workers with caring 
responsibilities (Bailyn 2002).  
Budd and Mumford found that employees with a lower hourly wage, shorter job tenure 
and lower levels of education, who work less hours and who are not managers or 
professionals are less likely to have access to work-life balance practices (Budd and 
Mumford 2003). Higher qualified employees tend to have greater time autonomy over 
their distribution of working time than the lower educated (Breedveld 1998) (Seifert 
2001) (La Valle et al. 2002). These work-family benefits are however often offset by 
long hours worked by highly educated employees (Fagan and Burchell 2002).  
The question of equal access not only involves differences between highly qualified 
employees and less qualified employees, whose needs for work-life balance may be the 
same, but whose retention value to the company may differ (Klammer and Klenner 
2003a). Crompton et al. (2003) found that family-friendly arrangements are more 
easily available to lower-level employees, but that these jobs were often low paid and 
did not generate enough income to provide the sole support for a family. Concerns 
have been raised that family-friendly policies enable employees to work at the 
margins, but seldom challenge traditional patterns of work as the norm and ideal 
(Lewis 1997). Where work-family policies are implemented as marginal ‘add-on’ 
benefits, the goal of gender equity may be undermined, rather than advanced (Fletcher 
and Rapoport 1996; Rapoport et al. 2002). 
Workplaces are still predominantly organised on the assumption of the ‘male’ worker, 
who is able to commit long hours to the job. This assumption is for example engrained 
in job assessment procedures, with male working behaviours and characteristics 
shaping evaluation criteria of what constitutes a ‘committed’ and ‘competent’ worker 
(Rubin 1997; Harrington 1999). Work-life balance policies can provide flexibility to 
reconcile employment with caring responsibilities in the home and can thus be used as 
a tool to advance gender equity in the workplace. However, findings have highlighted 
that workplace cultures which tend to equate willingness to give time with 
commitment and productivity, undermine the effectiveness of family-friendly 
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arrangements as they are perceived to have negative career consequences (Bailyn 
2002; Böhm et al. 2002; Kodz et al. 2002).  
When this is the case, take-up levels tend to remain low (Hochschild 1997; Yeandle et 
al. 2002). Further barriers to take-up of family-friendly working time arrangements 
include the concern of letting colleagues down in the context of work intensification, 
as they would have to shoulder more work to compensate for working time reduction 
or leave from work (Crompton et al. 2003). Phillips and colleagues, in a study on 
working parents of older adults, found the fear of being labelled as in need of help as a 
deterrent from take-up of supportive arrangements. Carers tended to make use of their 
annual leave instead (Phillips et al. 2002). In the context of increasing job insecurity, 
anxiety to lose one’s job can also constitute a major barrier to the uptake of work-
family arrangements and increase pressure to work long hours to show commitment to 
the firm (Lewis and Cooper 1999). Even where family-friendly working time 
arrangements are formally offered, employees may not always feel that they can use 
them (Eaton 2003).  
Working time choices are shaped by the prevailing workplace culture and practices 
(Böhm et al. 2002). Organisational research in the United States and Europe has 
pointed out that organisational working culture can be in conflict with work-family 
reconciliation objectives (Lewis and Lewis 1996; Hochschild 1997; Lewis 2001b; 
Bailyn 2002). A long-hours culture in which presence is equated with performance, 
and long working hours are equated with commitment to the job, mediates the 
perceived entitlement to flexible or shorter working hours to which employees might 
be formally or legally entitled (Haas and Hwang 1995; Bailyn 1997; Højgaard 1998; 
Burke 2002; Eaton 2003; Sheridan 2004). There is a widespread perception among 
workforces, that management and supervisory positions require the input of long hours 
(Hochschild 1997; Kodz et al. 2002; Crompton et al. 2003; Rubery et al. 2005). The 
perception that management positions are not compatible with family leave and 
working time reductions represents a cultural barrier to the uptake of such work-family 
arrangements. While high qualification levels and managerial employment positions 
may strengthen an employee's bargaining position and time autonomy on the one hand, 
their indispensability to the employer may at the same time reduce their access to long 
leave allowances or working time reductions (Vaskovics and Rost 1999).  
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The likelihood of voluntary provision of family-friendly working time arrangements 
varies by industrial sector, organisational size, gender composition of the workforce 
and of decision makers, and management attitudes as to the relevance of family-
friendliness for the organisation. Barriers to provision include lacking awareness, 
willingness and ability to offer employee-oriented flexibility. Requests for and take-up 
of family-friendly working time arrangements depend on the individual time needs as 
well as expectations whether a change in working time practice is possible or 
manageable. Individual working time needs are highly individual and are shaped by 
the employee’s particular family arrangement, the nature of care responsibilities, the 
financial situation and access to care services (Perrons 1999; Phillips et al. 2002; 
Yeandle et al. 2002). Access to family-friendly working time arrangements at the 
workplace is further mediated by awareness levels, the degree to which the ‘workplace 
culture’ endorses a family-friendly ethos, the operational nature of the job, and 
approachability and understanding of supervisors or line managers (Haas et al. 2002; 
Meager et al. 2002b; Yeandle et al. 2003).  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to contextualise the access problematic within the 
British and German national contexts in the late 1990s, when New Labour and the 
‘Red-Green’ Government came to power. The first part provided a brief overview of 
the reconciliation choices of German and British families with children under the age 
of six and situated these within the context of government provided resources through 
a review of reconciliation policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Work-family reconciliation 
choices in Germany and the United Kingdom in the late 1990s were characterised by a 
strong gender division of labour reflecting the male breadwinner family model. While 
fathers assumed the primary breadwinning responsibility through working long hours, 
a significant proportion of mothers left employment to care for their infants full time 
and returned to part-time employment when their children were older (Table 1 and 
Table 2). The strong gendered impact of parenthood on parental employment patterns 
reflected structural constraints on work-family reconciliation, particularly as parental 
preferences strongly diverged from their actual reconciliation choices (Fagan et al. 
2001; Bielenski et al. 2002). The review of government-provided reconciliation 
resources in the 1980s and 1990s revealed low levels of public childcare provision in 
both countries, full-time leave provisions, as well as financial incentives supporting the 
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male breadwinner arrangement, especially in the case of Germany. Neither country 
explicitly encouraged the externalisation of care or a dual-earner/dual-carer model. 
Although the benefit of family-friendly working time arrangements to parents was 
acknowledged, neither government intervened in private sector employment relations 
to improve parental access to family-friendly working time arrangements.  
The second part then considered access constraints in the German and British working 
time regimes, taking into account the different levels at which the organisation of work 
is negotiated and regulated. In a context in which employee representation was not 
universal and where working parents did not have a strong collective voice, voluntary 
regulation of family-friendly arrangements through autonomous collective bargaining 
was not extensive. In the UK, low levels of unionisation, and low levels of trade union 
recognition combined with decentralised collective bargaining practice gave unilateral 
management decisions on the introduction of family-friendly working time 
arrangements the greatest relative weight. But even in Germany were collective 
bargaining practice was highly centralized, covering three quarters of employees, 
coverage of collective bargaining was not universal. Although employee 
representatives in the German system of employment relations had better structural 
conditions to negotiate family-friendly working time conditions, this potential was not 
used (Klenner 2005). Family-friendly working time flexibility was not a priority on 
bargaining agendas. Only a comparatively low number of workplaces had introduced 
family-friendly provisions on the basis of collective agreements. In the absence of state 
regulation and collective bargaining, the voluntary provision by employers was shown 
to vary by industrial sectors, organisational size and exposure to work-family 
pressures, the gender composition of the workforce, and management awareness and 
attitudes (Dex and Smith 2002; Krell and Ortlieb 2003). Working parents employed in 
male-dominated workplaces and sectors, in small establishments with line managers 
and top management who are unaware or insensitive to work-family pressures were 
less likely to work for an employer offering family-friendly working time 
arrangements than other working parents. Access to family-friendly working time 
arrangements within workplaces where these are formally offered is further hampered 
by restrictions on eligibility within the workforce on the basis of individual 
characteristics and discretional management practices, unsupportive workplace 
cultures and opportunity costs in terms of promotions and lost earnings (Bailyn 2002; 
Böhm et al. 2002; Budd and Mumford 2003).  
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Drawing together the main findings of the chapter, the access problematic in Germany 
and the United Kingdom can be summarised as follows: in the absence of universal 
state regulation, the provision of family-friendly working time arrangements to 
working parents is subject to collective agreements between trade unions and 
employers and their representatives, the voluntary introduction by employers at the 
level of the firm and individual negotiations between parents and their managers. 
Neither collective bargaining nor voluntary employer provision had yielded 
widespread access to family-friendly working time arrangements in the late 1990s. 
Provision varied between and within workplaces creating structural access inequalities 
between working parents. Access inequalities were further associated with individual 
characteristics such as education and employment status and gender. Reconciliation 
policies by both governments reinforced the male breadwinner arrangement through 
the lack of support of dual-earner arrangements and no explicit government strategy to 
improve access to family-friendly employment practices was pursued. 
This approach changed under the incoming centre-left governments who explicitly 
supported female employment and saw the facilitation of the simultaneous 
reconciliation of work and family responsibilities in a dual-earner model as a societal 
rather than private responsibility to be shared by parents, employers and the state. 
Within this changed approach to work-family reconciliation more widely, both New 
Labour and the ‘Red-Green’ Government started to explicitly address the access 
problematic explored in this chapter through government interventions in the 
employment relationship. The review of policy legacies inherited by the incoming 
governments revealed different starting points for policy development: while New 
Labour’s policy strategy built on a liberal legacy of non-regulation and minimal state 
intervention in support of working mothers, which assumed the male breadwinner 
family arrangement, the German legacy was one of explicit resource allocation in 
favour of the male breadwinner/female carer family arrangement through long parental 
leave entitlements and tax and benefit incentives. Further policy differences were 
identified with regard to working time regulation with a non-regulative policy 
approach in the UK compared to statutory regulation of minimum and maximum 
working hours, rest periods and annual leave in Germany. 
Chapters Four and Five trace the development of family-friendly working time policy 
on the basis of different policy legacies in the two countries, placing attempts to 
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address the problematic discussed in this chapter within the wider development of 
reconciliation packages of family leave, childcare policies, and working time policies. 
In order to explore how and to what extent the New Labour and ‘Red-Green’ 
governments addressed the access problematic of increasing provision on the one 
hand, and matching the flexibility offered with employee needs on the other hand, a 
comparative analytical framework is developed in the next chapter. It enables the 
comparative analysis of policy strategies in terms of instrument choice and design and 
cross-national variation along a number of dimensions of employee empowerment.  
Chapter 3 
70 
 
3. A framework for comparative analysis 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework for cross-national, 
comparative policy analysis to address the research question of the thesis: what policy 
strategies did the British and German governments pursue to improve access to family-
friendly working time arrangements, in what ways did they differ, and why? To 
address this research question, the policy strategies pursued by the two governments 
were analysed in terms of instrument choice and design: which policy instruments they 
chose to increase access, and how these were designed.  
The key challenge in the development of this comparative analytical framework was to 
identify a dimension of comparison which links the three components of the research 
puzzle as well as capturing the implications for gender and employment relations. In 
order to compare the policy output both over time and cross-nationally in a purposeful 
way, it was necessary to develop an indicator that allows ‘measurement’ of the degree 
to which policy output addresses access constraints to family-friendly working time 
arrangements. In this chapter, I propose that the concept of employee ‘empowerment’ 
meets this requirement. The concept of ‘empowerment’ encapsulates state-individual 
and employee-employer relations in that it considers the degree to which government 
policy empowers individuals with care responsibilities to negotiate the working time 
arrangements they need within the context of asymmetrical power relations between 
employees and employers. The assumption here is that the more working parents are 
‘empowered’ to negotiate the working time arrangements they need, the more likely it 
is that they will gain access to the type of working time flexibility they require. It is 
important to distinguish between employer and employee-oriented working time 
flexibility. The availability of flexible working time arrangements in workplaces does 
not necessarily mean that flexibility is oriented at employee needs (Rubery et al. 1998; 
Everingham 2002). An employee-focused perspective gives consideration to the 
diversity of individual time needs and access constraints. 
I consider the concept of empowerment useful in three respects: firstly, it is a good 
indicator of family-friendliness as it focuses on the ability of individuals to flexibly 
adjust work and family responsibilities in line with their individual time needs, rather 
than evaluating family-friendliness by the mere presence of flexible working time 
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arrangements irrespective of whether these are oriented at employee needs or not. The 
working time needs of working parents vary depending on the age of the child and the 
particular needs for care. For example, time needs are different depending on whether 
the care is for infants, school age children, or disabled children. Not all family-friendly 
working time arrangements offered by employers necessarily meet the time needs of 
working parents. A defining criterion of the family-friendliness of a policy strategy is 
therefore the empowerment of working parents to obtain a certain degree of control 
over working time flexibility, which allows the adjustment of work schedules to 
individual needs.  
Secondly, the concept of empowerment provides an important conceptual tool for the 
analysis of policy choice and design. In the literature, systematic analysis of instrument 
choices usually begins with an attempt to identify a single or limited number of 
dimensions along which categories of policy instruments are said to vary (see for 
example Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett 2000). A systematic comparison of policy 
measures against criteria of empowerment allows one to critically explore the 
empowering potential of a given policy package. In practice, a highly empowering 
policy design might not lead to the increase in access that is intended by policy 
makers. A policy package with a low empowering potential, which is not designed to 
empower working parents to negotiate the time flexibility that they need, is even less 
likely to have a strong impact on access outcomes. An assessment of the empowering 
potential of the German and British policy strategies was pursued to address the 
question to what extent they were designed to empower working mothers and fathers.  
Thirdly, I have chosen to analyse policy choice and design from an ‘empowerment’ 
perspective because I expect there to be a connection between the empowering 
potential of certain instruments and instrument attributes and actor interests, which in 
turn helps one to understand the politics of instrument choice and design. The concept 
of empowerment draws the link between certain types of instruments and their 
attributes and interest politics in this particular field, as government intervention in the 
realm of working time organisation touches upon the core of power relations between 
employers and employees in the employment relationship. Thus, an empowerment 
perspective allows one to address both questions on the degree of family-friendliness 
of a given policy strategy, as well as questions relating to the policy process of 
choosing certain policy instruments and attributes in design over others.  
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The chapter is structured into two parts. The first part develops the comparative 
framework used to analyse policy strategies to improve access to family-friendly 
working time arrangements from a cross-national perspective. Policy strategies are 
compared in terms of instrument selection and design. First, drawing on the instrument 
choice literature, three broad instrument categories of ‘regulation’, ‘economic means’, 
and ‘information’ instruments (Vedung 2003), and their respective ‘empowering 
potential’, are distinguished to allow systematic comparison of instrument choice 
across countries. Then, five criteria to assess the degree of empowerment of a given 
policy measure are constructed for the systematic comparison of family-friendliness at 
the level of policy design. The second part of the chapter turns to the politics of 
instrument choice and design and the question of how differences in policy approaches 
between countries can be explained. Drawing on the policy making literature, policy 
choices are conceptualised as being shaped by the ideas and interests of actors who 
operate and interact with the nationally specific institutional configurations and policy 
contexts. 
I. A framework for the comparison of policy choice and design 
This section sets out the methodological approach chosen for the comparative policy 
analysis. The comparison of policy developments between 1997 and 2005 proceeded 
through two steps: first, the selection of policy instruments was explored, addressing 
the question of what policy strategies were pursued to increase access and in what way 
instrument choice has varied over time and across countries. This then lead to the 
second step of analysing and comparing the specific design of policy instruments to 
address the question of how empowering they were designed to be. 
1. The government’s ‘tool kit’: instrument choice  
The first step in the comparison scrutinises the selection of policy instruments to 
systematically compare policy strategies in the two countries. Policy instruments are 
the empirically observable output of a government’s policy strategy14. In creating new 
policy, policy makers select among different ‘means’ (Woodside 1998) or ‘techniques’ 
                                                 
14 Non-intervention is also a policy choice (Anderson 1977). The discussion of government choices 
between policy instruments presupposes that a decision in favour of intervention was made (Vedung 
2003). 
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(Schneider and Ingram 1990) available to them to attempt to achieve a policy goal. 
These means or techniques are commonly referred to as ‘policy instruments’. Within 
political science, the study of policy instruments has been advanced as a method of 
analysing policy processes that focuses on policy instruments, their (perceived) 
attributes, and the rationale for their selection (Howlett 2004). There is a long tradition 
in policy analysis to classify different instrument types according to shared 
characteristics or principles (for example Anderson 1977; Bardach 1977; Doern and 
Phidd 1983; McDonnell and Elmore 1987; Schneider and Ingram 1990). The most 
commonly used classification of policy instruments distinguishes between different 
types of instruments on the basis of the governing resources they employ (Hood 1983; 
de Bruijn and Hufen 1998).  
A prevalent resource-based classification scheme is Vedung’s Carrots, Sticks and 
Sermons classification that proposes that instruments fall into one of three mutually 
exclusive categories: ‘Regulations’ (Sticks), ‘Economic means’ (Carrots) or 
‘Information’ (Sermons)15 (Vedung 2003). Vedung differentiates as follows: 
As to the relationship between governor and governee, the typology takes three 
basic possibilities into consideration. In the regulatory case, the governee is 
obligated to do what the governor tells her to do. In the second instance, the 
governee is not obligated to perform an action but the governor may make 
action easier or more difficult by adduction or deprivation of material 
resources. Thirdly, the relationship may be persuasive, to wit, involving only 
the communication of claims and reasons but neither material resources nor 
obligatory directives. These three relationships are the defining properties of 
the classes of regulatory, economic, and informative policy instruments 
(Vedung 2003 p.31)  
In the following, I shall briefly review his framework and propose a number of 
amendments. 
Regulation 
In Vedung’s terms, ‘regulations are measures undertaken by governmental units to 
influence people by means of formulated rules and directives, which mandate receivers 
to act in accordance with what is ordered in these rules and directives’ (Vedung 2003 
p.31). It is important to note that Vedung’s use of the term differs from the common 
                                                 
15 These three categories are derived from Etzioni’s three-fold classification of power distinguishing 
between coercive, remunerative, and normative power, where power is defined as ‘an actor’s ability to 
induce or influence another actor to carry out his directives or any other norms he supports’ (Etzioni 
1975 p.5 ff) 
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use of ‘regulation’ in the literature as an all embracing category of political control16. 
Vedung considers regulation as ‘just one of a wider variety of tools that governments 
have at their disposal to exert power over the actions of their citizens’ (Vedung 2003 
p.32). 
While Vedung rightly notes that regulations are not always associated with threats of 
negative sanctions, he stipulates that the defining property of regulation is ‘that the 
relationship is authoritative, meaning that the controlled persons or groups are 
obligated to act in the way stated by the controllers’ (p.31). Viewed from an 
empowerment perspective, this definition of authority is limiting as it omits the use of 
government authority to empower as well as to obligate. Through the use of law, 
regulation can be used to allocate rights as well as obligations. In the context of 
employment relations, the rights of some (working parents) are associated with the 
obligations of others (employers). Extending Vedung’s definition of government 
authority to encompass empowering as well as controlling, the complexity of 
‘governor-governee’ relations can be better captured. 
Economic means 
‘Economic policy instruments involve either the handing out or the taking away of 
material resources, be they in cash or in kind. [They] make it cheaper or more 
expensive in terms of money, time, effort, or other valuables to pursue certain actions 
but in contrast to regulations, governees are not obligated to take certain actions’ 
(Vedung 2003 p.32). This leeway to choose not to take certain actions makes economic 
instruments ‘principally different from regulation’ (Ibid.). While economic instruments 
may provide subsidies for the purchase of childcare, they do not entitle parents to a 
childcare place. Similarly while cash benefits might be paid to full-time parents as a 
compensation for lost earnings, it is different from entitling them to family leave or 
working time reduction by law. Vedung’s category of economic instruments includes 
monetary as well as non-monetary material resources, thus including for example the 
provision of childcare services as well as cash benefits towards their costs. 
                                                 
16 For example Meier: ‘Regulation is any attempt by the government to control the behavior of citizens, 
corporations or sub-governments. In a sense, regulation is nothing more than the government’s effort to 
limit the choices available to individuals within society’ (Meier 1985 p.1).  
Chapter 3 
75 
 
Information 
Information, ‘also referred to as “moral suasion”, or exhortation, covers attempts at 
influencing people through the transfer of knowledge, the communication of reasoned 
argument, and persuasion’ (Vedung 2003 p.33). Vedung uses the information category 
as: 
a catch-all term for all information campaigns; for the diffusion of printed 
materials like brochures, pamphlets, booklets, folders, fliers, bulletins, 
handbills, and posters; for advertising, labelling, audits, inspections, 
demonstration programs, custom-made personal advice, training programmes, 
and educational efforts; and for other forms of amassing, packaging, and 
diffusion of knowledge and recommendations (Ibid.).  
The absence of obligation (entitlement) and handing out or taking away of material 
resources distinguishes ‘information’ from the previous two categories. Vedung’s 
classification scheme is particularly useful for the study of family-friendly working 
time policy as it explicitly includes information as a separate category of policy 
instruments. The attempt to influence the behaviour of employers through information 
and persuasion to provide family-friendly working time arrangements in the absence of 
regulation and economic incentives is an important component of both the German and 
British policy strategies (DfEE 2000a; BMFSFJ and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). 
Figure 3 provides examples of regulation, economic means and information-based 
policy measures. 
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Figure 3: Policy examples by type of instrument category 
POLICY 
INSTRUMENT TYPE 
POLICY EXAMPLES  
Regulation 
Working Time Regulations 
Employment rights to family-friendly working time patterns 
Economic 
incentives 
Tax concessions for the provision of family-friendly working 
time arrangements 
Financial transfers compensating the loss in earnings 
Information  
Information campaigns on the benefits of family-friendly 
working time arrangements 
 
The basis of division: degree of authoritative force / empowerment 
In line with much of the literature on policy instruments, the ‘Carrots, Sticks and 
Sermons’ scheme is organised around the theme of coerciveness (Anderson 1977; 
Doern and Phidd 1983; Linder and Peters 1989). Vedung sees the basis of division 
between the different categories of instruments in the ‘authoritative force involved in 
the governance efforts’ (Vedung 2003 p.34). By authoritative force he means ‘the 
degree of power which the government is prepared to use in order to achieve 
compliance’ (Ibid. p. 34). On this basis of division, ‘regulation is more constraining for 
addressees than economic means, and the latter are more constraining than 
information’ (Ibid. p. 35).  
Vedung’s conceptualisation of the degree of authoritative force involved in the 
governing relationship can usefully be drawn upon to conceptualise the differences in 
the ‘empowering potential’ of different instrument categories among which 
governments can choose in the development of family-friendly working time policy 
(see Figure 4). Regulations can provide statutory entitlements to access family-friendly 
working time arrangements and obligate employers by law to provide them or to 
accommodate employee rights. Therefore they have a greater ‘empowering potential’ 
than attempts to encourage family-friendliness through the provision of economic 
incentives such as tax concessions or through information, research and guidance. This 
does not mean that regulations are necessarily backed by negative sanctions in the case 
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of non-compliance, but they can be, contrary to an information campaign. The 
selection of policy instruments therefore provides an indication on whether or not 
governments are prepared to intervene in the given power balance between employers 
and working parents. The choice of statutory regulation indicates the willingness to 
back up the interests of working parents with state power, whereas information 
instruments leave the power balance between employers and employees relatively 
unchallenged. The introduction of family-friendly working time arrangements is left to 
the good will of employers.  
Figure 4: The empowering potential of the governing effort by instrument types 
HIGH →            LOW 
 
Regulation 
 
Economic means 
 
Information  
   
 
In other words, employment rights can be backed up by sanctions and therefore be 
more coercive than an information programme, which tries to persuade rather than 
coerce. This does not necessarily mean that an information programme is not 
empowering: by informing working parents about different working time arrangements 
that could help them ease work family reconciliation pressures, and by providing 
guidance on how to negotiate their case, such programmes can empower through 
capacity building. This form of empowerment, however, is generally perceived as less 
threatening by employers and therefore employers can be assumed to be more 
supportive of information programmes than employment rights.  
Policy packages 
Policy instruments to address a particular policy problem tend to come in packages 
rather than in isolation (Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung 2003). The empowering 
potential of policy strategies is stronger if policy instruments are combined than if they 
are employed in isolation. This can be illustrated with the well-researched example of 
family leave policies: the allocation of cash benefits (economic means) to working 
mothers in the form of Statutory Maternity Pay makes ‘time to care’ more affordable, 
empowering them to take up an entitlement to maternity leave (regulation). This in 
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turn represents a greater shift in the power balance between the working mother and 
her employer as the choice of taking leave from employment is more ‘real’ when it is 
financially affordable (Beckmann 2001b). If the mother then chooses to allocate time 
to care by taking the leave, this in turn forces the employer to adjust the work 
organisation to her choice. From the employers’ perspective, family-friendly working 
time policy which uses economic means to substantiate formal rights represents a 
greater shift in the power balance than entitlements to family-friendly working time 
arrangements alone as it empowers working parents to act on their rights. Applying the 
example to fathers in the form of paternity pay and paternity leave, the provision of 
paternity pay enables fathers to afford time to care which has an equality promoting 
effect on gender relations by enabling a more equal time allocation to care. It further 
impacts on employment relations in that employers are faced with both men and 
women being able to afford ‘time to care’, representing an even greater potential 
impact on the power balance as it enables more employees to afford time to care. The 
packaging of policy instruments can strengthen the empowering potential of a policy 
strategy. 
Broad instrument categories provide some indication of the empowering potential of a 
chosen policy strategy based on the degree of authoritative force governments are 
prepared to involve, and resources they are willing to invest. However, limiting the 
analysis to the question of instrument choice would fail to capture potential variations 
within instrument categories created through instrument design. Kenneth Woodside 
has drawn attention to the need to ‘recognize that each policy instrument itself can be 
used in a wide range of ways that involve different degrees of coercion’ (Woodside 
1986 p.788). He emphasised that each instrument can be ‘structured, disaggregated and 
moulded to fit political circumstances’ (Ibid.), making it necessary to pay careful 
attention to the specific form an instrument takes, rather than just resorting to broad 
classification by types of instrument. In a later contribution he distinguished between 
two levels of choice to introduce a sharper focus on the politics of instrument choice. 
The examination of the process of instrument choice from this perspective involves, at 
the first level, the choice of one instrument over another, and at the second level the 
choice of appropriate characteristics of the instrument that has been chosen (Woodside 
1998). I refer to this second level of choice as the level of instrument design. A policy 
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strategy can be more or less empowering depending on first, which policy instruments 
are chosen and second, how each instrument is designed.  
2. The devil lies in the detail: comparing policy design 
The task of this section is to operationalise the concept of empowerment for the 
comparative analysis of policy design. As an indicator of family-friendliness, the 
concept of ‘empowerment’ needs to be defined in a way that is applicable to the 
context of family-friendly working time policy. This involves defining the degree of 
empowerment of working parents in terms of a number of ‘measurable’ criteria against 
which policy measures can be analysed and compared. These criteria must be at once 
relevant for individual access and applicable to aggregate policy measures. To enable 
the systematic comparison of policy over time and across countries, it is necessary that 
the criteria of ‘empowerment’ can travel across different types of policy instruments. 
Based on insights regarding access constraints gained from the different literatures on 
working time flexibility, management and organisational research, employment 
relations and gender regimes discussed in Chapters One and Two, I derived five 
indicators to operationalise the concept of ‘empowerment’. These five Empowerment 
Criteria explore who benefits (breadth of coverage), whether policies address working 
parents directly or via intermediary actors (precision of targeting), the degree to which 
working parents have control over the type of flexibility of their working time 
arrangements (scope of employee control over working time flexiblity), whether 
employee preferences can be enforced in the face of employer opposition 
(enforceability), and finally, whether policies address the opportunity costs attached to 
flexible working time arrangements, such as detrimental treatment or financial loss 
(opportunity costs). These will be briefly discussed in turn.  
1. Breadth of coverage 
The review of the literature in Chapter Two highlighted the strong variation in access 
both across and within workplaces (Dex and Smith 2002; Phillips et al. 2002; Budd 
and Mumford 2003; Krell and Ortlieb 2003). Government policy can redress access 
inequalities arising through voluntary provision and collective bargaining by 
universally targeting policies at those in need. An indicator measuring the ‘breadth of 
coverage’ is needed to capture the degree to which government policy aims to redress 
access inequalities or reinforces them. Selectively targeted policy measures, for 
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example, only cover a subgroup of the population of working parents, excluding 
others. Selectivity criteria include targeting by individual attributes such as care status, 
gender, or employment status, or by employer attributes such as employer size or 
industrial sector. Breadth of coverage can be measured along a continuum of highly 
selective to universal coverage, where a highly selective approach is associated with a 
low degree of empowerment, and a universal approach is associated with a high degree 
of empowerment. The more working parents are covered by a policy, the more 
‘empowering’ it is. 
2. Precision of targeting 
Given the multi-level structure of working time negotiation involving a broad range of 
actors with influence on working time organisation (Anxo and O'Reilly 2000), the 
second criterion for the measurement of empowerment is the precision of targeting. 
Here I distinguish between direct and indirect targeting of policy measures. Policy 
measures that are directly targeted at working parents are seen as most empowering, 
and measures that are indirectly targeted at them via their representatives or via 
employers, or employer representatives, are progressively less empowering. Indirectly 
targeted policies are less empowering because they are channelled through 
intermediary actors who may or may not act in the interest of working parents (Berg et 
al. 2004; Pärnänen et al. 2005). Therefore, indirect policy measures have less potential 
to impact on their intended beneficiaries in the intended way than policy measures that 
are directly targeted at them. Directly targeted policy measures are therefore rated 
highly empowering, whereas policy measures directed at employer representatives 
represent a comparatively low degree of empowerment. 
3. Scope of employee control over working time flexibility 
The third criterion is the scope of employee control over working time flexibility, and 
the extent to which policies allow working parents to adjust their working time patterns 
to their individual time needs. Feminists for a long time have advocated a reduction in 
normal working hours as a gender equitable working time scenario which allows a 
more equal sharing of care work between men and women and gender equity in the 
labour market (Rubery et al. 1998; Mutari and Figart 2001). Although part-time work 
provides time to care, feminist research emphasises the associated risks. Part-time 
work is often associated with a reduction in labour standards (Rubery 1998) and can 
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imply lower hourly wages compared to full-time employment, and reduced benefits 
and pension outcomes (Ginn and Arber 1998). Further, a reduction of working hours 
can be problematic when it is exchanged for greater employer flexibility in scheduling 
(Gornick and Heron 2006). A consideration of employee control is crucial to avoid 
confusing employee-oriented flexible working opportunities with imposed flexibility 
by firms (Bettio et al. 1996). Everingham warns that a focus on working time reduction 
is too limited by arguing that:  
It is not just the hours worked that are the issue, but the control that workers 
have over their working hours [...] the call for shorter working hours for all 
does not necessarily address this issue of flexibility – and the need for greater 
worker control over the hours that are worked (Everingham 2002 p. 345).  
As the care responsibilities and reconciliation arrangements of working parents are 
diverse and variable over time, ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies do not necessarily meet 
individual time needs. Access to part-time employment, when what is needed is a 
variable distribution of full-time working hours over the working week, is therefore not 
empowering. Therefore, policies enabling variation in both length and distribution of 
working hours are rated more empowering than policies that are limited in the scope of 
time flexibility they allow.   
In addition to the flexibility in terms of length and distribution of hours worked, 
flexibility in ‘procedural’ matters such as the frequency with which employees can 
make requests and whether arrangements are permanent or can be reversed are 
considered, taking account of the changing nature of time needs across the care cycle. 
Empowerment is measured by the degree of employee-oriented flexibility: the more it 
enables working parents to adjust work and care responsibilities according to 
individual need, the more empowering the policy is.  
4. Enforceability 
The fourth criterion is the degree of enforceability of policy measures. If working time 
regulations or employment rights entitle working parents to certain types of working 
time flexibility but non-compliance by employers is not sanctioned, then the degree of 
enforceability is low. This corresponds to a low degree of empowerment as actual 
access is jeopardized although it is formally improved. A growing body of 
organisational literature points to discrepancies between policy and practice at the level 
of the firm, where workplace culture and management practice can undermine access 
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to formally provided policies (for example Højgaard 1998; Burke 2002). While 
government policy cannot ensure compliance in implementation, safeguards can be 
built into policy design. This criterion considers how easy it is for employers to ignore 
or refuse requests for family-friendly working time arrangements.  
The degree of enforceability also allows a distinction between different types of policy 
instruments and their ‘empowering potential’. While statutory regulations can be 
backed up by sanctions for non-compliance, this is not the case with information 
campaigns and best practice dissemination. The anticipated fear of employment 
tribunals and costly compensation payments can be a strong motivation for employers 
to comply with policy requirements. This can considerably strengthen the negotiation 
position of working parents wanting to change their working time arrangements.  
5. Opportunity costs 
The fifth criterion of empowerment refers to the opportunity costs associated with 
family-friendly working time arrangements. The higher the opportunity costs attached 
to family-friendly working time arrangements, the lower the degree of empowerment. 
High opportunity costs in terms of risk of job loss (Lewis and Cooper 1999), career 
impediments (Bailyn 2002), and financial loss (Vaskovics and Rost 1999; Beckmann 
2001b; Yeandle et al. 2002), are major deterrents to take-up, even if working time 
flexibility is greatly needed. Actual or perceived opportunity costs that act as a barrier 
to take-up are extremely difficult to measure. I shall define policy measures aimed at 
reducing the opportunity costs borne by working parents making use of family-friendly 
working time arrangements as empowering. An example of such policy would be the 
protection of working parents from dismissal, or disadvantaged treatment compared to 
workers working standard hours. Other examples include policies attempting to reduce 
the financial loss incurred through care related working time reduction by financial 
state transfers. The absence of such opportunity cost reducing policy measures will be 
rated as a low degree of empowerment. 
The degree to which a certain policy measure can be said to be ‘empowering’ to 
working parents can be assessed with regard to how it ‘scores’ on the five defining 
criteria: coverage, targeting, the scope of employee control over working time 
flexibility, enforceability, and opportunity costs. Figure 3 provides an overview of 
variation. 
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Figure 3: Criteria of Empowerment 
 CRITERIA OF 
EMPOWERMENT 
POLICY DESIGN DEGREE OF 
EMPOWERMENT 
1 Breadth of coverage Universal / highly selective High/low 
2 Precision of targeting  Direct / indirect High/low 
3 Scope of employee 
control over working time 
flexibility 
Broad choice of time variations / 
limited time variation 
High/low 
4 Enforceability Backed by sanctions / voluntary High/low 
5 Opportunity costs  Policies tackling disadvantage 
and, or, financial loss relative to 
standard hours /  no policy 
intervention 
High/low 
 
Summing up, each category of policy instruments (information, economic means, and 
regulation) has through their different characteristics varying potential to empower 
working parents. Given the particular significance of affordability in the context of the 
work/family interface, it is important to consider the combination of instruments in 
determining the degree of empowerment, as a formal right (regulation) which is not 
backed up financially (economic means) might entitle parents to reduce their working 
hours without significantly improving access if they cannot afford to do so due to the 
financial loss associated. Further, each policy instrument can be designed to be more or 
less empowering depending on the choices that are made with regard to its attributes as 
illustrated in Figure 3.  
The comparative empowerment framework provides a tool to systematically compare 
the German and British policy strategies in terms of instrument choice and design. It 
further allows to identify the empowering potential of the types of policy instruments 
and their attributes that were chosen by the respective governments, and to identify 
cross-national differences between them. However, the framework tells us little about 
why certain choices are made, and why policy strategies might vary over time and 
between countries. These questions are addressed in the remainder of the chapter, 
which turns to the politics of instrument choice and design. 
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II. Analysing variation in instrument choice and design 
Family-friendly working time policy strategies in Germany and the UK were analysed 
over the time period of approximately one decade. In this time, New Labour (1997-
2005) and the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition governments (1998-2005) progressively 
developed their policy responses to the problem of insufficient and unequally 
distributed access to family-friendly working time arrangements. While the policy goal 
of improving access was the same in both countries, the approaches of the two 
governments differed over the time period considered and compared to each other. In 
order to understand both changing policy choices over time and cross-national 
variation, one must contextualise the process of instrument choice and design both 
within time and within its nationally specific context (Pierson 2000b). Policy choices 
are influenced by many factors. To reduce complexity and to make policy explanation 
possible and manageable, scholars have to make choices as to which factors to 
emphasise and which ones to ignore in the analysis. These choices are made explicit by 
the theoretical framework applied (Nagel 1999). The perspective adopted here is that 
policy strategies are developed by actors who have different interests and ideas and 
operate within different institutional settings and policy contexts (Howlett and Ramesh 
2003).  
Policy instruments are employed as means to reach policy goals (Woodside 1998). 
Different policy goals can provide explanations for variation in policy choice and 
design. At the specific policy level, both governments were pursuing the same goal, 
namely to increase access to family-friendly working time arrangements to enable 
parents to combine paid work and family care. However, this specific policy goal is 
embedded within a wider policy agenda in which it serves other, overarching, policy 
goals. Family-friendly working time arrangements are instrumental in the 
reconciliation of work and family care, which in turn is instrumental in attaining other 
policy goals such as poverty prevention, labour market inclusion, child welfare, and 
equal opportunities between men and women (OECD 2002). In other words, although 
both countries wanted the same thing at the specific policy level, they may have 
wanted it for different reasons. Depending on government priorities, family-friendly 
working time policy, for example, could be either biased towards increasing the 
employability of parents (time to work), or towards enabling workers to spend more 
time with their children (time to care). The selection of policy instruments must 
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therefore be contextualised within the wider policy agenda of a given government at a 
particular point in time, as the government’s overarching priorities can provide 
explanations for the choice of certain policy instruments over others, and their design.  
Due to the instrumentality of work-family reconciliation to a wide array of policy 
objectives, actors across policy fields are interested in its promotion. The policy 
process involves a number of policy actors operating in different government 
institutions where they plan and develop policy reforms under different policy 
agendas. Indeed, the development of family-friendly working time policy was in both 
countries organisationally fragmented, spanning across different policy fields for 
which different government departments were responsible. In the UK, responsibility 
for the development of family-friendly working time policy was primarily shared 
between the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) and the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI)17. In Germany, responsibility was shared between the 
Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) and the Federal Ministry for 
the Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ). Under the roof of 
employment policy, industrial relations, family policy, equal opportunities or poverty 
prevention, policy measures with implications for access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements might be developed as a by-product of wider reforms. As different 
departments have different institutionalised policy priorities and ways of doing policy, 
instrument selection and design can vary as a result (Linder and Peters 1989). 
The institutional set up within which actors influence policy choice and design is 
different for regulatory and information based instruments. Institutions are here 
defined, following Hall, as the ‘formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard 
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals’ (Hall 1986). A 
new law, for example, undergoes a policy formulation and decision making process, 
which differs fundamentally from the development of an information campaign. While 
the policy process for the passing of laws undergoes a formal decision making 
procedure, where the passing of laws depends on majority voting, information 
campaigns are developed and managed under the discretion of government ministers 
and civil servants in the state executive. Here, policy decisions are not directly subject 
                                                 
17 Departments changed over the period of consideration and since: In the UK, the Department for 
Education and Employment was changed to the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) in 2001. 
The Department of Trade and Industry was changed to the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) in 2007.  
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to parliamentary majorities. Institutions ‘provide incentives, opportunities and 
constraints’ for actors to influence policy choice and design by structuring the relative 
influence of different actors on decision-making (Immergut 1992 p.32). 
New policy decisions are made against the backdrop of the ‘policy inheritance’ 
resulting from previous years, or decades, of past policy choices which represent ‘a 
vast deadweight of accumulated practices and ways of thinking’ (Heclo 1974 p.46). 
Past policy experiences influence the approach of policy makers, who follow 
established ways of doing, or react against them when these are perceived to create 
policy failure. In the first case, the literature speaks of ‘path dependence’, in other 
words of continuity along a chosen policy path where preceding steps in a particular 
direction induce further movement in the same direction (Pierson 2000a). The 
conception that once a particular policy path has been taken, the return to policy 
alternatives comes at relatively higher costs than continuing along the chosen path, has 
been more amenable to explain continuity in policy approaches than change (Levi 
1997). Where past policy choices are seen to have failed to achieve their intended 
outcomes, dissatisfaction can provoke policy change (Palier 2005). Policy change can 
occur through a process of ‘learning’ from past experience and new knowledge (Heclo 
1974; Hall 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). In both Germany and the UK, the 
dissatisfaction with low provision levels and access inequalities in the absence of state 
intervention prompted governments to decide to address this problem through 
government policy (Home Office 1998; BMFSFJ 1999). As previous governments had 
not proactively attempted to address access constraints, no previous knowledge was 
however available on the effectiveness of regulation, financial support, or persuasion 
strategies (see Chapter Two). Despite the absence of a statutory past in family-friendly 
working time regulation, policy developments in Britain and Germany did not develop 
on a clean sheet.  
Within the wider realm of working time policy, employment relations, and work-
family reconciliation, the policy legacies inherited from the Conservative/Liberal 
governments of the 1980s and 1990s differed widely (Chapter Two). The British 
policy inheritance was a very low level of employment regulations and no explicit 
reconciliation policy. The German inheritance on the other hand was a policy mix, 
which provided strong incentives for mothers to exit employment. The policy 
framework in place in the 1990s differed. Policy makers in the two countries reacted to 
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different policy legacies and ways of dealing with work-family reconciliation and 
working time regulation. Nationally specific institutional configurations, policy 
legacies and policy agendas influence the formulation of policy strategies. Different 
starting points, different policy traditions and ways of doing, and different institutional 
constellations within which actors operate and different policy goals to which work-
family reconciliation is instrumental represent important possible determinants of 
variation across countries and over time. In order to understand the rationale for 
instrument selection and design and variation in the empowering potential of policy 
strategies, one must further consider the actors involved in the policy process, their 
ideas and interests, and interactions between them (Smith 1993; Sabatier 1999). Two 
explanatory propositions that are derived from the policy making literature are 
explored in the following discussion: firstly, that policy makers are more likely to 
choose instruments and instrument attributes that are in line with their own interests 
and ideas (Surel 2000); and secondly, that policy makers are more likely to 
accommodate interest group demands if they are in a relationship of inter-dependence, 
for example when policy makers need the cooperation of interest groups for policy 
implementation (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996; Kooiman 2000). Let us consider these 
two propositions in turn. 
1) Policy makers are more likely to opt for policy instruments which are congruent 
with their wider normative and cognitive frames 
In recent decades, an increasing number of scholars have developed theoretical 
frameworks asking how ideas, principles, values and beliefs influence and constrain 
the behaviour of policy makers and the dynamics of the policy-making process (Braun 
and Busch 1999; Surel 2000; Capano 2003). A number of concepts have been 
developed to grasp the cognitive and normative dimensions of policy making, namely 
frames (Schön and Rein 1994), belief systems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), 
référentiels (Jobert and Muller 1987) or paradigms (Hall 1993). Yves Surel has 
brought together these different concepts under the general expression of ‘normative 
and cognitive frames’ referring to ‘coherent systems of normative and cognitive 
elements which define in a given field, ‘world views’, mechanisms of identity 
formation, principles of action, as well as methodological prescriptions and practices 
for actors subscribing to the same frame’ (Surel 2000 496).  
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Analytically, the central elements of cognitive and normative frames can be located on 
a hierarchical scale descending from the general to the specific. Surel categorised these 
as ‘metaphysical principles’, ‘specific principles’, ‘forms of action’, and ‘instruments’ 
(Surel 2000 p.496).  On the most general level are values and metaphysical principles, 
sometimes referred to as a ‘world view’. Sabatier calls this level the deep core. It 
includes ‘basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the relative valuation of 
individual freedom versus social equality, which operates across all policy domains’ 
(Sabatier 1998 p.103). An example, drawn from Peter Hall’s research, would be neo-
liberal principles guiding policy decision across different policy fields (Hall 1993). 
Embedded within these general norms, values and beliefs are more ‘specific 
principles’ relevant to a specific policy field, which Sabatier calls the policy core. 
These define ‘legitimate strategies with respect to objectives more or less specifically 
prescribed by general principles’ (Surel 2000 p.498). From the general and policy-
specific cognitive and normative frames are then derived ‘practical considerations of 
the most appropriate methods and means to achieve the defined values and objectives’ 
(Ibid.), which draws the link from the ‘mental maps’ constructed by cognitive and 
normative frames to the delimitation of instrument choices to implement a particular 
policy strategy. Finally, the last level is concerned with the specification of 
instruments. The normative and cognitive frame ‘delimits the scope of necessary and 
potential instruments and the relative importance of each of them’ (Surel 2000 p.499). 
Thus, policy preferences regarding certain categories of instrument and their attributes 
at the specific policy level are framed by the wider cognitive and normative 
orientations of policy makers.  
Adopting this insight to the development of family-friendly working time policy 
strategies, it is necessary to explore the wider ideational context within which 
decisions on policy instruments are embedded. What is seen to be the appropriate role 
of the state in the governance of employment relations? And under which conditions 
can state intervention be justified? Is the negotiation of working time perceived to be 
the strict right and responsibility of management and labour, or is state regulation 
justified by the aim of redressing market inequalities? How is the value of time 
sovereignty conceptualised, as a social good or right, or as a benefit subordinate to 
business prerogatives? Is the care of children understood foremost as a parental 
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responsibility or as a social responsibility to be met through the provision of public 
services (Folbre 1994; Gornick and Meyers 2003)?  
An ideational approach suggests that policy makers are more likely to opt for policy 
instruments which are congruent with their wider normative and cognitive frames. For 
example, if policy makers subscribe to a neo-liberal view of state-economy relations, 
this mind-set is likely to rule out policy instruments which involve regulatory 
interventions in the employment relationship. Within the German and British context 
of the late 1990s, parties of the political left came to power, which are generally 
considered more willing to redress market-created inequalities than parties of the 
political right (Huber and Stephens 2000). Indeed both New Labour and the ‘Red-
Green’ Government intended to provide government support to working parents whose 
time needs were insufficiently catered for in the labour market. Their normative and 
cognitive frames were conducive to government interventions in the employment 
relationship in principle. A favourable general disposition towards the employee-
empowerment interests of trade unions, family and equality groups could be expected 
in terms of the ideas of political parties. However, it is important not to treat political 
parties or indeed government as a Black Box. Ideas of individual policy makers, 
mediated by the organisational priorities of the government departments or 
parliamentary committees they operate in, and the particular political pressures they 
are exposed to, can vary by policy issues within as well as across political parties. In 
this respect it is useful to think of actors as belonging to one of several advocacy 
coalitions within a policy subsystem as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s propose in their 
Advocacy Coalition Model (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).   
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith propose to take policy field specific ‘policy subsystems’ as 
the unit of analysis, which comprise ‘actors from a variety of public and private 
organisations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue’ (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993 p.17). This large number of actors involved in a given policy 
subsystem over a period of time is aggregated into smaller categories of two to four 
‘advocacy coalitions’, which are:  
people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group 
leaders, researchers, etc.) who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of 
basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a 
nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993 p.25).  
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Within the policy subsystem concerned with the family-friendly organisation of 
working time, government actors as well as societal actors can be conceptualised either 
as Employee-Empowerment advocates favouring policy interventions that empower 
employees, or as Managerial Freedom advocates pushing for solutions which leave the 
balance of power between employers and employees unchallenged. This 
conceptualisation moves beyond the structural divisions of government institutions, 
interest groups, and political parties but instead focuses on the structuring effect of 
ideas and interests, here divided around the concept of employee empowerment and 
the associated policy instruments and instrument attributes.  
Interest groups try to influence policy outcomes in the interest of their members 
(Wilson 1990). I define interest groups, following Wilson, as ‘organisations, separate 
from government, though often in close partnership with government, which attempt to 
influence public policy’ (Wilson 1990 p.1). Family-friendly working time policy 
touches upon the interests of highly organised and long established interests groups in 
both Germany and the UK, including business and labour organisations. It is also of 
interest to family and equality groups in both countries as the access problematic is 
highly relevant to their constituencies. ‘Empowering’ policy measures have the 
potential to shift the balance of power between employers and employees in favour of 
the latter. As interest groups such as employer organisations, trade unions and family 
groups generally advocate policy choices that maximise the benefits to their 
constituents18, one would expect policy choices that are perceived by interest groups to 
effect a redistribution of power to employees to be advocated by trade unions, family 
and equality groups (see for example TUC 2001), whereas one would expect 
employers and their organisations to advocate measures that are not perceived to 
redistribute control over working hours to working parents, in order to protect 
employer control over working time organisation (CBI 2003).  
Assuming that interest groups advocate policy choices that maximise the benefits for 
their constituents, inferences can be made from particular instrument types and their 
attributes to the policy preferences19 held by different interest groups20. Taking the 
                                                 
18 The underlying assumption here is that control over working hours is a benefit to both employers and 
employees. 
19 By policy preferences I understand the manifest expression of what actors say they want.  
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example of employment rights, employer representatives can be expected to oppose, 
and employee representatives to favour the choice of employment rights over 
information campaigns, where employment rights are perceived to be more 
empowering to employees than information campaigns. Once the decision to introduce 
legislation is made, however, employers are expected to bargain for a low degree of 
empowerment at the level of instrument design, whereas employee representatives are 
expected to advocate a high degree of employee empowerment (see for example Work 
and Parents Taskforce 2001). Taking the example of ‘breadth of coverage’ as an 
instrument attribute of employment rights, highly selective eligibility criteria have the 
effect of keeping the number of employees  entitled to make claims to a minimum, 
whereas universal entitlements cover a large amount of employees, potentially 
affecting a larger number of workplaces in a more substantial way. One may therefore 
expect that employers will be in favour of highly selective coverage whereas 
employees and their representatives will advocate universal entitlements. While it is 
relatively straightforward to empirically identify which advocacy groups different 
interest groups fall into by analysing their expressed policy preferences, a more 
challenging question is how interest groups influence instrument selection and design 
by policy makers (Smith 1993). By policy makers I refer to those actors at the level of 
national government who make decisions about the selection and design of policy 
instruments.  
Variations in the empowering potential of policy strategies can be in part attributed to 
variable opportunities of these interest groups to influence policy decisions in line with 
their policy preferences. In the literature, the degree to which societal interests shape 
policy decisions is contested. Whereas pluralist, corporatist and Marxist approaches 
attribute a great deal of influence to societal groups, statist scholars highlight the 
autonomy and governing capacity of government actors in the policy process. Statist 
scholars argue that in understanding policy, it is important to recognize that state actors 
have interests and the potential to fulfil these interests (Nordlinger 1981; Skocpol 
1985; Wilson 1990; Smith 1993). Yet, high costs may be incurred by making policy 
decisions that go against the interests of societal groups. Smith argues that states have 
an interest in developing integrated relationships with groups as a means of increasing 
                                                                                                                                             
20 Although individual actors are not assumed to act rationally, an organisational rationality is assumed 
in the lobbying and bargaining process over policy formulation, in which each interest group tries to 
maximise the benefits for their members. 
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infrastructural power and that these relationships affect policy making (Smith 1993 
p.75). Hence, one may expect that: 
2) Policy makers are more likely to accommodate interest group demands if they are in 
a relationship of inter-dependence. 
In family-friendly working time policy, as in any policy area, policy makers do not 
operate in isolation from ‘society’. In many cases, interactions with interest groups and 
other experts in the policy field are actively sought to gain knowledge and better 
understanding of the issues at stake (Wilson 1990; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
Consultation and exchange of ideas with stakeholders further increases the acceptance 
and legitimacy of policy strategies as policy makers are seen to take societal interests 
into account (Smith 1993). In many cases, interest groups are not only valuable sources 
of information but also important mediators between government and the target groups 
a policy strategy is directed at (Wilson 1990). Interest groups have better access to the 
groups targeted by policy strategies: employers, works councils, trade unions and 
working parents. 
Government actors are reliant on the cooperation of interest groups if access to family-
friendly working time arrangements is to be increased, especially on a voluntary basis. 
At the same time, interest groups are interested in cooperating with government as this 
provides them with access to policy makers and opportunities to influence the policy 
strategies pursued. Policy makers who try to persuade employers to introduce family-
friendly working time policies have an interest in not antagonising them in order to 
maximise the chances of policy success (Hood 1983). This makes the policy option of 
a non-threatening, information-based policy strategy more attractive. Christopher 
Hood observed that when policy makers want voluntary compliance from target groups 
they tend to use information, whereas when they want to redistribute resources they 
will use regulation (Hood 1983). 
Useful insights into the nature of government-interest group relations are provided by 
the governance literature, which broadens the focus of analysis beyond government 
actors, and emphasises that policy decisions are also shaped by the interactions 
between government and societal actors (Kooiman 2003; Van Kersbergen and Van 
Waarden 2004). Moving beyond the traditional focus on regulatory ‘command and 
control’ policy instruments, which are described as the quintessence of government 
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(Pierre and Peters 2000; Richards and Smith 2002; Jordan et al. 2005), the governance 
perspective considers ‘governance mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to 
authority and sanctions of government’ (Stoker 1998), including ‘negotiation, 
accommodation, concertation, cooperation, and alliance formation’ (Van Kersbergen 
and Van Waarden 2004). This widened focus is particularly useful for the analysis of 
family-friendly working time policy which encompasses both authoritative and 
cooperative instrument choices, including alliance formation (see Chapter Seven). The 
understanding of governance as a process in which multiple actors are involved has 
drawn attention to different governing styles or relationships between governing 
actors. Group and network approaches for instance emphasise the inter-dependence of 
actors and the influence of network characteristics on instrument choice (Rhodes 1996; 
Rhodes 1997; John 1999). Bressers and O’Toole argue that the more an instrument’s 
attributes help to maintain the existing features of a network, the more likely it is to be 
selected during the policy formation process (Bressers and O'Toole 1998 p.220).  
Within a governance perspective, different instrument categories can be linked to 
different governing styles. The choice of regulatory ‘command-and-control’ 
instruments can be associated with a hierarchical, top-down, governing style, in which 
government actors take an authoritative role, willing to use sanctions in case of non-
compliance and tolerating conflict between themselves and interest groups. In contrast, 
information-based, non-coercive, instruments are used in a horizontal governing style 
in which government seeks cooperation with stakeholders and pursues a consensus-
seeking approach, avoiding conflict as far as possible. Due to the limited governing 
capacity of the state to increase access to family-friendly working time arrangements 
directly, there is a high degree of reliance on the cooperation and compliance of actors 
who control the negotiation of working time flexibility. The governing style adopted 
also reflects political considerations (Woodside 1998). In highly politicised policy 
areas such as employment relations, policy makers try and reduce conflict to minimize 
political costs (in terms of party competition and electoral loss). Stakeholder 
acceptance of policy strategies not only furthers compliance but also political 
legitimacy as the state is not seen to be acting against the interests of society (Hood 
1983; Wilson 1990). The nature of government-interest group relations can explain the 
choice of certain governing styles and associated instrument choice and design. 
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Interdependence and consensus-seeking rule out certain policy choices and promotes 
others. 
Over-time changes in the ‘empowering potential’ of policy strategies as well as cross-
national variation can be explained with reference to the ideas and interests of actors 
involved in the policy process, and the nature of interactions between them. The 
empowering potential associated with policy instruments and attributes can help 
understand the politics of choice. Policy makers mediate between conflicting societal 
interests which either favour or oppose empowering interventions. Yet policy makers 
are not neutral but share the wider normative and cognitive frames with societal actors, 
with whom they interact (Surel 2000). Two propositions derived from the literature 
guide the analysis of policy choices: first, policy makers are assumed to be more likely 
to opt for policy instruments which are congruent with their wider normative and 
cognitive frames, and second, policy makers are assumed to be more likely to 
accommodate interest group demands if they are in a relationship of interdependence. 
While policy choices are driven by the ideas and interests of actors, they are mediated 
by first, the policy context within which choices are made, which consists of both the 
policy legacies on which new policy builds and the policy goals which it serves, and 
second, the institutional context within which actors operate and which shapes the 
opportunities of different actors to influence policy. There is considerable overlap in 
the literature between the policy context and institutional context as past policy choices 
lead to the creation of institutions within which actors operate (for example Streeck 
and Thelen 2005). My understanding of policy context, for the purpose of this study, is 
confined to policy legacies and policy goals within the policy fields relevant to and 
affected by family-friendly working time policy, rather than referring to government 
policy in general. The institutional context refers more closely to the organisational 
structures within which actors operate, such as government departments, parliamentary 
committees, political parties, advisory groups, and interest groups, which shape their 
interests in the policy output as well as the procedures through which they interact with 
each other (Figure 5).  
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Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the method of comparison and the explanatory approach used 
for analysing instrument choice and design to address the two research questions of the 
thesis. In order to systematically explore the policy strategies of the German and 
British governments to improve access to family-friendly working time arrangements 
and to identify variations in the degree to which they were designed to empower 
working mothers and fathers, an empowerment perspective was applied to the analysis 
of family-friendly working time policy, which conceptualises employee empowerment 
as the defining characteristic of family-friendliness.  
A two step approach was followed in the systematic comparison of policy strategies, 
summarised in Figure 6. In a first step, policy choices between different categories of 
instruments were distinguished to enable cross-national comparison in a systematic 
way. I applied a resource-based approach drawn from the instrument choice literature, 
applying Vedung’s ‘Carrots, Sticks and Sermons’ framework to family-friendly 
working time policy (Vedung 2003). While Vedung distinguishes instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee 
Empowerment 
Advocates 
Managerial 
Freedom 
Advocates 
Policy choices 
Past policy choices 
Wider policy agenda and 
policy goals pursued 
Policy Context 
Institutional Context 
Figure 5: Factors influencing policy choice and design 
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categories by the degree of authoritative force employed in the governing efforts, 
instrument categories were here distinguished by their empowering potential to 
working parents. In a second step, following Woodside’s call to recognize that each 
policy instrument can be used in a variety of ways, the instrument attributes were 
scrutinised to explore the degree to which the design ‘structured, disaggregated and 
moulded’ the empowerment potential of instruments to fit political circumstances 
(Woodside 1986). In order to systematically compare variations in the empowering 
potential of policy instruments, five indicators were defined to address the access 
problematic identified in Chapter Two.  
Figure 6: Summary of the comparative framework 
STEP 1 Policy choice 
↓ Instrument categories: Regulation / Economic means / Information 
STEP 2 Policy Design 
 Empowerment Criteria: Breadth of coverage / Precision of targeting / 
Scope of employee control over working time flexibility / 
Enforceability / Opportunity costs 
The second part of the chapter developed the theoretical framework used to analyse 
why policy approaches analysed differed between the two countries. The framework 
merged insights from interest and ideas based approaches, the interaction-oriented 
governance literature and historical institutionalism taking account of the role of 
institutional settings and past policy choices. Given the different policy legacies 
identified in Chapter Two, which implied different starting points for both countries in 
the development of family-friendly working time policy and the instrumentality of 
work-family reconciliation to a variety of policy goals, the policy context within which 
policy choices are made is given particular attention in cross-national comparison. 
Structuring actor preferences in terms of advocacy of either employee empowerment or 
managerial freedom, the relative influence of conflicting interest group demands on 
policy choices is conceptualised in terms of congruence of ideas and interests between 
policy makers and interest groups trying to influence them, and in terms of inter-
dependencies between these actors. In this particular policy field, where government 
capacity to steer working time negotiations is limited due to the institutionally 
Chapter 3 
97 
 
protected autonomy of management and labour to negotiate the terms of the 
employment relationship (Chapter Two), the success of policy strategies relies on 
cooperative relations, which in turn can strengthen the influence of interest groups on 
policy formation and design. 
These analytical perspectives are applied to the detailed exploration of the 
development of family-friendly working time policy in Germany and the UK in the 
remainder of the thesis. The next chapters present a comprehensive overview of policy 
development over time, placing relevant policy developments in the areas of working 
time, employment relations, and care, in the wider historical context of the policy 
legacy inherited from previous governments, as well as the wider policy agendas and 
work-family reconciliation policy packages of which they are part. The approach of 
single-country, chronological narratives allows to identify over-time trends in the 
policy trajectories and to explore the processes of agenda setting and instrument 
selection in a way that is sensitive to the temporal uniqueness of these developments, 
following the advice of historical institutionalists that it matters when things happen, 
and not just what (Pierson 2000b). The details of instrument design, and the 
exploration of factors explaining variation in instrument design between the two 
countries will be returned to in Chapters Six and Seven, providing in-depth 
comparative case studies of regulatory and information based instruments. These are 
analysed separately due to the very different policy processes and institutional 
configurations shaping government-interest group interactions in each instrument 
category. The insights from all four chapters will be drawn together in Chapter Eight, 
which provides an overall assessment of the degree of family-friendliness of the 
British and German policy approaches since the late 1990s, and the main reasons for 
variation between them. 
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4. Family-friendly working time policy in the United Kingdom 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive account of the British policy 
approach to family-friendly working time policy pursued by the New Labour 
government between 1997 and 2005. It provides a chronological account of the policy 
choices made to improve access to family-friendly working time arrangements, and 
locates these within the wider policy agendas of which they were part. In particular, 
family-friendly working time policy is contextualised within the wider reconciliation 
policy packages developed by New Labour, as the scope and implications of policy 
developments in this area can only be fully grasped if the policy mix of time, money 
and service resources is taken into consideration.  
Government policy plays a role in mediating the reconciliation choices regarding the 
allocation of time to family care and to paid employment that are negotiated between 
men and women at the ‘kitchen table’ as well as at the workplace. Genuine choice 
regarding how much time to dedicate to care and to gainful employment is only 
possible if backed up by financial and care resources to maintain the financial security 
and emotional and physical well-being of family members. Government can contribute 
to the resource mix available to families through financial transfers (money) and the 
public provision of care services (services). Genuine choice over working time patterns 
also requires a certain degree of employee control over the length and distribution of 
time spent at work. Although working time negotiations are predominantly subject to 
individual and collective bargaining and employer decisions, government can 
influence the degree of individual ‘time autonomy’ through substantive and procedural 
interventions that shift the power balance in employment relations in general, and 
control over working hours in particular, in the employee’s favour. Employment rights 
to family leave or care related working time reductions and other flexible working 
patterns empower employees to negotiate the amount of time given to care provision 
with their employers (time). The policy orientation between ‘time to care’ and ‘time to 
work’ is a continuous theme throughout the chapter. 
The chapter begins with a chronologically structured discussion of family-friendly 
working time policy within the wider context of reconciliation policy, working time 
and employment relations policies. This policy discussion is structured in two parts, 
each covering one term in office, and places family-friendly working time policy 
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within reconciliation policies over this time period to explore the reconciliation choices 
encouraged by the wider resource mix. Part III of the chapter then focuses on the 
selection of policy instruments over time, between three broad categories of policy 
instruments classified by Vedung (2003) as ‘regulations’, ‘economic means’ and 
‘information’, which imply varying degrees of empowering potential to working 
parents (Chapter Three). The analysis provides explanations for the policy strategy 
pursued, scrutinising the role of policy preferences, overarching policy goals, 
government-interest group relations and the inherited policy legacy. The analysis 
closes in an evaluation of the empowering potential of the British policy strategy 
between 1997 and 2005.  
I. 1997 to 2001 – New Labour’s first term in office 
Following a landslide victory gaining 66 per cent of seats in the House of Commons in 
May 1997, New Labour, led by Tony Blair, succeeded the incumbent Conservative 
Party in government. The Labour Party had approached the 1997 general election with 
the explicit intention to help parents balance work and family life (New Labour 1997). 
Once in power, the Prime Minister set up a Ministerial Group of the Family, chaired by 
Home Secretary Jack Straw, to develop a coherent government strategy on how the 
support and help available to families could be increased (Home Office 1998). A 
number of consultative documents published in the course of 1998 outlined New 
Labour’s policy agenda (Cm 3959 1998; Cm 3968 1998). In the consultation document 
Supporting Families, published in November 1998 (Home Office 1998), the 
Government laid out the general strategy on family policy developed by the Ministerial 
Group, including its strategy to promote a more family-friendly organisation of 
working time. This was to be achieved through a dual strategy of firstly, setting 
minimum standards in legislation and, secondly, encouraging firms to provide beyond 
the statutory minimum of family-friendly employment rights (Home Office 1998 p. 
54).  
The Government’s approach to minimum standards in legislation was laid out in the 
White Paper Fairness at Work, published in May 1998, which outlined a statutory 
framework of basic family-friendly employment rights (Cm 3968 1998). These 
included the protection from excessive working hours and entitlements to minimum 
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rest and vacation periods, the expansion of maternity leave, the introduction of parental 
leave and time off for family emergencies, and the protection of part-time workers 
from discrimination (Cm 3968 1998). This early policy agenda of family-friendly 
employment rights was prompted almost entirely by the European Directives on 
Working Time (93/104/EC), Parental Leave (96/34/EC) and Part-Time Work 
(98/23/EC). With its opt-out from the European Social Chapter in June 1997, the UK 
Government had agreed to implement the European Council Directives on Parental 
Leave and Part-time Work which had been passed in 1996 and 1997. The Working 
Time Directive, which the Major Government had successfully blocked until losing its 
case before the European Court of Justice in 1996 was also due for implementation 
when New Labour took office (see Chapter Two). With regard to the encouragement 
of voluntary provision beyond these minimum statutory requirements, an awareness 
and promotional campaign was envisaged. It was to make better information, advice 
and guidance on family-friendly working practices available, to promote greater 
recognition of a good record on family-friendly employment and to provide advice on 
good practice, case studies and approaches to problem solving (Home Office 1998).  
The development and implementation of the Government’s family-friendly agenda was 
split across different government departments. The Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) was in charge of developing family-friendly employment rights. In addition to 
the implementation of European Council Directives, the DTI undertook a revision of 
existing maternity rights with the aim of simplifying the complex regulations. Ordinary 
Maternity Leave was increased from 14 to 18 weeks in line with Maternity Pay and the 
qualifying period for unpaid Additional Maternity Leave was reduced from two years 
to one through the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 (SI 
1999/3312). The Inland Revenue administered the new Working Families Tax Credit. 
Finally, the Department of Health was in charge of developing a National Strategy for 
Carers, which the Prime Minister had announced in June 1998. Non-legislative 
measures to promote family-friendly employment practices at the workplace were 
being planned at the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) within the 
wider context of the development of a National Childcare Strategy.  
The National Childcare Strategy pursued two aims: firstly, to achieve better outcomes 
for children in terms of child development and early years’ education through good 
quality care, and secondly, to increase the employability of parents by increasing 
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access to, and affordability of, childcare services. The main instrument to help families 
with the cost of externalising childcare was the introduction of a new ‘Childcare Tax 
Credit’ for working families which replaced the Family Credit in 1999 as part of the 
new Working Families Tax Credit (Strickland 1998). Up to £70 for one child, and 
£105 for two or more children, were to be provided towards the purchase of approved 
childcare services. Finally, access to childcare places was to be improved through 
encouraging the creation of new out-of-school childcare places and providing better 
information to parents about local childcare providers. Free, part-time, early years 
education places were guaranteed for every four-year-old from September 1998.  
Although the main emphasis of the Childcare Strategy was on childcare services, the 
importance of time for parental care was also acknowledged. The framework 
document Meeting the Childcare Challenge, which was published for public 
consultation in May 1998, stated that:  
children have a right to the support of both parents - in emotional as well as 
material terms. Neither mothers, nor fathers, should have to sacrifice their 
parenting role for the sake of their employability (Cm 3959 1998 p. 49).  
Employers were attributed an important role in enabling parents to spend time with 
their children by offering family-friendly employment options. One objective of the 
Childcare Strategy was therefore the development of effective ways of promoting best 
practice among employers. 
The Work-Life Balance Campaign 
The role of employers in providing parents with ‘time to care’ was addressed through a 
promotional campaign that was developed within the wider context of the National 
Childcare Strategy at the DfEE. The aim of the so-called Work-Life Balance 
Campaign, which was launched by the Prime Minister in March 2000, was to ‘bring 
about a better balance between work and other aspects of life, to the benefit of 
business, the economy, parents and carers, and society’ (DfEE 2000a). The campaign 
rested on three pillars: the strategic cooperation with a group of  ‘best practice’ 
employers (Employers for Work-Life Balance) to disseminate information and 
guidance to other employers, the provision of hands-on advice on the implementation 
of family-friendly measures through free consultancy services, funded via a Work-Life 
balance Challenge Fund (Nelson et al. 2004), and thirdly, widespread publicity to raise 
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awareness levels among the general public on flexible working options and the 
benefits of a better ‘work-life balance’ (Int. UK 02, 21/09/2005)21. The Work-Life 
Balance Campaign incorporated two separate work/family agendas. It encouraged 
change in attitudes and the workplace culture in support of working parents on the one 
hand, but equally for carers of adults (HC Deb 09 March 2000 vol 345 c231WH). The 
problem of reconciling employment with care for elderly, ill or disabled relatives had 
been addressed by the Department of Health in a National Strategy for Carers (Lloyd 
2000). The document Caring about Carers (DoH1999) published in February 1999, 
had dedicated a chapter to the needs of carers in employment, with reference to the 
role that flexible employment policies and support services could play in meeting the 
flexibility needs of working parents. While the policy approach to family-friendly 
working time arrangements pursued by the DfEE was explicitly non-threatening to 
employers relying on information and consultancy services, a regulatory approach to 
the provision of family leave, prompted by European Directives, was developed at the 
DTI within the wider context of the Employment Relations Act 1999.  
Family-friendly employment rights 
In the White Paper Fairness at Work New Labour outlined proposals for collective 
trade union and individual employment legislation, with which they intended to create 
‘an industrial relations settlement’ between management and labour (Cm 3968 1998 
p.2). This included for instance the reintroduction of a statutory procedure for union 
recognition, which had been abolished under the Conservative Government. This new 
legislation provides that, where a union claim for recognition for collective bargaining 
purposes cannot be resolved bilaterally with the employer concerned, the union may 
refer the matter to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) for determination (Hall 
2000). Before then, union recognition by employers was voluntary, without 
administrative or judicial route for unions to secure recognition (Goodman et al. 1998). 
The Employment Relations Bill further included a number of ‘time to care’ provisions 
in the form of parental leave, leave for urgent family reasons and maternity leave 
entitlements. Against the historical backdrop of minimal employment regulation under 
the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, regulative interventions 
envisaged by the incoming Labour Government received strong employer opposition. 
                                                 
21 The list of interviews is included in Appendix A. 
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Ruth Lea, Head of the Policy Unit at the Institute of Directors, saw the Government’s 
work-life balance agenda as a main source of ‘re-regulation of the British labour 
market’ (Lea 2001). New Labour stressed that even after the reforms proposed, Britain 
would have ‘the most lightly regulated labour market of any leading economy in the 
world’. With their Fairness at Work agenda, they sought a compromise between ‘the 
absence of minimum standards of protection at the workplace and a return to the laws 
of the past’ (Cm 3968 1998 p.2). While not wanting to return to the days of ‘strikes 
without ballots and mass picketing’ Tony Blair clearly stated that it was not right ‘to 
deny British citizens basic canons of fairness [....] that are a matter of course 
elsewhere’ (Ibid.).  
A strategy of minimal statutory regulation was in line with New Labour’s revised 
approach to industrial relations, which the Party had outlined in its party manifesto: to 
create a floor of ‘basic minimum rights for the individual at the workplace, where [the] 
aim is partnership not conflict between employers and employees’ (New Labour 
1997). This strategy shaped New Labour’s approach to the organisation of working 
time, which did not differ significantly from the Conservative rationale that employers 
and employees should negotiate the organisation of working time, and that it was not a 
role for government to intervene through regulations. This attitude becomes apparent 
when exploring the policy avenues for a family-friendly working time organisation for 
which opportunities were created, but not followed through. 
The European Framework Agreements on Parental Leave and on Part-time Work both 
provided opportunities for the introduction of legislation to facilitate a more flexible 
family-friendly organisation of working time. In the event of their implementation, 
however, New Labour did not seize these regulatory opportunities. The Parental Leave 
Directive (96/34/EC), for instance, made provisions for employees to take parental 
leave on a part-time basis (Clause 3 of the Framework Agreement). While the 
Employment Relations Act 1999 allowed for regulations to give employees the right to 
take their parental leave on a part-time basis (New section 78 (3) of the 1996 Act) the 
Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 did not make use of this provision 
(Lourie 2000). The statutory default scheme, which applies to employees not covered 
by collective or workforce agreements relating to parental leave, only permits leave to 
be taken in blocks of full weeks up to a maximum of four weeks a year (SI 
1999/3312). The Parental Leave Directive was implemented as a minimal fall back 
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scheme, which applies where more generous and more flexible leave arrangements 
voluntarily agreed between management and labour are not in place.  
Another example illustrating New Labour’s reluctance to legislate to facilitate family-
friendly working time arrangements is the implementation of the European Directive 
on Part-time Work. While the main emphasis of the Directive was on the prevention of 
discrimination against part-time workers, Clause 5 of the European Framework 
Agreement intended employers to consider requests to switch from full-time to part-
time work and vice versa22. Again, the Employment Relations Act 1999 made 
provisions for the Secretary of State to implement Clause 5 of the directive by issuing 
Codes of Practice (Section 20 (b) and (c)). In the policy making process, however, the 
initial plan to issue a Code of Practice on an employee-oriented flexible organisation of 
working time was abandoned. This decision was justified by Alan Johnson on the basis 
that change was best achieved in a ‘spirit of consensus’ with employers, and this was 
more easily achieved with guidance than with a code of practice (Education and 
Employment Committee Reply to Q 16). Describing codes of practice as ‘beloved by 
lawyers’ and ‘big slabs of print which lead to a confrontational situation in 
workplaces’(Education and Employment Committee Reply to Q 16), he explained the 
Government’s strategy as follows:  
We are looking for a system where we can actually go out rather evangelically 
and say ‘Here are the benefits of part-time work’. Not to force people out of a 
code of practice, to sit down and look throughout their company and say: ‘I 
have to do this because it is in the code of practice, look at these jobs I can 
make part-time’ but to say ‘Here, there is something in this for you’ and to go 
out and sell the idea. We do think this is the right approach (Education and 
Employment Committee Reply to Q 17).  
This approach of ‘selling’ the case for part-time working was then ostensibly pursued 
with the Work-Life Balance Campaign.  
A third example of minimal regulatory intervention in the realm of working time 
organisation is the implementation of the European Working Time Directive through 
the Working Time Regulations 1998. For the first time, UK workers gained statutory 
rights to four weeks of paid holiday, minimum daily and weekly rest periods at and 
                                                 
22 Clause 5 (3) states that as far as possible, employers should give consideration to (a) requests by 
workers to transfer from full-time to part-time work that becomes available in the establishment and (b) 
requests by workers to transfer from part-time to full-time work or to increase their working hours 
should the opportunity arise. 
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from work, and they could no longer be required to work for more than 48 hours a 
week (averaged over 17 weeks) (93/104/EC). The regulations did however allow 
workers to voluntarily ‘opt-out’ from the 48 hours limit and agree to work longer 
(Statutory Instrument 1998 No. 1833). While this arguably protected individual choice 
regarding the number of hours worked, it demonstrates that New Labour did not seize 
the opportunity provided by the European Council to fight the long hours working 
culture by regulatory means.  
The Work and Parents Review 2000: to legislate or not to legislate? 
Following the first wave of reforms which had brought only minor revisions to 
existing maternity rights and the introduction of unpaid parental leave and time off in 
family emergencies through the Employment Relations Act 1999, the DTI launched a 
large scale review of maternity and parental rights in June 2000. The aim of the 
review, which was co-ordinated by a Ministerial Group chaired by Stephen Byers, then 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, was to consider ‘the steps needed to make 
sure that parents have choices to help them balance the needs of their work and their 
children so that they may contribute fully to the competitiveness and productivity of 
the modern economy’ (HC Deb 22 June 2000 v 352 c 237 W). Against this backdrop, 
one of the paths of enquiry was to take account of the impact on competitiveness and 
productivity ‘of returning to work part-time, from home or on flexible hours’ (HC Deb 
22 June 2000 v 352 c 237 W). Between June and December 2000, the review team 
consulted widely with stakeholders and undertook fact-finding visits to the USA, 
Sweden and the Netherlands leading to the publication of a Green Paper, Work and 
Parents: Competitiveness and Choice, in December 2000 (Cm 5005 2000).  This 
explored a wide range of policy options including extending maternity leave to one 
year; shifting the payment of Statutory Maternity Pay from employers to the 
government; introducing paid paternity and adoption leave; introducing payment for 
parental leave; and introducing a right to return to work on reduced hours after 
maternity leave.  
The publication of the Green Paper marked a turning point in New Labour’s approach 
to flexible working. For the first time since coming to power, the policy option of 
introducing a statutory right for reduced working hours was openly discussed. Three 
policy options presented in chapter four of the Green paper revolved around the 
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provision of a limited right to work reduced hours for parents, either during the period 
of maternity leave (for either mother or father) or for both parents after the end of the 
maternity leave period (Cm 5005 2000 para. 4.16-4.20). In 1999, the Education and 
Employment Committee had recommended that:  
the Government should introduce legislation guaranteeing women the right to 
return to work after maternity leave on a part-time basis, while retaining their 
right to transfer to full-time work, unless the employer is able to demonstrate 
that it would be to the detriment of the operation of the employer's business 
(Education and Employment Committee 1999).  
This recommendation had been made in the context of the imminent implementation of 
the European Part-time Work Directive which had led to the Committee’s enquiry into 
the situation of part-time workers. At that time, the Government had argued against the 
introduction of a statutory right on the basis that it would be going beyond the scope of 
the Directive (Education and Employment Committee 2000c Reply to Q 19). A year 
later, a weakened proposal had found its way onto the family-friendly agenda. 
Employers’ needs were also taken into account. Different options for a ‘harm test’ 
were discussed to allow employers to refuse requests for reduced hours working to 
prevent harm to the business. The Green Paper also discussed alternatives to 
legislation, such as spreading good practice through incentives, information, support 
services and an accreditation scheme to reward best practice (Cm 5005 2000). 
Stakeholders were consulted on whether flexible working was an area best left to best 
practice, or whether the Government should legislate (DTI 2001e). The consultation 
was met with considerable public interest. 
Overall, over 600 formal responses were received by the end of the consultation period 
in March 2001, in addition to meetings with almost 300 employers, working parents, 
and representatives of employer associations, trade unions and family organisations 
face to face (DTI 2001d). Flexible working emerged as a key, yet highly controversial 
issue. Reactions to the proposal to introduce a parental right to reduced hours after 
maternity leave were polarised (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001). Employers and 
their representatives opposed it, while parents and their representatives welcomed the 
introduction of legislation. The Institute of Directors (IoD) reported that its members 
were ‘overwhelmingly opposed’ to the proposal in the Green Paper that both parents 
should have the right to work reduced hours after maternity leave, arguing that ‘the 
hours of work should be left to employers and employees to determine, not the 
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Government by means of legislation’ (Wilson and Harris 2001 p. 23). Opposition to 
legislation was based on the concern that ‘if enacted, this measure could cause serious 
organisational difficulties for businesses and increase their costs’ (Wilson and Harris 
2001 p. 23). Strong opposition was also voiced by the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) whose members were ‘united in opposing any regulations which would 
result in a significant amount of red tape, the likelihood of a further increase in the 
number of employment tribunal cases or that would damage operational effectiveness 
or competitiveness’(CBI 2001 p.3). This applied especially to proposals for a 'right to 
work reduced hours' as these were perceived to ‘be unworkable and damaging to 
competitiveness’ (Ibid.). The Institute of Management encouraged the Government to 
‘proceed with its best practice options in the area of flexible working rather than 
pursue a rigid and prescriptive legislative approach’ arguing that this would be the 
better way to close the gap between provision and demand in this area (Institute of 
Management 2001 p.9).  
Parent and equality organisations did not share this view. Parents at Work, for 
example, wrote to the Government: ‘Although best practice and guidelines can play an 
important role, we believe that legislation must underpin any best practice promotion. 
Incentives only work in times, areas and sectors where there is full employment’. They 
further warned that ‘any economic downturn will have a detrimental effect on 
employees' access to flexible working practices’ and that ‘lower paid and lower skilled 
employees find it more difficult to obtain even small changes to their hours, because of 
their lack of negotiating power’. It is for these employees, they argued, that legislation 
was essential (Parents at Work 2001). The Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) showed 
equal pessimism arguing ‘that a 'best practice' approach will simply not tackle the 
fundamental problem of widespread and persistent noncompliance by employers’ 
(CAB 2001 ch. 5.5), a view also shared by the Mothers’ Union whose concern was that 
best practice promotion only encourages those employers who are already convinced 
of the value of flexible and/or family-friendly working (Mothers' Union 2001). The 
Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) saw ‘a strong argument for intervention at 
government level - through legislation - to speed the pace of change and provide 
consistency across the economy as a whole’. This view was based on the concern that 
the ‘current approach of depending upon the voluntary initiatives of individual 
companies and organisations will not break down labour market rigidity’ (EOC 2001 
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para 68). Trade Unions also welcomed the proposal of legislation. The TUC 
recommended ‘a basic legal framework encouraging employers and parents to agree 
requests for reduced hours or flexible working. However, where agreement or a 
negotiated solution [was] not possible, both mothers and fathers should also have the 
right to have requests for reduced hours or flexible working granted unless employers 
can justify refusals on objective grounds’ (TUC 2001). Employee and parent 
representatives saw regulatory intervention by the Government justified on the basis 
that incentives for voluntary change were not strong enough to ensure equitable, 
widespread access to flexibility. Employers however opposed such proposals both in 
principle and in the light of anticipated costs and restrictions to business. 
The review ended shortly before the general election 2001. The family-friendly agenda 
was a prominent topic during New Labour’s electoral campaign, targeting especially 
female voters. Announcements of policy reforms in less controversial areas followed 
in stages. The Budget published in March 2001 announced measures involving 
financial state support: an increase in the flat rate of Statutory Maternity Pay (SMP) 
and Maternity Allowance from £62.20 to £75 a week from April 2002 and to £100 a 
week from April 2003. Maternity Pay was to increase from 18 weeks to 26 weeks in 
April 2003, involving an extension of the Ordinary Maternity Leave period from 18 to 
26 weeks. The Government further announced the introduction of two weeks paid 
paternity leave and paid adoption leave, paid at the same flat rate of £100 per week as 
Maternity Pay (HM Treasury 2001 Ch. 5). In April 2001 Stephen Byers announced 
revisions to the parental leave scheme, notably an extension from 13 to 18 week for 
parents of disabled children as well as an extension of parental leave to children born 
before December 1999 when the entitlement was introduced (who were under five 
years old on 15 December 1999).  The family-friendly working time agenda was 
revealed last and remained somewhat unclear prior to the general election in June 
2001. In the election manifesto, specific reference was made to the mothers' wish to 
reduce their hours when returning to work but no concrete policy intentions were 
announced at this point except that Government would ‘work with business and 
employees to combine flexible working with the needs of business’ (New Labour 
2001a). Only shortly before the election, Stephen Byers announced that the 
Government would ‘provide a right for parents to request to work flexible hours when 
their child is young’ (New Labour 2001b). This was to represent a significant shift in 
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the nature of state intervention from the promotion of best practice and voluntary 
change to regulatory intervention in the organisation of working time. While the 
family-friendly policy agenda in the late 1990s had been strongly shaped by European 
directives and an extended policy review and agenda setting phase rather than wide-
reaching policy reforms, New Labour approached their second term in office with a 
comprehensive agenda of policies to support working parents.  
II. 2001 to 2005 – New Labour’s second term in office 
A few months into the second term in office, Patricia Hewitt, then Secretary of State at 
the DTI, confirmed that the Government was to introduce a ‘light touch legislative 
approach’ on flexible working and that a taskforce was appointed to design a right for 
parents of young children ‘to make a request to work flexible hours and to have this 
request considered seriously by the employer’ (HC Deb 28 June 2001 vol 370 c 149 
W). This was a turning point in New Labour's policy approach to flexible working, as 
the line from information to regulation was crossed.  
The right to request flexible working 
Flexible working had come to dominate discussions during the review, and the demand 
from parents had emerged very clearly, highlighting the need for, as well as 
legitimating, government action in this area (Cm 5005 2000). Nevertheless, the careful 
balance of interests remained a priority for policy makers. The polarised stakeholder 
positions on the issue of legislative intervention in the area of flexible working, which 
had clearly emerged in the course of consultations, presented the Government with a 
particular challenge of reconciling opposing stakeholder demands (Education and 
Employment Committee 2000b). The Department of Trade and Industry appointed a 
taskforce to ‘look at how to meet parents’ desire for more flexible work patterns in a 
way which is compatible with business efficiency’ (HC Deb 28 June 2001 vol 370 c 
149 W).  
The strategy of delegating the design process of this new and controversial law to 
stakeholder groups was a strategy to raise acceptance for the law by constructing a 
consensus with the main stakeholder groups, notably the CBI, TUC, EOC, Parents at 
Work and employers. This approach of dealing with controversial policy issues had 
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been successfully tested in the case of the National Minimum Wage during their first 
term in office. In 1997, the Government had appointed the Low Pay Commission, 
whose members were drawn from employer, employee and academic background, to 
reach consensus on the level of National Minimum Wage (Cm 3976 1998). The Low 
Pay Commission provided a template for the Work and Parents Taskforce that was to 
work under the same leadership of Sir Professor George Bain. As one of the taskforce 
members commented: ‘what they tried to do was to replicate the social partnership of 
the Low Pay Commission, both to deal with the technical issues but also to give them 
political cover’ (Int. UK 07, 15/12/2005).  
The Work and Parents Taskforce (WPT), composed of representatives from 
businesses, trade unions and family and equality organisations, was charged with the 
negotiation of the detail of the new legislation. The taskforce met over a five month 
period, consulted with parents and employers, commissioned relevant research, and 
negotiated a consensus on the key aspects of instrument design (Work and Parents 
Taskforce 2001). Their recommendations, published in November 2001, were accepted 
by the Government (DTI 2001e) and incorporated into the Employment Bill at 
Committee Stage.  The new legislation was passed without major modifications on the 
basis that ‘the right to request flexible working and the duty on employers to consider 
requests seriously’ would be reviewed after three years (SC Deb (9 Del Leg) 5 
December 2002 c017). The Flexible Working Regulations 2002 came into force in 
April 2003 (SI 2002 No. 3207; SI 2002 No. 3236). They provided parents of children 
under six, or disabled children under eighteen, with a statutory right to request flexible 
working patterns and to have their requests considered seriously by their employer. 
The ‘right to request’ was ‘light touch’ in that parents whose requests were refused 
could not challenge the business reasons of the refusal before employment tribunals. 
This ‘toothless right for a narrowly defined group’ was introduced to obtain employer 
acceptance with the option to subsequently build upon it after a period of settling in 
and adjustment of cultural attitudes (Kilpatrick and Freedland 2004 p.342). Although 
the nature of state intervention had changed in form from information to regulation, its 
spirit of promoting best practice and voluntary change rather than regulating the 
organisation of working time was continued.  
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‘Time to care’ through paid family leave  
In parallel to facilitating the simultaneous combination of employment and care 
responsibilities through flexible working patterns through the ‘right to request’, New 
Labour also extended the periods of paid family leave available for parents of young 
children, facilitating ‘time to care’. The period of paid Maternity Leave was increased 
from 18 to 26 weeks and was extended to adoptive parents. Statutory Maternity Pay 
and Maternity Allowance were increased from £63.30 to £100 in 2003. An additional 
26 weeks of unpaid maternity leave brought up the total period of protected leave from 
employment for mothers to one year (HM Treasury 2003). Fathers were entitled to two 
weeks Statutory Paternity Pay from April 2003 at a flat rate of £100 per week. The 
proposal of entitling mothers to return part-time after the birth of their child, which had 
been consulted on during the Work and Parents Review, had not been implemented. 
Rather an increasingly long period of full-time leave was encouraged for mothers (as it 
was paid) but not for fathers, whose entitlement to paid leave was only two weeks 
compared to 26 weeks for mothers.  Policy developments enacted through the 
Employment Act 2002 clearly signalled a family-care orientation with regard to the 
care of infants for the first year in which mothers were encouraged to act as main 
carers while the caring role of fathers was only hesitantly encouraged (Kilkey 2006).  
‘Time to work’ through the externalisation of care 
With regard to older children, however, government policy increasingly invested in the 
externalisation of care to provide parents with ‘time to work’. As a result of the Inter-
Departmental Childcare Review, which had recommended further investments in 
childcare to advance the Government’s lone parent employment and child poverty 
objectives (DfES et al. 2002), government funding was increased by £1.5 billion by 
2005/6 in the 2002 Spending Review (HM Treasury 2002; House of Commons Work 
and Pensions Committee 2003). In 2004, the Government laid out their strategy for 
childcare for the next ten years, and their vision ‘to ensure that every child gets the best 
start in life and to give parents more choice about how to balance work and family life’ 
(HM Treasury 2004b p.1).  
The Ten Year Strategy addressed the reconciliation needs of working parents more 
explicitly than in 1998, and more emphasis was placed on the role of childcare services 
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as ‘time providers’ for working parents. Child care objectives announced in 2004 
included the gradual extension of the entitlement of free early years’ education for 
three and four year olds from 33 to 38 weeks per year by 2006, and from 12.5 to 15 
hours per week by 2010 with the longer term goal to extending this to 20 hours per 
week. In order to increase parental flexibility, the entitlement to free early-years 
education, which was generally split into five 2.5 hours sessions per week was to be 
offered more flexibly over three days a week to suit parental time needs. The strategy 
document also explicitly mentioned the intention to better integrate early education 
within high-quality, affordable day care between 8 am and 6 pm all year around (HM 
Treasury et al. 2004). For older children, access to school based after-school care for 
the five to eleven-year-olds was to be provided by 2010, again on a full-time, all year 
around basis and by 2010 all secondary schools were to open from 8 am to 6 pm 
offering after school and holiday activities (HM Treasury 2004b para 5.22 and 5.23).  
The underlying intention of New Labour's childcare policy was to provide working 
parents with a more genuine choice to work on a full-time basis. However, the 
Government only committed to make out-of-school childcare places available to 
children aged three to fourteen on a full-time basis leaving the responsibility for the 
care of under three-year-olds to parents to organise (HM Treasury 2004b para 5.19). 
Support for the care of young children was provided through the tax and benefit 
system. General financial support through Child Benefit and targeted financial support 
with the costs of childcare through the tax system was increased in order to improve 
affordability, irrespective of the child’s age. From April 2005 the limits of the 
childcare element of the Working Tax Credit available to parents working at least 16 
hours per week increased to £300 a week (£175 for one child) and from April 2006 the 
maximum proportion of costs that can be claimed increased from 70 per cent to 80 per 
cent (HM Treasury 2004c para 5.21). While the Government’s ‘time to work’ strategy 
was backed up by significant funds to improve affordability of care externalisation and 
a dual-earner model, no such transfers were introduced to back up gender equitable 
reconciliation choices corresponding to the dual-earner/dual-carer model. Furthermore, 
New Labour continued on its course of best practice promotion and minimal regulative 
direction with regard to the family-friendly organisation of working time. Two 
examples illustrate this: the approach to long hours and the review of the Flexible 
Working Regulations. 
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Family-friendly working time and the issue of long hours  
The problem of long working hours returned to public debate in early 2004, incited by 
a European Commission consultation on the Working Time Directive. A review of the 
individual ‘opt-out’ from the 48 hours limit to average weekly working time was 
required by the Council Directive 93/104/EC. Stakeholder positions on the future of 
the individual opt-out in the UK were polarised. The TUC urged the Government to 
end it, claiming that many employers coerced workers to sign the agreement, many of 
whom were not aware of their legal rights (TUC 2002; BMRB Social Research 2004). 
In anticipation of the European review of the opt-out, the TUC had launched the It’s 
about Time campaign in 2003 to ‘put long hours and work/life balance at the top of the 
workplace agenda’ (Arrowsmith 2003). The CBI, on the other hand, urged the 
Government to protect the right of UK employees to work more than 48 hours a week 
if they choose to (Hall 2003). They published a report arguing that retention of the opt-
out was a matter of freedom of choice and a vital part of companies’ strategies for 
competitiveness (CBI 2003). The Government’s position on this point was favourable 
to business interests. Employment Relation Minister Gerry Sutcliffe confirmed that the 
Government was committed to retaining the opt-out in order to protect employee 
choice and workplace flexibility (DTI 2004c). In a Communication in January 2004, 
the European Commission voiced doubt that the UK’s application of the ‘individual 
opt-out’ was ensuring the spirit and terms of the Directive and that real guarantees for 
free consent of workers to opt out from the working time ceiling were provided. An 
end of the opt-out was considered (COM (2003) 843 final). The Commission further 
proposed ‘that the revision of the Working Time Directive could be exploited in such a 
way as to encourage the Member States to take steps to improve the compatibility of 
work and family life’ (COM (2003) 843 final p. 21). In its reply to the Commission, 
the UK Government maintained its support for the retention of the individual opt-out 
and stated that it saw the Working Time Directive as an ‘inappropriate vehicle for 
dealing with work/family balance issues’ and that it rather saw ‘scope for a deepening 
of exchanges of best practice between Member States within the peer review process’ 
(House of Lords European Union Committee 2004; UK Government 2004 para 1). In 
the consultation document Working Time – Widening the Debate, the DTI framed the 
individual ‘opt-out’ in terms of individual choice, which in turn was framed as family-
friendly, as the following quote illustrates:   
  Chapter 4 
114 
 
for parents, one may decide temporarily to work longer to maintain the family 
income when the other decides to withdraw from the labour market or work 
reduced hours in order to spend time caring for their children. The choice that 
the opt out offers, i.e. the right for the individual to choose whether to work 
over the 48-hour week limit or not, fits into the wider framework of choice that 
the Government is promoting through policies on flexible working and work 
life balance (DTI 2004g para. 2.1).  
While some, notably the trade unions, saw the defence of the ‘opt-out’ as inherently 
inconsistent with any serious attempt to improve work-life balance, the rhetoric of 
individual choice was used to glue together the apparent cracks caused by these 
tensions within ‘family-friendly’ and ‘working time’ strategies. The Government’s 
reluctance to restrict flexibility by regulating the organisation of working time 
continued to be apparent in the debate on the Flexible Working Regulations.  
Extending a ‘toothless right’ 
Encouraged by the overall success of the ‘right to request’, the Government soon 
considered extending the law to parents of older children and to carers of sick and 
disabled relatives (DTI 2005a). Following the application of the Flexible Working 
Regulations in April 2003, the DTI and several stakeholder organisations had 
undertaken research to monitor and evaluate the working of the legislation (e.g. CIPD 
2003; Palmer 2004; The Maternity Alliance 2004). Overall, implementation had gone 
smoothly with few complaints from employers. DTI research found that the majority 
(86 per cent) of requests made within the first year of the entitlement had been 
accepted, either in full or in part (Palmer 2004). In February 2005, the DTI published 
the consultation document Work and Families: Choice and Flexibility to consult with 
stakeholders on the case for an extension of the right to request.  
The ‘light touch principle’ of the right to request represented a key point of division in 
the policy debate among interest groups. Family and employee representatives showed 
disappointment that the Government only considered the case for an extension of the 
‘right to request’ to other groups of employees rather than consulting the public about 
the structure of the right (Working Families 2005 p.ii). Working Families emphasised 
the need for a strengthened right with particular reference to fathers, whose requests 
were more often rejected than those of mothers. They argued that the ‘legislation 
should be strengthened to include a requirement on the employer to show real 
justification for a decision to turn down a request, and for an Employment Tribunal to 
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be able to examine the business reasons given’ (Working Families 2005 p.ii).  Unions 
also argued strongly in favour of a strengthened right, reasserting, as they had done in 
2000, ‘that parents should have the right itself, rather than the right to request’ (TUC 
2005). Conceding that the new legislation might have assisted in creating a general 
climate supportive of flexible working, they were concerned that it did not provide a 
right for employees to challenge unfair refusals (TUC 2005). Employers, on the other 
hand, welcomed the commitment not to change the structure of the right (e.g. CBI 
2005; FSB 2005).  
In its reply to the public consultation, the Government stated that it no longer intended 
to review the principles of the law, as it had previously committed to in reply to the 
Taskforce report (DTI 2001e) and in Parliament (SC Deb (9 Del Leg) 5 December 
2002 c017). Instead it explained ‘that extending the scope rather than undertaking a 
review of the principles of the law offers a better outcome for both employers and 
employees’ (DTI 2005b para 5.8). The Government decided to extend the right to 
request flexible working to carers of adults from April 2007, but not to parents of older 
children. Although many employee and family organisations as well as some employer 
representatives had advocated to extend the ‘right to request’ to all employees with 
caring responsibilities (see for example Working Families 2005) or even to all 
employees (see for example CIPD 2005a; EOC 2005), the Government was ‘not 
persuaded to take a blanket approach to the right to request flexible working and 
extend its scope to all employees’ (DTI 2005b para 5.28), preferring to target statutory 
support to those most in need and encouraging more generous provision on a voluntary 
basis.  
The policy developments during New Labour’s second turn in office implemented 
many of the policy objectives planned during the early years in office. While much of 
the policy effort in the late 1990s was directed at preparing fertile ground by building 
consensus on the desirability of such resources and envisaging growth from a very low 
basis of childcare services, financial support and employment rights, the emphasis 
from 2000 onwards was on integrating the resources directed at working parents within 
a ‘home grown’ policy agenda. Family-friendly working time policy developed as part 
of the wider policy package of policies aimed at an employment-oriented organisation 
of care. In terms of instrument choice, the focus of family-friendly working time policy 
throughout the second term in office had been on the development and introduction of 
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statutory regulation in the area of flexible working. The Work-Life Balance Campaign, 
which had moved to the DTI following re-election in 2001, continued to disseminate 
information and guidance alongside these developments and was phased out in 2005. 
The partnership with Employers for Work-Life-Balance, which originally had been 
planned to last one year continued until 2003, when the employer group disbanded and 
handed over their web portal to the Work Foundation (Ellwood 2003)(Int. UK 14, 
02/02/2006). The Challenge Fund, co-funded by the European Social Fund, ran for five 
application rounds until 2004 providing consultancy services to 448 employers, 
covering 1.2 million employees (Interview Civil Servant, DTI, 25th July 2005). Having 
won the general elections in May 2005 for a third term in office, the third wave of 
family-friendly reforms entered the parliamentary process in October 2005 with the 
Work and Families Bill. The Work and Families Act, passed in June 2006, extended 
the right to request flexible working patterns to carers of adults.  
Having traced the development of family-friendly working time policy over time, and 
within the wider work-family reconciliation context, the following discussion will 
explore the way family-friendly working time policy is ‘nested’ within the wider 
resource mix of reconciliation policies introduced by New Labour. 
‘Time to care’ versus ‘time to work’: variation over the care cycle 
The resource infrastructure of ‘time’, ‘money’ and ‘services’ built by New Labour 
between 1997 and 2005 was consolidated over time to facilitate the employment of 
individuals with care responsibilities. The reallocation of time from employment to 
family care (‘time to care’) was facilitated through the introduction and expansion of 
family leave entitlements, notably through an increase in Maternity Leave to a total of 
one year, its extension to adoptive parents and the introduction of Paternity Leave as 
well as Parental Leave entitlements. Paid Maternity Leave enabled mothers to stay at 
home with their baby during the first six months. Fathers were entitled to two weeks of 
Statutory Paternity Pay. Access to family leave was strongly gender biased, reinforcing 
the male breadwinner/female carer family arrangement during the first year of 
parenthood.  
New Labour’s reconciliation policy emphasis on providing ‘time to care’ for mothers 
during the child’s first year of life was in part motivated by a concern for child well-
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being and child development, ‘to ensure that every child gets the best start in life’ (HM 
Treasury 2004b p.1). A strong emphasis was placed on child development (HM 
Treasury 2004b Appendix A). Although an important objective of the Childcare 
Strategy was to enable parental employment through better access to and affordability 
of services, the 2004 Strategy emphasised the importance of  ‘consistent one to one 
care’ in the first year of a child’s life when rapid developments take place. The benefits 
were highlighted with reference to research on child development (see for example 
NICHD Early Child Care Research Network 2002; Gregg et al. 2003) and maternal 
health (Chatterji and Markowitz 2004). Long, paid Maternity Leave was considered an 
appropriate instrument to enable consistent maternal care during the first year of a 
child’s life. The long term goal was to increase the period of paid Maternity Leave 
from six months in 2004 to nine months in 2007 and twelve months by the end of the 
following term in office with the option of transferring some of this paid leave to the 
child’s father (HM Treasury 2004b). While the policy orientation emphasised ‘time to 
care’ for young children, it emphasised ‘time to work’ policies for parents of older 
children.  
Parental employment was seen as a key instrument in fighting child poverty. The 
strategy document gave particular emphasis to the detrimental effects of poverty on 
child development, constructing a link between parental employment as a means of 
poverty reduction and positive child development outcomes. In the Childcare Review 
in 2002, and the new strategy of 2004, the issue of parental employability through 
childcare services was more strongly emphasised than in the original framework 
document in 1998, highlighting the instrumental function of childcare services in 
improving parental employability and reducing child poverty (DfES et al. 2002; HM 
Treasury et al. 2004). The emphasis was timely in the context of the parallel Child 
Poverty Review, which was conducted in 2003 to assess progress towards the 
Government’s pledge of eradicating child poverty by 2020 (HM Treasury 2004a). 
Childcare provision was also a fundamental condition to reaching the Governments’ 
employment target of 70 per cent for lone parents by 2010. Against the backdrop of 
these overarching policy goals, a dual-earner model was encouraged, placing no 
emphasis on the equal sharing of work and care between men and women. Gender 
neutral ‘time to care’ entitlements, notably parental leave and working time reduction 
under the Flexible Working Regulations, were, in contrast to Maternity Leave, not 
  Chapter 4 
118 
 
paid. While formally gender neutral, these ‘time to care’ entitlements were not 
affordable for workers with breadwinning responsibilities, as they were not financially 
backed up. 
The policy emphasis was on economic incentives to encourage the externalisation of 
childcare, through the Childcare Tax Credit, and funding of childcare services. The 
financial incentive structure coupled with the growing emphasis of childcare services 
as ‘time providers’ reflects the strong employment orientation of New Labour’s overall 
approach to welfare, or, to borrow Fiona William’s terms, New Labours ‘ethic of paid 
work’ (Williams 2001). It included the increase of financial transfers that were 
conditional upon employment participation, notably the Working Families Tax Credit. 
The externalisation of childcare to enable parents to dedicate time to employment was 
financially supported through in-work tax credits towards childcare costs, while issues 
of accessibility and quality of the care infrastructure were addressed through the 
National Childcare Strategy, which aimed to make high quality childcare services 
accessible to everyone needing them.  
The policy package of resources was designed to facilitate different reconciliation 
choices across the childcare cycle: moving from a facilitation of family care during the 
first year of the child’s life to facilitating parental employment when the child is older 
(especially from age three). While leave policies were strongly gender-biased, 
encouraging maternal rather than paternal care (Lewis and Campbell 2007), family-
friendly working time policy was presented as gender neutral, formally enabling 
fathers to take a greater share in family care. According to the Second Flexible 
Working Survey in 2004, 16 per cent of men compared to 39 per cent of women had 
requested to work part-time (Holt and Grainger 2005 Chart 5). Within the wider 
reconciliation policy package, family-friendly working time policy had the function of 
smoothing the transitions between childcare services, family care and parental 
employment rather than substantively promoting parental reallocation of time from 
employment to family care. Without being financially backed up, family-friendly 
working time policy has only limited capacity in enabling ‘genuine’ choice to dedicate 
more time to family care. In combination with increasingly employment-oriented, 
wrap-around childcare services, family-friendly working time policy measures are 
instrumental in strengthening parental attachment to the labour market. Due to the lack 
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of financial backing, they serve a dual-earner/externalised care model rather than a 
dual-earner/dual carer model.   
Having contextualised the development of family-friendly working time policy within 
the wider policy context, the remainder of the chapter focuses more narrowly on the 
policy strategies pursued by New Labour to improve access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements, focusing on the choices made between the encouragement of best 
practice and the regulation of working time. Summing up family-friendly working time 
policy between 1997 and 2005, the key reforms constituting the British strategy to 
improve access to family-friendly working time arrangements were the Work-Life 
Balance Campaign between 2000 and 2005 and the Flexible Working Regulations 
2002. Indirect interventions with possible implications for access included the trade 
union recognition procedure introduced through the Employment Relations Act 1999 
improving employee access to workplace representation. The Working Time 
Regulations 1998 improved employee protection against family-unfriendly working 
time patterns such as excessively long working hours and insufficient rest periods, but 
the possible opt-out weakened this protective effect. Further, the Working Time 
Regulations did not contain provisions improving access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements. The Part-time Workers Regulations, while not promoting the 
provision of part-time work, addressed the opportunity costs of part-time working by 
outlawing discrimination on the basis of part-time work (SI 2000 No. 1551). Figure 7 
summarises the policy reforms between 1997 and 2005 at a glance.  
Figure 7: Family-friendly working time policy in the UK, 1997-2005 
 POLICY INSTRUMENT TYPE POLICY REFORMS 
Regulation 
Flexible Working Regulations 2002 
Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 
Flexible Working Regulations 2002 
Economic incentives / 
Information  
Guidance on Part-time Work 
Work-Life Balance Campaign 
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Part III of the chapter analyses the policy choices characterising the British strategy to 
increase access to family-friendly working time arrangements. It analyses over time 
changes in policy choice, seeks explanations for instrument selection, and discusses the 
implications for the power balance between employers and employees. 
III. Policy choices over time: from best practice promotion to the regulation 
of best practice  
In this section, the policy instrument selection between information, economic 
incentives and regulation based instruments is analysed over time, exploring the role of 
ideas and interests of actors, the nature of the relationship over time, the overarching 
policy goals to which family-friendly working time policy is instrumental and the role 
of past policy choices on policy choice.  
In several respects, the change in Government in 1997 represents a critical variable for 
the analysis of family-friendly working time policy in the British context. The 
Conservative Party’s approach to the family in general, and the ‘problem’ of 
reconciling work and family life in particular, was led by the perception that how 
parents decide to combine work and family responsibilities was a private decision and 
not an area for government intervention (Lewis 2003). One might interpret this stance 
within the wider context of the neo-liberal paradigm which led Conservative 
government policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s: if parents wanted to work and use 
childcare services, it was the market, not the state that would be best apt to provide 
them (Esping-Andersen 1999). Flexible working patterns to accommodate care 
responsibilities should be voluntarily negotiated between employers and employees 
and not statutorily regulated by government. An ‘interventionist’ family-friendly 
policy stood in conflict with the dominant neo-liberal policy paradigm of deregulation 
and the ideal of the free market.  
The change in government allowed for new ideas regarding the appropriate role for 
state intervention to shape the policy agenda. The Labour Party did consider the 
reconciliation of work and family responsibilities an issue for government policy, that 
it is a societal rather than private affair, which it was time to explicitly address (HC 
Deb 9 July 1996 vol 281 c 238). Arguably, policy developments since 1997 indicate 
that ‘the nature of the gendered division of work and care at the household level is still 
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treated as a matter of private decision-making’ as there has been no pro-active policy 
approach to increasing the male share in time dedicated to family work (Lewis and 
Campbell 2007 p.7). Overall, the policy initiatives leaned towards enabling a 
redistribution of time from family care to employment by addressing various barriers 
to labour market participation of individuals with caring responsibilities. Tony Blair’s 
overarching orientation to welfare reform ran under the credo that all should be given 
the opportunity to participate in employment, and contribute their skills and 
productivity to the economy (Lister 1998). Economic independence through 
employment constituted a central policy goal in the Government’s social inclusion 
strategy (Levitas 1998). Within this wider policy frame guiding New Labour’s 
approach to welfare, help with reconciling employment and family responsibilities was 
in part motivated by the goal of preventing social exclusion caused by the reduced 
ability or inability of care givers to participate in employment (Bonoli 2005). New 
Labour saw successful work-family reconciliation as instrumental to its key policy 
objectives of poverty prevention and social inclusion (Home Office 1998). 
Continuity on the path of voluntary best practice promotion 
In their choice of policy instruments, New Labour’s policy approach initially 
continued on the Conservative path of best practice promotion by taking an 
information-based rather than regulatory form. The Conservative Government had 
pursued a largely non-interventionist approach, limiting its activities to the publication 
of information brochures in the early to mid-1990s (Employment Committee 1995). 
New Labour’s information-based quest significantly increased the intensity of 
information provision. A wider array of measures were grouped under its Work-Life 
Balance Campaign, which ran over a five year period from March 2000 to March 
2005, and firmly established the concept of work-life balance and its benefits to 
employees and businesses in the media and public discourse. Despite significantly 
greater policy effort in this area, New Labour equally steered clear from regulatory 
intervention where it was not required by European Directives or already in place, as in 
the case of maternity leave. There are several possible explanations for this path-
dependent policy development during New Labour’s first years in office.  
Against the backdrop of the non-interventionist Conservative policy legacy, an explicit 
family-friendly working time policy had to be developed from scratch. While New 
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Labour had come to power with a clear strategy to expand childcare provision, a 
family-friendly employment agenda had not been formulated during opposition years 
(New Labour 1997). New Labour underwent an extensive information searching and 
agenda setting phase during the first years in government in which they consulted 
widely with experts and stakeholders. In the absence of a pre-formulated policy agenda 
and in the light of later regulatory intervention, it is plausible to suggest that in the late 
1990s the Conservative path of best practice promotion was continued out of a lack of 
a regulatory reform proposal on the table rather than out of the same ideational 
commitment to statutory non-intervention. New Labour’s willingness to re-regulate the 
labour market was evidenced through the signing of the European Social Chapter and 
the Employment Relations Act 1999.   
The emphasis on best practice promotion during the early years can also be interpreted 
as an attempt to contain the regulatory ‘shock’ to business initiated by the European 
policy agenda. The first wave of regulatory reforms promoting ‘family-friendly’ 
employment was almost entirely led by external policy requirements (Dean 2002). The 
UK, following the signing of the European Social Chapter in 1997, had to ‘catch up’ 
on a number of EC Directives, notably on Working Time23, Parental Leave and Part-
Time Work. These policies required statutory reforms as implementation through 
collective agreements was not practicable in the UK industrial relations context. 
Although the Government pursued a strategy of minimal implementation, reforms 
were perceived as a wave of regulatory ‘red tape’ by the employer community and 
fiercely contested (Lea 2003). The opportunity to introduce statutory regulations on 
family-friendly working hours offered by both the Parental Leave and Part-time Work 
Directives were not seized to keep the organisational burden and costs to employers 
minimal. The impetus of European policy requirements was however to stimulate 
policy debates and enquiries and to anchor the issues of the long hours working 
culture, part-time working and family leave on the agenda during these formative, 
agenda setting years (e.g. Social Security Select Committee 1999; Education and 
Employment Committee). Leading on from shock containment, let us more broadly 
consider the nature of government-business relations under New Labour.  
                                                 
23 Which was not part of the social chapter, but implementation had been delayed by the Conservative 
government. 
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The cautious, non-regulatory emphasis on best practice promotion can be interpreted 
as a strategy of conflict avoidance and trust building. The incoming Labour 
Government faced the pressure of proving to a suspicious business community that 
New Labour was indeed more business-friendly than old Labour had been. A central 
component of this endeavour was the commitment to reducing regulatory burden, 
especially for small businesses (Conway 2001). The Government attempted to 
carefully mediate between the different stakeholder groups. On the one hand, 
expectations for change from women and trade unions were high after 18 years of 
Conservative rule. On the other hand, New Labour, having undergone a redefinition of 
party ideas and policy objectives during opposition years, was anxious to demonstrate 
to the suspicious business community that they were not heavily biased towards union 
interests. They wanted to signal that they could be trusted to promote economic growth 
and competitiveness and not to work against business (Bara and Budge 2001; Blair et 
al. 2001). It was thus crucial to strike the right balance between polarised interests. 
This tension, one may argue, had the implication that Government wanted to 
demonstrate that it listened to both sides and wanted to find out what support was 
needed. It pursued a strategy of consensus building through the practice of wide 
consultation with stakeholders, both privately to formulate policy options, and publicly 
to legitimise them. Stakeholders were actively involved in the policy making process 
through participation in a number of advisory groups, notably the Work and Parents 
Taskforce. This approach enabled the Government to reduce opposition and tension 
which would have been likely had the stakeholders' views not been taken into account. 
Wherever possible, conflict potentials were avoided as exemplified by the 
implementation of Clause 5 of the Part-time Work Directive in which best practice 
guidance was preferred over a Code of Practice.  
Regulating ‘best practice’ 
Against the backdrop of New Labour’s reluctance to go beyond information-based 
interventions in the realm of family-friendly working time organisation, the decision to 
introduce legislation represents a surprising shift in direction. How can the shift in the 
choice of policy instruments from information to regulation be explained? Firstly, it is 
important to keep in mind that the right to request is not an absolute right but a way of 
more effectively encouraging the dialogue between employees and employers. The 
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Flexible Working Regulations are a procedural intervention aimed at regulating best 
practice in working time negotiation rather than substantively providing working time 
flexibility itself. The use of legislation rather than merely best practice guidance gave 
the issue more visibility, maximizing the outreach of information about flexible 
working to employers who generally pay more attention to changes in the law than to 
guidance and information published on government websites. The right to request was 
kept ‘light touch’ so as to reduce employer resistance from the outset but the decision 
to legislate meant that flexible working was discussed on a wide and visible platform. 
Secondly, considering the timing of the reform proposals, electoral considerations 
seem to have played an important role in the decision to legislate. This impression is 
reinforced by the fact that the decision to introduce an employee right to flexible 
working was announced strategically just days before the general election in June 2001 
(New Labour 2001b). The extensive consultation period had highlighted a high level of 
demand for flexible working hours among parents and carers (Cm 5005 2000). Trade 
unions, family and equality organisations demanded a statutory right to flexible 
working. Government was under increasing pressure to act. The Employment 
Relations Act 1999 had gone some way in accommodating trade union demands but 
arguably had not provided much for the substantial segment of female New Labour 
voters. The pronounced family-friendly agenda for the second term in office was 
serving this constituency. After four years in power, New Labour had gained 
confidence in government and had established a business-friendly reputation. A record 
of economic growth and low unemployment might have encouraged a bolder move in 
family-friendly policy. This move was facilitated by the fact that two years after the 
Employment Relations Act, there was ‘regulatory space’ for new employment reforms. 
The central policy challenge for New Labour was to bridge conflicting interests; to 
create a supportive policy framework while keeping regulatory burdens for businesses 
low. The result was a ‘toothless’ right to request (Kilpatrick and Freedland 2004), 
which in its regulatory form of an employment right signalled to parents and carers 
that Government was acting in their interest, but in its substance did not harm business 
interests. 
Thirdly, the need for tangible policy outcomes was another driver behind the choice of 
legislation. Best practice promotion alone was not a sufficiently strong instrument to 
ensure widespread and needs-oriented access to family-friendly working time 
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arrangements as voluntary employer policies were unevenly spread across industries 
and workplaces (Hogarth et al. 2001). In order to ensure equitable access for those who 
need it, a statutory framework was needed to underpin voluntary initiative (Cm 3968 
1998; Cm 5005 2000). The choice of a legislative approach was very much 
conceptualised as a way of speeding up the process of best practice as voluntary 
change occurs too slowly. Working families needed support in juggling the time 
demands of work and care quickly if they were to meet the Governments’ employment 
and poverty targets. New Labour had set itself concrete deadlines of enabling 70 per 
cent of lone mothers into employment by 2010, by which time they also wanted to 
have halved the occurrence of child poverty. To both policy goals, the ability to 
combine care with employment was essential. The central importance of employment 
in New Labour’s general policy agenda increased both the need for family-oriented 
working time flexibility, and its instrumentality to reaching policy targets.  
Over time there was a clear trend in family-friendly working time policy from best 
practice promotion through information and guidance to employers, to best practice 
promotion through procedural regulation of working time negotiations between 
working parents and their employers. The silent phasing out of the Work-Life Balance 
Campaign in 2005 prompts the interpretation that with regulation on flexible working 
now being in place, the promotion of voluntary change through information and 
guidance was no longer needed. If this interpretation is correct, the impression is 
reinforced that information based instruments merely served to prepare the ground for 
later statutory regulation with its independent function becoming obsolete once a 
stronger instrument was put in place. This confirms earlier findings in the instrument 
choice literature that governments start with least intrusive (coercive) instruments 
moving progressively towards more intrusive ones (Anderson 1977; Doern and Phidd 
1983). 
The absence of economic incentives 
When considering the nature of state intervention over time, bearing in mind Vedung’s 
classification of ‘information’, ‘economic means’ and ‘regulation’ instruments, one 
notices the absence of direct economic incentives for flexible working on the policy 
agenda between 1997 and 2005. In terms of incentives encouraging employers to adopt 
family-friendly working time policies, the business benefits in terms of improved 
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recruitment and retention rates and reduced absenteeism were highlighted (DTI 
2001a). Free consultancy aiding the introduction of work-life balance measures was 
provided through the Work-Life Balance Challenge Fund (Nelson et al. 2004). 
However, the option of encouraging best practice through state-provided benefits such 
as tax concessions compensating some of the additional costs associated with work 
reorganisation was not part of the policy agenda (it was however, with regard to 
employer-provided childcare services). With regard to financial incentives for take-up, 
forms of wage compensation to make working time reductions financially ‘affordable’ 
were not addressed in the policy debate on flexible working in the way it had been 
done in the case of unpaid Parental Leave (Social Security Select Committee 1999). 
Arguably, the lack of economic instruments merely reflects that family-friendly 
working time policy is still a ‘young’ policy field which has moved at the level of 
instrument choice from information to regulation with further policy consolidation yet 
to be awaited through the use of more resource-intensive economic incentives (Hood 
1983). Until this stage of policy consolidation is reached, working parents face 
considerable economic loss by re-allocating time from employment to family care.   
The compensation of earnings lost through the reallocation of working time either in 
part or in full represent a significant investment of state resources and there are several 
factors acting as obstacles to such a policy approach. Most obviously there are 
budgetary constraints. Family-friendly employment policies in contrast effectively 
delegate the responsibility of time provision and its associated costs to employers, 
while incurring relatively insignificant immediate costs to the public purse. At the 
same time, the decision not to substantiate ‘time to care’ policies through financial 
transfers can be interpreted as a ‘business-friendly’ policy strategy. By entitling 
working parents to time off work without designing the policy in a way that makes it 
‘affordable’, up-take can reasonably be expected to be low and thereby limiting its 
impact on employers and minimizing the requirement, and associated costs, of work 
re-organization. This was the case with the introduction of unpaid Parental Leave and 
arguably served as a rationale for not applying the same principles of Maternity Pay to 
Paternity Pay, as it can be anticipated that few fathers will take-up paternity leave at 
no, or low levels, of wage compensation. The same problematic applies in a somewhat 
weaker form to the case of working time reduction (where the financial loss is not as 
high as in the case of full-time leave). Statutory entitlements without economic 
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substantiation can be regarded as an ‘empty-shell’ policy: increasing reconciliation 
choices in ‘form’ but not in ‘substance’.  
Another important factor to consider in searching explanations for the absence of 
economic incentives for the re-allocation of time from employment to care in the 
context of family-friendly working time policy is the role of ‘competing’ policy 
instruments. In British policy development there was a clear prioritisation of incentives 
to externalise care through the purchase of childcare services providing parents with 
‘time to work’. The investment in a child care service infrastructure has a number of 
‘competitive advantages’ over family-friendly working time policy. In combination 
with education, it serves New Labour’s policy goal of social investment in children 
(Lister 2006), whereas less influence can be exerted on the quality of parental care and 
education. As ‘time (to work) providers’ childcare services effectively serve the policy 
objective of integration of parents (mothers) and carers in the labour market. Last but 
not least, public investment in the childcare infrastructure is supported by employers, 
who benefit from increased labour (time) supply, whereas intrusive advances in 
family-friendly working time policy are vehemently opposed. In Bonoli’s terms, there 
is a ‘convergence in interests’ between working women and employers on the issue of 
publicly supplied childcare services (Bonoli 2005 p.443), whereas in the case of 
control over working time organisation, there are divergent interests between 
employees and employers. In brief, the ‘returns on investment’ in childcare services 
appear more promising than investments in ‘time to care’, which families provide 
anyway (Ungerson 1997).   
Summing up, the shift from information to regulation represents a strengthening in the 
empowering potential of the Government’s policy strategy over time. Applying 
Vedung’s framework and its adaptation to family-friendly working time policy 
developed in Chapter Three to the British case in Figure 8 illustrates this shift. 
Figure 8: The 'empowering potential' of the British policy strategy over time 
Low             → High 
Work-life balance 
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 Flexible Working 
Regulations 
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Due to the light touch nature of the flexible working regulations, which are not backed 
up by heavy sanctions in case of non-compliance, nor with economic transfers to 
working parents making ‘time to care’ more affordable, the introduction of legislation 
did however not imply a strong shift in the power balance between employers and 
employees.  
Conclusions 
Starting from a modest level of best practice promotion in the early to mid-1990s, 
family-friendly working time policy has significantly ‘taken off’ following the change 
in government in 1997. Following a period of agenda setting and fact-finding, the 
British policy approach to family-friendly working time policy was characterised first 
by intensification and diversification of the information-based tool kit bundled under 
New Labour’s high-profile Work-Life Balance Campaign and second, during New 
Labour’s second term in office, the introduction of a statutory right to request flexible 
working patterns. State intervention remained path-dependant in the use of 
information-based policy instruments, which aimed to steer change in working practice 
through information and guidance but avoided regulatory intervention in the 
employment relationship. The introduction of the Flexible Working Regulations in 
2002 marked a significant transition from information-based to regulatory intervention. 
However, the new ‘right to request’ was a procedural rather than substantive 
intervention aimed at spreading good practice in the negotiation of employee requests 
rather than augmenting the degree of control working parents have over their working 
time. Therefore, although New Labour changed the tool kit, they continued along the 
path of best practice promotion rather than redressing the power balance between 
employers and employees by regulatory means, which is a point that will be elaborated 
further in Chapter Six.   
Family-friendly working time policy did not employ economic incentives to promote 
provision and use of family-friendly working time patterns. Unless ‘time’ resources 
such as entitlements to leave or working time reduction are backed up by financial 
resources, there is no ‘genuine’ choice to reallocate time from work to family care, 
especially not for fathers who assume the main breadwinning responsibility in the 
majority of families. The policy trajectory of the development of family-friendly 
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working time policy in the UK between 1997 and 2005 has revealed that the debate on 
appropriate instrument choice has been between encouraging change through 
information (voluntary change) or regulation (obligated change). The focus of attention 
was on employers and their role in advancing change at the workplace. Policies to 
smoothen the loss of income incurred through a care-related working time reduction 
and thus supporting the choice of reallocating time from work to family care were 
absent from the family-friendly working time agenda. This stands in contrast to 
maternity and paternity leave, which are paid, providing incentives (for mothers) for a 
temporary full-time exit from work after the child is born. Family-friendly working 
time policy, albeit being addressed at both men and women, did little to address the 
strong gender polarisation of working time characteristics of the British working time 
regime. A more gender equitable allocation of time was not pursued (Campbell 2006; 
Lewis and Campbell 2007).  
Placing the development of family-friendly working time policy within the wider 
policy agenda, the analysis revealed that reconciliation policies under New Labour 
were designed to serve an employment-oriented policy agenda, moving from the 
assumption of a male breadwinner to an adult worker model (Lewis 2002). The 
provision of ‘time to work’ through the development of a comprehensive childcare 
infrastructure backed up by financial support was prioritised over the ‘time to care’ 
function of family-friendly working time policy. ‘Time to care’ was selectively 
promoted through family leave entitlements, which were designed on a full-time basis, 
implying a temporary absence from work, which did not serve to promote the 
simultaneous reconciliation of work and family care. Policy interventions directly 
aimed at improving access to family-friendly working time arrangements were 
primarily information based and not backed up by financial resources. The business-
oriented protection of managerial freedom in the name of economic competitiveness 
and productivity were prioritised over family-oriented, employee-empowering 
flexibility, which was indicated by the absence of protective and ‘control’- 
redistributing interventions,  as the defence of the ‘individual’ opt-out from the weekly 
48 hour limit illustrates (DTI 2004g).  
Comparing policy development under New Labour with the policy approach of the 
Conservative/Liberal governments preceding them, a pattern of path dependence in the 
policy orientation to family-friendly working time policy in the UK was observed, 
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despite change at the level of policy instruments. Although the intensity, visibility and 
outreach of information-based instruments were innovatively expanded, they remained 
within the voluntary realm. The introduction of legislation was employed to achieve 
the same policy goal: spread best practice to achieve cultural change and thereby a 
more family-friendly working time organisation. New Labour’s ideas regarding the 
role of the state in regulating employment relations, notably ensuring fairness for all 
through a minimum floor of statutory employment rights while keeping the regulatory 
burden to businesses low as laid out in the White Papers Fairness at Work and 
Modernising Government, are clearly reflected in their adopted policy approach to 
family-friendly working time policy (Cm 3968 1998; Cm 4310 1999). Although the 
overall policy direction, if viewed narrowly, has been path dependent, with a cautious 
approach to encouraging employer provision, family-friendly working time policy was 
part of a package of more far reaching policy reforms to support work-family 
reconciliation which stand in stronger contrast to the non-interventionist Conservative 
approach. These however were designed in an employer-friendly way, so as to avoid 
organisational burdens, which had the implication that ‘time to care’ was primarily 
provided through temporary employment exit, making a profound, employee-oriented 
reorganisation of working time to accommodate care-related working time reductions 
unnecessary. Chapter Five now discusses the German case and concludes in a 
comparison of the two policy approaches.  
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5. Family-friendly working time policy in Germany 
Compared to the British case, where family-friendly working time policy was 
developed against a policy legacy of non-interventionism in the organisation of 
working time and minimal family-oriented government support, German policy 
reforms built on a legacy of statutorily regulated employment relations and expanding 
resource allocation to families (Meyer 2003; Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser 2004). This 
chapter analyses the development of family-friendly working time policy in Germany 
under the Social Democrat led ‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government with Bündnis 
90/Die Grünen (hereafter referred to as the Green Party), which took office in 
September 1998. During their two terms in office (1998–2002 and 2002-2005) the 
‘Red-Green’ Government undertook far-reaching measures relating to the 
reconciliation of work and family life and access to family-friendly working time 
arrangements.  
Compared with the British case in Chapter Four, a number of key differences between 
the approaches emerge. In addition to the different policy legacies against which 
family-friendly working time policy developed in the two countries, the analysis 
reveals different overarching policy goals in which work-family reconciliation is 
instrumental. While social inclusion through employment and the reduction of child 
poverty were of key concern to New Labour, employment creation through voluntary 
working time reduction and gender equality were central policy goals during the ‘Red-
Green’ Government’s early years in office. Following a reconceptualisation of family 
policy by the Social Democrats (SPD), pronatalist policy motivations in response to 
demographic change and the goal of a ‘sustainable family policy’ increasingly shifted 
the policy focus from equal opportunities in employment and a regulatory role of the 
state to redress market inequalities, to improving the childcare infrastructure, with 
significant implications for family-friendly working time policy during their second 
term in office. 
This chapter is structured in three parts. Parts I and II provide a chronological analysis 
of family-friendly working time policy across policy fields, structured by legislative 
period from 1998 to 2002, and from 2002 to 2005. The relative ‘fit’ of family-friendly 
working time policy within the wider ‘time to care’ and ‘time to work’ orientations of 
reconciliation policies is explored. Part III then pulls the relevant findings together to 
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explore the policy choice between regulation, economic means and information-based 
instruments over the time period considered, seeking plausible explanations for 
changes in instrument selection over time. This is then followed by a discussion of the 
empowering potential of family-friendly working time policy, applying Vedung’s 
framework and its modified version as developed in Chapter Three to the German 
case. The chapter closes by highlighting the similarities and difference between the 
German and British policy trajectories. 
I. 1998 to 2002 – the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition’s first term in office 
Working time was a prominent topic on the policy agenda agreed by the coalition 
partners in October 1998. It featured in labour market policy, family policy and 
women’s policy. In the field of family policy, the coalition parties agreed on the 
introduction of a statutory entitlement for parents to reduce their working hours during 
parental leave. Under the heading A new departure in women's policy, the Government 
announced that it intended to make equal opportunities for women and men a large 
social reform project. An action programme with the title Woman and Work was to 
include an effective equal opportunities law with binding regulations that would also 
cover the private sector, improve flexible working times and create better conditions 
for part-time work. However, in the realm of labour market policy, the Government 
put trust in social dialogue and employment impulses through negotiated agreements. 
To fight unemployment, for instance, the Government intended to cooperate with 
businesses and trade unions in a tripartite Alliance for Jobs, Training and 
Competitiveness to agree on a 'flexible and employment-creating organisation of 
working time’, including part-time work, partial retirement, an employment-creating 
reduction in overtime, and work-family compatibility' (Koalitionsvereinbarung 1998). 
In the following, the different policy fields in the context of which family-friendly 
working time policy was developed are discussed in turn, starting with the Alliance for 
Jobs.  
The Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness 
Working time policy in the late 1990s was considered a relevant instrument for job 
maintenance and employment creation. The ‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government 
wanted to tackle the problem of mass unemployment jointly with the trade unions and 
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business associations, building on a previous attempt to collaborate which had failed 
under the Kohl Government in 1996 (Hassel 2001). The new tripartite Alliance for 
Jobs, Training and Competitiveness was formed in December 1998 (Schulten 1998). 
One of twelve goals jointly agreed by the alliance partners was to promote 
employment by distributing work through flexible working time arrangements, notably 
through a reduction in overtime, the use of working time accounts, and the promotion 
of part-time work. In July 1999, the two central associations of the collective 
bargaining parties, the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) and 
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA) issued a joint declaration 
on working time. It set out the principles for the future development of collective 
bargaining, which contained plans for ‘a differentiated and flexible working time 
policy and a different distribution of work’, through ‘an employment-creating 
reduction of overtime’, the use of working time ‘corridors’ and annualised working 
time arrangements yearly and/or life-long working time accounts. This included the 
creation of more part-time work and the development of new models to make such 
work more attractive, such as partial retirement for older workers (Schulten 1999b).  
Overall, this working time agenda, while promoting flexibility, was not family 
oriented. The role of working time reduction and flexibility in the reconciliation of 
paid work with family responsibilities did not play a role in the tripartite dialogue on 
working time policy (Klenner 2001). Observers attributed the omission of family-
oriented working time flexibility to the lack of representation of women and equality 
groups in the Alliance, who could have pushed the issue on the agenda (Klenner 2001; 
Lang 2001; Vogelheim 2001). Klaus Lang, IG Metall representative on the Alliance’s 
steering group, commented that the interests of women were neglected, which he 
attributed to the unwillingness of societal actors to facilitate and increase female 
employment, and to promote their training and career progression opportunities in 
times of high unemployment (Lang 2001 295). In the late 1990s, the ‘Red-Green’ 
Coalition had put trust in the social partners to voluntarily advance an employment-
oriented organisation of working time. Acknowledging the lack of substantial progress 
through voluntary negotiation, the Government provided impetus for change through 
regulatory intervention.  
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The Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts Act 
The proposal to promote part-time employment through a statutory entitlement to a 
reduction in working hours was advanced in the Part-time Work and Fixed-term 
Contracts Bill in October 2000. With the policy goal of an employment-promoting 
reorganisation of working time remaining the same, there was a shift from relying on 
voluntary tripartite negotiation to statutory state intervention. The change was 
prompted by the fact that existing regulations through the Employment Creation Act 
(Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz ) on fixed-term contracts, which had been introduced 
in 1985, were about to expire in December 2000 and needed to be renewed (BT-Drs. 
14/4374 p.1). Secondly, Germany needed to implement the EU Directives on Part-time 
Work, for which the implementation deadline had already passed in January 2000 and 
on Fixed-term Work, which was due to be implemented in national law by July 2001 
(97/81/EC; 1999/70/EC). The decision to promote flexible employment through fixed 
term contracts and the introduction of a statutory right to working time reduction in the 
same reform project was an attempt to balance employer and employee interests. The 
aim was to increase stakeholder acceptance of the reforms by catering for both sides 
(Int. DE 13, 19/09/2006). While these external requirements partly explain the timing 
of the shift to regulation, Social Democratic policy preferences provide an explanation 
for the change in instrument choice. The shift to regulation represents a change in the 
role of the state away from moderating social partner negotiations horizontally in 
favour of the hierarchical ‘top-down’ approach of statutory regulation.   
The idea of promoting part-time employment by way of a statutory entitlement had 
been part of Social Democratic reform proposals to fight unemployment for a number 
of years. In the mid-nineties, for example, the SPD had brought in a motion calling 
upon Government to reform employment law to eliminate existing barriers to part-time 
employment and to introduce a statutory entitlement to a reduction in working time 
with the right to return to full-time employment (BT-Drs. 13/7522; BT-Pl. 13/178). A 
general working time reduction that contributed towards full employment and to more 
time sovereignty of employees - enabling them to reconcile work and family life in a 
gender-equitable way - was a proclaimed goal of the Social Democratic Party as stated 
in their party policy statement (SPD 1998b). Clause five of the European Directive on 
Part-time Work then provided an opportunity for the Social Democrats to introduce a 
universal statutory entitlement to a reduction in working time within the context of this 
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reform. The facilitation of work-family reconciliation for employees with caring 
responsibilities was a supportive argument for the introduction of the entitlement, but 
the primary policy goal was employment creation. Working time reduction by those 
employees in employment was considered to ‘liberate’ work which could then be 
redistributed to the workless (BT-Drs. 14/4374 p.11). At the first hearing of the Bill on 
Part-time Work and Fixed-term Contracts (TzBfrG) in Parliament in October 2000, 
Walter Riester, Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, said: ‘around 3 million 
employees want to work part-time and wish to reduce their working hours. Here lies an 
unused employment potential’ (BT-Pl. 14/127 p.12243 (C)). It was assumed that there 
was substantive latent demand for part-time work, based on data by the Institute for 
Labour Market and Employment Research (IAB), which had stated that almost a third 
of full-time employees would prefer a reduction in working hours, taking into account 
lower earnings (Holst and Schupp 1998). By encouraging employees to act upon their 
working time preferences through a legal entitlement, the Government hoped to tap 
into this unused potential of work redistribution. 
While the promotion of part-time employment and a flexible organisation of working 
time was generally welcome, there was no cross-party consensus on how to implement 
this. The proposal of introducing a statutory right to a reduction in working time was 
fiercely contested by the Liberals (FDP), who believed it would hinder rather than 
promote part-time employment by increasing bureaucratic hurdles (BT-Drs. 14/4625 
p.20). The Christian Democrats (CDU) did not object to legislation in principle. 
However, they asserted that the introduction of a statutory right to part-time work was 
only justified on the grounds of caring responsibilities or health impediments, and 
demanded that entitlement should be restricted to parents of children under 12, carers 
of adults, and employees with health problems that prevent full-time employment (BT-
Drs. 14/4526). They opposed an unconditional right to working time reduction (BT-
Drs. 14/4625 p.19). The introduction of an employee’s right to reduce their working 
hours was fiercely contested on the part of employers and their organisations, who 
argued that such a right compromised the freedom to manage and would have negative 
long term effects on the labour market (Ausschussdrucksache 14/965 2000). The strain 
on small and medium-sized enterprises incurred through the administrative burden 
associated with part-time work was also stressed (Fuchs 2004).  
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Despite fierce oppositions from employer groups, the reform was passed. It introduced 
a limited statutory right for employees to reduce their working hours if no business 
reasons opposed such request. Although the right was subject to a strong business 
defence, it was an important development for working parents in that entitlement was 
universal to all employees regardless of care status.  
While work-family reconciliation had not found consideration in the tripartite dialogue 
in the Alliance for Jobs, it played a role in the Part-time Work and Fixed-term 
Contracts Act (TzBfG). However, it can be argued that the time needs of working 
parents were utilised as part of the Government’s employment-creating objectives, as 
the rationale underlying the reform was that new employment could be created on the 
basis of a partial exit of workers (mothers) with caring responsibilities. In 2001, 86.4 
per cent of part-time workers were women, of which 62 per cent worked part-time for 
personal or family-related reasons. In comparison, only 5.2 per cent of men worked 
part-time (Viethen and Scheddler 2002 p.6).  
Parental Leave Reform 
In parallel with the policy developments on working time at the Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS), family-friendly working time policy was 
developed separately at the Federal Ministry for the Family, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth (BMFSFJ), where it was addressed at once in several reform projects. In 
contrast to policy developments at the BMAS, all policy reforms developed by the 
BMFSFJ had a strong gender equality rationale. The most significant reform project in 
terms of family-friendly working time was the parental leave reform. Both coalition 
partners perceived existing regulations as problematic in equality terms as they 
cemented the traditional division of labour within the family (only 1.5 per cent of leave 
takers were fathers) and promoted a long exit of women from the labour market. In 
their election manifesto, the Green Party had proposed a statutory right to a childcare-
related reduction in weekly working time (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998 p.75). The 
Social Democrats had wanted to introduce a flexible time account allowing both 
parents to work part-time and to share the care for the child more equally (SPD 1998a 
p.28). Both ideas were included in the coalition agreement (Koalitionsvereinbarung 
1998).  
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The idea of a right to reduced working hours had been on the party policy agendas for 
years. A decade earlier, in March 1988, the working group on gender equality of the 
Social Democratic Party had already published a statement in which they made 12 
demands for the societal recognition of family work. One of them addressed the need 
to consider family care as the shared responsibility of men and women. To achieve 
this, parents should receive a temporary right to a reduction in working hours and a 
right to return to full-time hours after the end of the period of active caring (SPD 
Bundestagsfraktion 1988). The Green Party, too, had called for a statutory right to 
reduced hours of work for parents of children under 12 in a motion on parental leave 
and childcare-related working time reduction back in 1990 (BT-Drs. 11/8423). 
Following the general elections in 1998 and the subsequent change in government, the 
opportunity for reform presented itself. 
The aim of the Bill for the Third Reform of the Child Raising Benefit Act, which was 
introduced to parliament in April 2000 (a few months before the Part-time Work and 
Fixed-term Contracts Bill) was to increase parental choice about how to balance paid 
work with their childcare responsibilities. It also intended to encourage more fathers to 
take a share in childcare by working part-time (BT-Drs. 14/3118). Four key elements 
were introduced to make the existing regulations more flexible. Firstly, the leave 
entitlement of 36 months was individualised, allowing both parents to take parental 
leave at the same time, rather than in turns as was previously the case. Secondly, the 
threshold of weekly working hours was increased from 19 to 30 hours per week, 
enabling higher earnings through part-time hours. Thirdly, the third year of the leave 
entitlement could be taken between the third and eighth birthday of the child. Finally, 
parents received a statutory right to reduce their working hours, in their job, to between 
15 and 30 hours while on parental leave. This was the most controversial element of 
the reform. It was welcome by family and equality advocates, and strongly opposed by 
employer groups in the public hearing on the proposed law (AFSFJ Protokoll 14/38).  
The parental leave reform included economic incentives for an early return to work 
through a new financial ‘budget option’. Parents shortening their parental leave were 
entitled to 420 Euros per month for up to one year, rather than up to 307 Euros per 
months over a two year period (BMFSFJ 2002). Although the budget option was 
designed to attract greater paternal involvement in family care while encouraging a 
stronger maternal attachment to the workplace (Leitner 2003a), it must be noted that 
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even the increased budget option was still very low, making it unlikely to provide a 
significant financial incentive for fathers to allocate time from paid employment to 
childcare (Beckmann 2001b). Overall, the Child Raising Benefit has continually 
decreased in its real value since its introduction in 1986: a trend which was not offset 
by the ‘Red-Green’ Government (Gerlach 2004a). While in 1986 83.6 per cent of 
families qualified for the full benefit of 600 DM during the means-tested part of the 
benefit after six months, this proportion had fallen to 48 per cent by 1997. The 2000 
reform slightly increased the income ceilings of the means-test which brought the 
proportion of eligible parents to 55 per cent (Dienel 2002 p.109). The level of the 
actual Child Raising Benefit was however not increased, and remained at the same 
level as at its introduction in 1986 (600 DM/Euros 307). As it was not indexed to 
prices, it has approximately halved in value (Dienel 2002 p.109). While the ‘choice’ of 
a more egalitarian time allocation between the parents was enhanced through the 
flexible regulation of working time reduction, time-frame, and the allowed frequency 
of taking turns, this ‘choice’ was not backed up by adequate financial compensation 
(Koch 2000 p.596). Research has repeatedly pointed out that financial considerations 
represent the most significant barrier to fathers taking parental leave (Vaskovics and 
Rost 1999; Beckmann 2001b; European Opinion Research Group 2004). The new 
regulations only led to a small increase in fathers’ take-up, from around 1.5 per cent to 
around 5 per cent in 2004 (BMFSFJ 2004). The statutory entitlement to working time 
reduction is insufficient to redress the gender imbalance in time allocation, as it does 
not sufficiently address the financial implications of working time reduction. Although 
a working time reduction sufficiently small to contain the financial penalty was 
enabled by the new time threshold of 30 hours, the use of this option is not possible 
unless backed up by adequate childcare services for the under-three-year-olds, which 
was a policy area that was not addressed during the ‘Red-Green’ Government’s first 
years in office. 
Instead, the BMFSFJ chose to address the high gender bias in uptake through an 
information and persuasion campaign addressed at fathers, which was launched in 
March 2001 shortly after the parental leave reform had come into effect. With the 
slogan More Freedom for Fathers, it encouraged men to take up their new entitlement 
(BMFSFJ 2001b). The campaign, which ran for one year, was targeted specifically at 
fathers and young men with the aim to ‘publicise the new freedoms afforded by the 
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Child Raising Benefit Act and to encourage greater participation of fathers in family 
work’ (BMFSFJ 2001a p.31). The underlying idea was that a change in mentality and 
working cultures was to be brought about by fathers going part-time during parental 
leave, to which they were now entitled by law. Government conceptualised their role 
as contributing to this change by providing the statutory framework and by 
encouraging men, through information instruments, to overcome traditional gender 
role patterns. The reform of the parental leave scheme illustrates a strategy of 
stimulating change in workplace culture and working practice through an employee-
initiated process of change by providing working parents with increased negotiation 
power through statutory regulation. The reform of the Works Constitutions Act to 
which we now turn, indirectly strengthened employee negotiations by empowering 
works councils to negotiate access to family-friendly working time arrangements on 
their behalf.     
The reform of the Works Constitutions Act 
The reform of the Works Constitutions Act 1972 (BetrVG) in 2001 included a number 
of amendments that strengthened the negotiation position of works councils with 
regard to family-friendly arrangements. The reform in general aimed to modernise the 
system of co-determination at the workplace in adaptation to changing workplaces and 
new forms of employment (BT-Drs. 14/5741). Such a modernisation had been a 
central demand of trade unions over the years (BT-Drs. 14/5741 p.23) and both 
coalition parties had unsuccessfully introduced reform proposals during their 
opposition years (BT-Drs. 10/3666; BT-Drs. 11/2995; BT-Drs. 11/4525). Important 
amendments were made to further women’s representation, both quantitatively in 
numbers represented in works councils, and qualitatively with regard to the themes to 
be raised by works councils with the employer. The problem of female under-
representation in works councils was addressed by a quota stipulating that women 
should be at least proportionately represented in works councils (Klenner and Lindecke 
2003). This was to ensure adequate representation of typically female concerns such as 
part-time working and work-family reconciliation measures. Furthermore, the 
promotion of the compatibility between family life and employment was explicitly 
added to the list of issues that works councils are entitled to raise with employers, who 
in turn have the duty to discuss them with works councils (§80 (1) 2b BetrVG)(BT-
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Drs. 14/5741). Thus, family-friendly working time arrangements were clearly 
established as an issue for workplace negotiations on behalf of working parents (Döge 
and Behnke 2006). A special Works and Staff Council Survey by the Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (WSI) on equal opportunities and family-friendliness in 
2003 found that in 27 per cent of the surveyed workplaces, work-family compatibility 
had been discussed, and in most cases these discussions had been initiated by the 
works council (Klenner 2004b). In the following, we now turn to the Government’s 
employer-oriented reform endeavours, which addressed the issue of family-friendly 
working within the wider policy frame of equal opportunities for women and men in 
employment. 
Family-friendly working time in the context of equal opportunities 
The objective to increase access to family-friendly working time arrangements was 
part of the equal opportunities agenda pursued under the programme Woman and Work 
at the BMFSFJ, which was agreed in Cabinet in the summer of 1999 (BMFSFJ 1999). 
The first reform project under this agenda was the amendment of the Women's 
Promotion Act for the Public Sector and the Federal Courts 1994 (FFG). When the Bill 
had been discussed in Parliament in 1993 both the SPD and the Green Party had 
criticised the lack of binding regulations and the exclusion of private sector employees, 
meaning that only 3.3 per cent of women in employment were covered by the 
provisions. Christina Schenk, speaking for the Green Party at the first reading of the 
Bill noted that:  
with regard to the instruments with which equality in opportunities is supposed 
to be accomplished, there is little point in going into a detailed criticism of the 
Government's Bill. The basic thought that equal opportunities can be enforced 
by ‘should’ and ‘could’ postulations, without coercion, control and without 
sanctions, is either worldly innocent or an expression of the fact that equal 
opportunities of women and men are not such a high priority after all (BT-Pl. 
12/179 p. 15443 (D); author’s translation).  
She announced that the Green party was to draft an alternative Bill soon.  
The SPD had already done so (BT-Drs. 12/5717). Their proposed equal opportunities 
law was to cover both public and private sector employees and contained binding 
regulations. The improved compatibility of work and family care was an explicit aim. 
Chapter 5 
141 
 
The SPD's motion was rejected by Parliament, and the Law for the Enforcement of 
Equal Rights for Women and Men (2. GleiBG) came into force in 1994.  
Against this background, the Coalition's agreement to amend the Equal Rights Act to 
make it more effective and to advance equal opportunities in the private sector through 
appropriate regulations was a consistent continuation of their policy preferences while 
in opposition. The ‘Red-Green’ Government amended the Equal Rights Act for the 
Public Sector in 2001. The reform was broadly supported by Parliament and justified 
by the findings of 4th Report on the Advancement of Women in the Public Sector, 
which had revealed the weak impact of the law between 1994 and 1998 (BT-Drs. 
14/5003). The amendments to the Bill postulated the provision of family-friendly 
working time arrangements, part-time work and family-related leave unless compelling 
reasons opposed it, thus tightening the rather vague wording of previous regulations. 
The advancement of equal opportunities in the private sector proved more of a 
challenge. 
In the action programme Woman and Work the Government announced their intention 
to advance equal opportunities in the private sector. Once the programme was agreed 
in Cabinet in June 1999, Women Minister Christine Bergmann started to consult on the 
framework and structure of a possible law with a group of experts composed of 
members of the governing parties; representatives of employee and employer 
organisations and legal experts; and held a number of public discussions to which 
interest groups were invited. In September 2000, Christine Bergmann presented a 
framework for an equal opportunities law for the private sector which proposed a two-
step process (Pfarr 2001). In a first step, businesses would develop and implement 
equal opportunities and work-family reconciliation measures in cooperation with trade 
unions or works-councils. As long as minimum legal standards24 were met, businesses 
were free to implement measures in line with their specific business context. Only 
where businesses failed to develop and implement equal opportunities measures 
voluntarily within a two or three year period would statutory regulations on the 
implementation of equal opportunities measures apply. Examples of work-family 
                                                 
24 The legal minimum standards were to cover targets on increasing the proportion of women in areas 
where they are underrepresented; gender mainstreaming; equal pay; the analysis of equal opportunities 
and the definition of targets; contact persons for women, and the prevention of sexual harassment at the 
workplace. In addition, businesses were to choose, subject to business size, among a variety of measures 
in the fields of ‘equal opportunities of women and men’ and ‘reconciliation of work and family’ (Pfarr 
2001) 
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reconciliation measures to be implemented by employers included family-oriented 
working time arrangements such as flexible working hours, part-time work and tele-
work; the provision or funding of childcare; as well as the provision of training during 
periods of family-related leave. This proposal intended to increase access by obliging 
employers to provide family-friendly working time arrangements. 
Bergmann's legislative proposals were met with fierce resistance from the employer 
and industry organisations (BDA 2000a), who were not willing to negotiate the 
introduction of legislation and rejected the proposed framework (DGB 2001; Pfarr 
2001). The most controversial aspect of the framework were the proposed sanctions in 
case of non-compliance. These included the tying of public investments to the 
advancement of equal opportunities and the right for associations to litigate on behalf 
of their members. In a position statement, the president of the Confederation of 
German Employers’ Associations (BDA), Dieter Hundt, stressed the willingness of 
German industry to achieve improvements in the area of equal opportunities, but by 
way of ‘voluntariness and sense of proportion’. ‘An equal opportunities policy with a 
crowbar’, he argued, ‘is a comparatively unserviceable instrument’ (BDA 2000a, 
author’s translation). The relations between the BMFSFJ leadership and the employer 
and business associations were hostile at this point. The debate on equal opportunities 
was polarised around the fact that the Government was planning to legislate: the actual 
content of the proposed legislation was secondary in the debate. In spite of employer 
opposition, Bergmann commissioned a group of legal experts to draft a Bill on the 
basis of the framework. It was completed and presented to the Chancellor's office in 
early 2001 (Pfarr 2001), but was rejected by the Chancellor before it could reach 
Cabinet. Gerhard Schröder was not willing to push through any further legislation 
against the will of employers, following fierce resistance against the Works 
Constitution Act reform earlier in the same year. The Chancellor's backing away from 
a legislative approach became clear when he invited the presidents of the central 
employer and industry associations, Dieter Hundt of the Confederation of German 
Employers’ Associations (BDA) and Michael Rogowski of the Federation of German 
Industries (BDI), for top level talks on March 27th, a meeting which was also attended 
by Economy Minister Müller and Women Minister Bergmann. The aim of the talks, 
according to a government spokesperson, was to examine ‘doable and desirable 
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solutions’ (Maschler 2001). It was also announced to the press that the Government 
did not intend to burden employers unnecessarily by bureaucratic regulations (Ibid.).  
In early April, Schröder indicated that he had allowed a further three years, in which 
employers would have the opportunity to implement equal opportunities measures 
voluntarily. Only if this voluntary route failed was the state to intervene through 
binding regulations. Schröder described his approach as ‘bargaining in the shadow of 
the law’, which was rooted in the belief that not all societal problems require a 
legislative response: as a step towards more civil society and away from ‘paternalistic 
and etatist thinking’ (Schröder 2001). He argued that the approach to policy 
management, which he was taking with regard to the advancement of women, 
represented further steps towards a bargaining and consensus-based democracy, where 
the state defined the target and minimum standards, but their implementation was to be 
left to the involved actors. The u-turn in policy strategy on equal opportunities was 
completed on July 2nd, when a voluntary agreement between the Government and the 
central industry associations was concluded, in which the central industry associations 
agreed to recommend company-based measures for the improvement of equal 
opportunities for women and men, including family-friendly working time 
arrangements (Bundesregierung 2001b). Progress was to be monitored by a high-level 
group composed in equal parts of Government and business representatives and 
evaluated after two years. With the Voluntary Agreement on the Promotion of Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men in the Private Sector, the legislative drive that had 
dominated working time policy in the Government's first term in office came to an 
end. By the end of 2001, all legislative reforms with an effect on working time 
flexibility were passed. 
During the election campaign for the upcoming general election in October 2002, 
family policy progressed to become one of the leading campaign issues for the social 
democrats (Mackroth and Ristau 2002). The key electoral promise for the following 
term was to substantively invest in the expansion of day care services with four billion 
Euros of federal funds (SPD 2002). The move of family policy to the centre stage of 
the (election) agenda was driven by both electoral and demographic rationales. The 
SPD leadership found that while the family was of utmost importance to voters, it had 
not been given the same central importance in politics (Mackroth and Ristau 2002; 
Ristau 2002). A ‘modern’ family policy and its association with the Social Democrats 
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(standing in contrast with the traditional male breadwinner family model promoted by 
the Christian Democrats) was perceived to have vote winning potential (Int. De 14, 
28/09/2006). The second driver was demographic change, particularly the problem of 
falling birth rates, which was associated with negative economic implications in the 
long run (Rürup and Gruescu 2003). The ageing of society jeopardized the 
sustainability of the generational contract in Germany’s insurance-based social security 
system. By addressing the fertility problem, family policy had a role to play in 
ensuring sustainability and economic growth and competitiveness (Rürup and Gruescu 
2003). In the run-up to the general election in October 2002, a shift in policy 
orientation from the provision of ‘time to care’ through employment rights to the 
provision of ‘time to work’ through a comprehensive childcare infrastructure took 
shape. This development had profound implications for the development of family-
friendly working time policy. 
II. 2002 to 2005 - the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition’s second term in office  
A central policy objective for the second term in office was to create a ‘sustainable’ 
family policy (Nachhaltige Familienpolitik) (Ristau 2005). To be sustainable, family 
policy had to meet the economic and societal challenge presented by demographic 
change by attaining two goals: sufficient children would have to be born to counteract 
the ageing of society; and an increase in female labour market participation was 
needed to counteract anticipated staff shortages (Rürup and Gruescu 2003 9). Causal 
relations were constructed between the lack in childcare services and low female 
labour market participation and Germany’s low birth rates (BT-Pl. 15/5 p.274-75). 
With reference to the experience of other European countries, notably France and the 
Scandinavian countries, where high levels of female labour market participation went 
alongside higher birth rates, it was argued that a comprehensive childcare 
infrastructure enabled women to combine employment with parenthood, and that one 
of the reasons for Germany’s growing childlessness was that women had to decide 
between having a career and having a family. The lack of a comprehensive childcare 
infrastructure contributed to the trend that especially well-qualified women, who faced 
high opportunity costs from leaving employment, increasingly remained childless 
(Rürup and Gruescu 2003). According to Micro Census Data of the year 2000, 44.3 per 
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cent of women between 35 and 39 years of age who held a postgraduate degree25 were 
still childless (BMFSFJ 2003b). The ability to reconcile work and family 
responsibilities was defined as a central indicator of ‘sustainable family policy’, and 
childcare services were seen as key to achieving this goal26 (Ristau 2005).  
This shift in policy emphasis towards service provision was rooted in a process of 
redefinition of the SPD’s concept of family policy (Mackroth and Ristau 2002). An 
internal working group (‘Forum Familie’) chaired by Renate Schmidt (Schmidt 2001) 
had developed a new party approach to family policy since 1999. At the Party 
Congress in November 2001, Schmidt emphasised the emancipation of family policy 
from the party’s gender equality agenda, which had been dominant in the late 1990s 
(SPD 2001)27. The new family concept rested on three pillars: first, improving the 
‘harmony’ between work and family life; second, improving the quality of family life 
(for example by improving the immediate environment in which families live - 
housing, public transport, playgrounds - and increasing their participation in social and 
political life); and third, creating a socially just and transparent system of financial 
transfers (Familienleistungsausgleich). The framework for the harmonisation of family 
and working life consisted of ‘concerted action in economy and society’, through a 
societal alliance for the ‘Future of the Family’, in which all societal actors were to be 
responsible for the creation of a family and child friendly society (SPD 2001 p.308) 
(Schmidt 2002). Following re-election in 2002, Chancellor Schröder asked Renate 
Schmidt to succeed Christine Bergmann as Federal Minister for the Family, Senior 
Citizens, Women and Youth. Under the leadership of Renate Schmidt, the new 
approach to family policy was translated into the new family policy agenda on 'the 
Future of the Family' (Int. DE 09, 12/07/2006).  
The new approach represented an important shift from a state-centrist 
conceptualisation of family policy to a ‘societal’ conceptualisation. With regard to the 
harmonisation of work and family life, this reconceptualisation implied a division of 
                                                 
25 Postgraduate degree translated from the German ‘Hochschul/Promotionsabschluss’, women living 
without children in their household. 
26 In the government’s national strategy on sustainability the measurable indicator for progress in 
tackling demographic change was defined in terms of full-time day care provision, which should reach a 
coverage rate of 30 per cent by 2010 for all children under the age of 12 (Bundesregierung 2001a 
p.124).   
27 ‘Family Policy is not the appendix of equal opportunities policy and equal opportunities policy is not 
the appendix of family policy. Both are discrete, important fields’. Speech by Renate Schmidt at the 
Party Congress in Nürnberg, 21. November 2001 (SPD 2001). 
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responsibilities between state and societal actors in which the role for government was 
to improve the national infrastructure for families, with a particular emphasis on the 
expansion and affordability of care services (SPD 2001). This development had an 
important implication for family-friendly working time policy: its development and 
implementation was largely delegated to employers. Whereas government intervention 
in the late 1990s had focused on regulating the negotiation of family-friendly working 
time arrangements through the introduction of employment rights and by strengthening 
the negotiation position of works councils: from 2001 onwards, government 
intervention in the realm of working time shifted to the use of information-based 
instruments with the aim of encouraging voluntary change. Although ‘time to care’ 
was recognised as a key variable to work-family reconciliation, the Government 
envisaged no further legislative reforms in this area. Change at the workplace was to 
be incited through cooperation with employers and by persuading them of the 
economic relevance of family-friendly working time arrangements. The key element of 
the new societal approach was the creation of an Alliance for the Family.. 
The Alliance for the Family 
With the Alliance for the Family, the Government implemented the idea of a division 
of labour between societal partners in creating a more family-friendly society. The 
stated aim was to change culture ‘through stalwart arguments and the distribution of 
examples of best practice, but also by initiating concrete change in businesses and 
local authorities’ (BMFSFJ and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). The strategy pursued by 
the BMFSFJ was to win influential partners in the ‘world of work’ as well as in local 
government, who were well placed to influence and promote change within their 
respective spheres of influence. They were drawn from the central business and 
employer associations, the trade union movement, the media, academia, and local 
government. They were all invited by the Minister to participate in the Alliance for the 
Family, and agreed to promote a better reconciliation of work and family within their 
respective spheres of influence (Int. DE 09, 12/07/2006). In the summer of 2003, 
Renate Schmidt jointly launched the initiative with Liz Mohn from the Bertelsmann 
Foundation (BMFSFJ and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). The Alliance for the Family 
consisted of a high-profile impulse group (Appendix F), providing ideas and publicity 
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at the national level; and local alliances that were to improve family-friendliness in 
concrete projects at the local level (Schmidt and Mohn 2004).  
The initiative of Local Alliances for the Family was formally launched in January 
2004, together with President Braun of the DIHK (BMFSFJ 2006d). In the context of 
limited government influence over outcomes at the local level within the federal 
structure of Germany, the policy strategy was to steer the process of alliance creation 
at the local level from a distance, by providing consultancy support with the setting up 
and management of such local alliances. Between December 2003 and October 2005, 
217 alliances were set up with a total of 412 locations receiving consultancy support28.  
Under the new ministerial leadership, there was no longer the political will to return to 
the option of statutory regulation in the realm of family-friendly working time 
arrangements, which did not ‘fit’ with the new policy strategy of voluntary co-
operation. The unpopular policy topic of equal opportunities had been pushed aside by 
the growing emphasis on the 'economic charm of the family' (Schmidt 2004a). This 
became especially evident when the first evaluation of the success of the voluntary 
agreement on equal opportunities for men and women in the private sector was due. In 
2003, the promised efforts were reviewed with regard to implementation of the 
agreement and its effects at the company level, and the results were presented in 
December 2003, known as the ‘Assessment 2003’ (BMFSFJ 2003a; Funk 2004). The 
authors of the report were satisfied by the developments and saw no need for the 
introduction of legislation. They even went as far as to conclude that: ‘the Government 
and industry agree with regard to the Assessment 2003 that statutory provisions and 
regulations in this area would change little in terms of workplace reality and would 
even have counterproductive effects’ [author’s translation] (BMFSFJ 2003a pp.38-39).  
By the end of 2003 it had become clear that the role for government was no longer 
perceived to be one of redressing injustices and rigidities at the workplace. Within the 
new division of labour, government attention was instead focussed on improving the 
service infrastructure to enable parents to better combine employment with 
parenthood.  
                                                 
28 The Alliance for the Family initiative was continued under the new Government that took office in 
October 2005.  In November 2007, the number of local alliances had increased to 450 with a total of 650 
locations receiving consultancy support (www.lokale-buendnisse-fuer-familie.de).  
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 ‘Time to work’ through the Day Care Expansion Act 
The Government set itself the target to double day care and childminding places by the 
summer of 2006, and to reach West European standards  (both quantitatively and 
qualitatively) of childcare provision by 2010 (Bundesregierung 2003; BT-Drs. 
15/3676). Impetus for these quantitative targets was given by the childcare targets set 
at the Barcelona Council of 2002, which were a 90 per cent childcare coverage rate for 
three to school age and 33 per cent for the under three-year-olds. These targets were 
considered necessary to realise the female employment rate target of 60 per cent by 
2010 that was agreed at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000. Although the 
Child and Youth Support Act 1990 (KJHG) had already postulated the needs-oriented 
provision of public care services, these regulations had not achieved the desired 
outcome. 
The level of service provision was especially low for the under three-year-olds, which 
had not been covered by the statutory right to a childcare place that had been 
introduced for children from the age of three to school age by the Pregnancy and 
Family Support Act 1996. In December 2002, there were only 85 places in day 
nurseries per 1000 children under the age of three in Germany compared to 790 places 
in kindergartens for children aged three to under seven.  Nursery provision levels in the 
West German Länder were significantly lower, with only 27 places in day nurseries 
per 1000 children compared to 370 places in the East German Länder (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2004). The Government intended to address these gaps in the care service 
infrastructure through the Day Care Expansion Act (TAG), which was passed in 
December 2004 and came into force in January 2005. The reform addressed the 
provision problem by setting concrete minimum provision targets, notably to provide 
day care places for all children under three whose parents are in education or 
employment, or whose care needs would not otherwise be satisfactorily met (§24 (3) 
KJHG). These day care places were to be provided either by day nurseries or by child 
minders. The reform further regulated quality standards for early education and care 
(BMFSFJ 2004c).  
The function of day care services as time providers for working parents gained 
increasing importance in the childcare debate, supported by arguments on the 
supportive role of day care in cognitive development and educational achievements 
Chapter 5 
149 
 
raised by Germany’s poor ranking in the OECD’s international PISA study, which 
assessed the educational achievement amongst fifteen-year-olds (OECD 2001c; Clasen 
2005). Short opening hours and unreliable school hours had for a long time been 
criticised as barriers to women’s employment and career advancement (Scheiwe 2000). 
The introduction of a statutory right to day care for three-year-olds in 1996 had led to 
the increase in provision, albeit only on a part-time basis of four hours a day, which 
made even part-time employment difficult (BMFSFJ 2006b). Increasingly policy 
recommendations stressed the importance of full-day and flexible care service 
provision to facilitate female labour market participation. Rürup and Gruescu for 
instance recommend day care opening hours from 7 am to 7 pm on a general basis, 
while stressing the importance of both quality (BMFSFJ 2003c) and affordability of 
such services (Rürup and Gruescu 2003 p.58). In this respect, the day care reform not 
only emphasised that day care places should be provided at least in sufficient number 
to cover working parents, but also that they should be oriented at their time needs, 
either through the provision of full-day places at day nurseries or supplementary care 
by childminders (§24 (1-3) KJHG). The regulation of public service provision was 
complemented by the encouragement of employer-based childcare provision through 
the Alliance for the Family (BMFSFJ 2004b). The Government further committed four 
billion Euros between 2003 and 2007 to the expansion of full-day schools through the 
investment programme Future of Education and Care which had benefited around 
5000 schools across Germany by 2005 (BT-Drs. 16/1360 p.XXVII). Full-day child 
care services aim to enable strongly employment oriented women to reconcile their 
career aspirations with parenthood in an attempt to address the high levels of 
childlessness among the highly qualified women.  
Efforts to regulate for a better childcare infrastructure were complemented by financial 
assistance with the cost of externalised childcare through the introduction of a child 
care tax allowance in 2002. It was provided to all working parents of children under 14 
irrespective of their income as long as childcare costs exceed 1,548 Euros per year to 
qualify for the 1,500 Euro allowance (BMFSFJ 2005c p. 20). This allowance was paid 
in addition to a universal tax credit for childcare or education (Betreuung und 
Erziehung oder Ausbildung) of a flat rate of 2,160 Euros per year (BMFSFJ 
2005c p.11) which was paid to all parents irrespective of whether care was provided 
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within the family or purchased on the market and set a signal of support to parents 
choosing a dual-earner reconciliation arrangement. 
Overall, under the roof of the Alliance for the Family, the state’s contribution to a 
more family-friendly society was the improvement of the service infrastructure of 
childcare and full-day schooling: moving away from the traditional approach of high 
financial transfers, which were no longer seen as an effective instrument to improve 
the compatibility of employment and family care (Schmidt 2002). The contribution by 
businesses, on the other hand, was to be the long term incorporation of family-
friendliness in company cultures and management philosophy, and appropriate 
measures in the organisation of working time and personnel and organisational 
development. Works councils and trade unions were encouraged to initiate workplace-
based projects promoting culture change (BMFSFJ and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003; 
BMFSFJ 2005a).  
Reform proposals for the next legislative period that were highlighted during the 
electoral campaign in 2005 included the target of a statutory right to childcare for two-
year-old children by 2010, and reductions in the costs of day care with the aim of 
providing free day care services for parents. Furthermore, the SPD planned to replace 
the means tested child raising benefits with an earnings related benefit (Elterngeld), 
mirroring the Scandinavian example of paid parental leave to provide greater financial 
compensation of lost earnings (SPD 2005). Proposals for an earnings related payment 
during parental leave had been proposed by Rürup’s economic expertise in 2003, as 
well as the 7th Family Report and the Child and Youth report in 2005. In line with the 
wage compensation of two thirds of previous earnings paid by unemployment 
insurance, this transfer could, in particular, help fathers to take a more active part in 
childcare with reduced breadwinning pressure (BT-Pl.15/186). The general election in 
October 2005 however marked the end of the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition’s time in 
government. The majority of the votes were gained by the Christian Democrats (CDU) 
who formed a coalition government with the Social Democrats. The BMFSFJ 
leadership was handed over to the CDU. The new Family Minister, Ursula von der 
Leyen, however, continued the policy course initiated by Renate Schmidt in 2002, 
notably by introducing the earnings-related Elterngeld in 2007.  
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Having traced the development of family-friendly working time policy over time, and 
having set it within the wider work-family reconciliation context, the following 
discussion will explore the way in which family-friendly working time policy is 
‘nested’ within the wider resource mix of reconciliation policies introduced by the 
‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government. 
From ‘time to care’ to ‘time to work’: towards a facilitation of dual-earner/dual-
carer arrangements 
The policy approach of the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government to reconciliation 
policies differed with regard to the (West German) Conservative/Liberal governments’ 
approaches during the 1980s and 1990s in terms of policy orientation, in that the aim 
to facilitate women’s labour market participation and attachment was explicitly 
pursued (BMFSFJ 1999). In the 1980s and 1990s, the German policy approach was 
oriented towards family care on the basis of a male breadwinner family model 
(Annesley 2003). Long, unpaid parental leave and the absence of comprehensive 
childcare provision in West Germany encouraged parental care by one parent while the 
other parent was expected to earn the living wage for the family. A statutory right to 
childcare and education was granted from age three. However, both kindergartens and 
schools largely operated on part-time hours. Derived benefits for family carers through 
the insurance and taxation system provided financial incentives for the male 
breadwinner arrangements (Sainsbury 1994b; Dingeldey 2000).  
With the parental leave reform in 2000, the ‘Red-Green’ Government aimed to address 
barriers to female labour market participation. They provided incentives to break the 
pattern of extended labour market exits by mothers: firstly, through the entitlement to 
take parental leave on a part-time rather than full-time basis; and secondly, through the 
introduction of a budget option for the Child Raising Benefit, providing a financial 
incentive for a shorter leave period. The parental leave reform aimed to provide 
parents with greater choice in the allocation of time between employment and family 
care. Due to the lack of external childcare services, this choice was however dependent 
on familial time negotiations and did not address the opportunity costs of lost earnings 
and career opportunities which one of the parents or both would have to accept. 
Mothers’ labour market attachment/earlier re-entry was made dependent on the 
father’s willingness to take a greater share in family care, thereby liberating time for 
Chapter 5 
152 
 
maternal employment. The policy strategy that was pursued to encourage fathers was 
an information campaign aiming to change attitudes. Research exploring the low 
uptake of fathers has however identified that the major deterrent from fathers taking 
parental leave is financial loss, rather than unwillingness (Beckmann 2001b). Despite 
this, the Child Raising Benefit was not increased at that time. Although the parental 
leave reform signals a move away from the male breadwinner/female carer model by 
removing regulatory barriers to the equal access to ‘time to care’ for both parents, 
neither sufficient public funds nor the availability of childcare services for the under 
three-year-olds facilitated the choice of a dual-carer reconciliation arrangement.  
It was not until 2002 that government policy actively promoted the externalisation of 
care for the under-three-year-olds through the Day Care Expansion Act, as well as 
providing financial support towards the costs of external childcare through tax reform. 
Until then, family-provided care was encouraged through the long parental leave 
entitlement. Walter Korpi (2000), in his categorisation of 'general family support' and 
'dual-earner support', classifies childcare for three to six-year-olds in the first and 
childcare for the under-threes in the second category. According to this classification, 
recent German childcare reforms, which have been improving the time-providing 
function of the childcare infrastructure, start to enable dual-earner arrangements and to 
facilitate the dual-carer arrangements that were envisaged by the parental leave reform.  
However, the focus on childcare provision since 2002 and the delegation of the 
responsibility for the supply of family-friendly working time arrangements to 
employers highlights the choice of ‘employer-friendly’ reconciliation policies over 
conflict-ridden interferences in the organisation of working time. In the context of the 
Alliance for the Family, regulatory state interventions to improve access were 
abandoned and governing resources directed towards consensual policy choices. This 
confirms Bressers’ and O’Toole’s argument that policies maintaining existing network 
characteristics are preferred in the policy selection process (Bressers and O'Toole 
1998). 
Having contextualised the development of family-friendly working time policy within 
the wider policy context, the following section focuses more narrowly on the policy 
strategies pursued by the ‘Red-Green’ Government to improve access to family-
friendly working time arrangements. It focuses on the choices made between the 
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encouragement of best practice and the regulation of working time. Summing up 
family-friendly working time policy between 1998 and 2005, a number of key reforms 
advanced the family-friendly working time agenda at the turn of the century. These are 
summarised in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Family-friendly working time policy in Germany, 1998-2005 
POLICY 
INSTRUMENT TYPE 
POLICY REFORMS 
Regulation 
Reform of the Federal Child Raising Benefit Act (2000) 
Part-time Employment and Fixed-term Contracts Act (2000) 
Equal rights Act for the Public Sector (2001) 
Works Constitutions Act (2001) 
Economic incentives Child Raising Benefit (2000) 
Information  
Voluntary Agreement for the Promotion of Equal Opportunities 
for Women and Men in the Private Sector (2001) 
Fathers Campaign (2001) 
Alliance for the Family (2003) 
 
With the introduction of two statutory rights to working time reduction, the 
strengthening of family-friendly provisions for public service employees and the right 
of works councils to co-determine the introduction of family-friendly measures with 
employers, employees were given statutory support in negotiating family-friendly 
working time arrangements. The change of leadership at the BMFSFJ following the 
general elections in 2002 advanced a reconceptualised policy agenda in which an 
emphasis on childcare provision took precedence over family-friendly working time. 
Family-friendly working was henceforth promoted through the Alliance for the Family 
which encouraged employers to introduce family-friendly working time arrangements 
voluntarily. Having provided a chronological account of policy developments within 
their wider policy context across different policy fields, the third part of the chapter 
focuses on the policy choices in the development of the German family-friendly 
working time policy strategy over time and their implications the power balance 
between employers and employees. 
III. Policy choices over time: via regulation back to information 
Through a series of regulatory interventions in the employment relationship around the 
turn of the century, the ‘Red-Green’ Government intended to enable working parents 
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to exert greater individual and collective control over the organisation of working 
hours. After this short and intensive regulatory spell, there was a policy u-turn to 
information-based policy interventions from 2001 onwards, in which government 
interventions focused on encouraging voluntary, employer-initiated provision of 
family-friendly working time arrangements. State-employer relations shifted from an 
authoritative top-down relationship, with government attempting to steer employer 
action by statute, to a more horizontal, cooperative relationship where a change in 
employer behaviour was sought through persuasion and voluntary commitment rather 
than statute. Until the late 1990s, family-friendly working time arrangements had only 
been state regulated for public sector employees but not for the private sector29, where 
provision depended on collective agreements and management decisions unsolicited by 
government prescription. Following the election of the ‘Red-Green’ Government, there 
was a distinctive shift from a de-regulating policy approach to labour law that had been 
pursued by the Conservative/Liberal governments in the 1980s and 1990s to ‘re-
regulation’ in line with their traditional policy goal of redressing the work relationship 
in the favour of the employee (Rose 2003 p. 121).  
In this section, the reasons for these shifts in policy choices are explored. It begins by 
addressing the regulatory ‘turn’ at the end of the 20th century and examining the 
question of why the ‘Red-Green’ Government chose to regulate the organisation of 
working time reduction by statute, before considering the return to the promotion of 
voluntary change. The section closes with a consideration of the implications of policy 
choices made for the power balance between employers and employees. 
The regulatory drive during the first years in office 
An important factor influencing the introduction of statutory regulation of family-
friendly working time arrangements was that a regulatory framework was already in 
place through the Works Constitutions Act (since 1972), the Child Raising Benefit Act 
(since 1986) and the Women's Promotion Act for the Public Sector and the Federal 
Courts (since 1994). Amendments of existing regulatory interventions are easier to 
‘push through’ than introducing legislation from scratch, especially when the reforms 
are perceived as an improvement to the existing rules in place (Heclo 1974). The failed 
                                                 
29 The Employment Promotion Act 1985 had introduced the principle of equal treatment of part-time 
and full-time employees. 
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equal opportunities law for the private sector in turn illustrates that the lack of previous 
legislation in the private sector, however weakly formulated, increased the hurdle to its 
introduction. Although both coalition partners had agreed to it in their Coalition 
Agreement, the strong mobilisation of employers and business organisations against 
the law, combined with the relatively low priority of equal opportunities in the 
hierarchy of policy goals, led to it being ‘sacrificed’ as a concession to employers 
(Alemann and Sielschott 2007). Following a large number of legislative reforms the 
Chancellor wanted to impose no additional regulatory burdens on businesses.  
The situation was somewhat different in the case of the Part-time Employment and 
Fixed-term Contracts Act (TzBfG). Although existing regulations of fixed-term work 
had to be renewed and the European Council Directives on Fixed-term Contracts and 
on Part-time Work needed to be implemented, this does not explain the introduction of 
the statutory right to request a reduction in working time. The regulations on fixed 
term contracts could have simply been renewed rather than creating a new legislation 
incorporating part-time employment (Int. DE 13, 19/09/2006). Clause five of the Part-
time Work Directive did not require implementation by legislation. In this case, the 
choice of statutory regulation is better explained by the long-standing social 
democratic policy preference, evidenced by earlier parliamentary motions during 
opposition years, for a statutory entitlement to working time reduction. All reform 
projects undertaken between 1998 and 2001 were attempts to redress earlier policy 
reforms in line with ‘Red-Green’ policy preferences, having in each case 
unsuccessfully attempted to shape policy development through their own reform 
proposals during opposition years.  
There were no significant institutional constraints preventing the choice for regulation. 
Rather, such a choice was facilitated by the obligation to implement European 
directives in national law. Thanks to a majority in Parliament, it was possible to pass 
working time regulation against the votes of the Conservative/Liberal opposition. In 
this policy field, the Bundesrat is not a significant ‘veto player’ as it does not have the 
institutional power to block reforms relating to labour law (Tsebelis 2002). As there 
are no direct costs to the public purse associated with working time regulations, there 
was no opposition from the Treasury (Rose 2003 p.122). In the late 1990s, the policy-
agenda of the ‘Red-Green’ Government was favourable to union demands. A large 
proportion of social democratic delegates were union members, which might have 
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played a role in supporting controversial reforms through Parliament against 
considerable employer opposition, having made certain concessions at the level of 
policy design. These will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six in relation to the 
statutory entitlements to working time reduction. The ‘regulatory spell’ in working 
time policy ended in 2001, with the Chancellor’s blocking of the equal opportunities 
law for the private sector in line with the business and employer lobby. Institutional 
constraints cannot explain the reluctance to regulate from 2001 onwards. Changing 
policy ideas and government-employer relations are more likely to provide answers for 
the second shift in policy approach: the ‘u-turn’ to information-based interventions 
from 2001 onwards. 
No less than a u-turn: the return to best practice  
With the move from the first to the second term in office, there was a shift in the 
overarching policy goals in which work-family reconciliation was instrumental. Policy 
objectives shifted from furthering equal opportunities and women’s advancement in 
employment, which had been a core social democratic demand, towards a pronatalist 
policy orientation aiming to address demographic change, notably by encouraging 
more women to have children. It was reflected by a reframing of work-family 
reconciliation from ‘gender equality’ to the ‘family’, which was initiated through an 
internal re-definition of the social democratic position on family policy, led by Renate 
Schmidt and translated into government policy when she took office as Family 
Minister following the general election in 2002 (Ristau 2005). Staff turnover and an 
organisational reshuffle at the ministerial level created opportunities for these new 
policy ideas and priorities to change the policy agenda, both in 1998 with the incoming 
SPD leadership under Christine Bergmann and then again in 2002. Renate Schmidt, 
who had been in charge of developing a new social democratic approach to family 
policy since the late 1990s, took over from Christine Bergmann, whose political 
priorities of advancing equal opportunities against employer opposition were no longer 
supported by the (male) decision makers in the Social Democratic Party. Under the 
leadership of Christine Bergmann, the reconciliation problem and working time 
flexibility had formed part of the Government’s equal opportunities agenda. From 
2002 onwards, it was dealt with under the roof of family policy, and moved 
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organisationally from the gender equality division to the family division (Int. De 12, 
02/08/2006). 
It is difficult to state with certainty that the shift in policy discourse from social justice 
(financial redistribution to families and gender equity) to economic argumentation 
(demographic change and economic competitiveness) of family policy reflects a 
change in policy goal. It may instead reflect a strategic change in governing method in 
order to obtain a wide societal consensus base for policy development. Although 
Germany was arguably undergoing a paradigm shift in family policy (most clearly 
announced by the SPD leadership itself, see Ristau 2005) what has been happening 
since 2002 (and especially since the time frame considered here) is a substantiation of 
the reconciliation choices envisaged by Christine Bergmann. Notably, the policy 
changes implemented and planned by Renate Schmidt (which were since followed 
through by her Conservative successor Ursula von der Leyen) improved the childcare 
infrastructure, providing ‘time to work’, and a better financial compensation of lost 
earnings, while allocating time from employment to family care (implemented through 
the Elterngeld reform in 2007). The ‘backing up’ of formal statutory working time 
entitlements through substantive cash and service provision serves gender equality 
objectives by ‘liberating’ time for female employment while making men’s greater 
share in family care more ‘affordable’. In contrast to labour law, both service 
expansion and cash transfers involve significant public financial commitment, which 
necessitates the support of all political parties at both the federal and Länder level (as 
the consent of the Bundesrat is here required). Building a cross-party policy consensus 
was therefore an important condition for obtaining a political majority in support of 
reforms.  
Two policy ideas dominated the new approach to work-family reconciliation in 
general, and affected family-friendly working time policy in particular: the need for a 
better (service) infrastructure; and the preference for a ‘societal’ rather than ‘state-
centrist’ intervention to create a more family-friendly society. While the policy 
approach hitherto had had ambitions to directly regulate the employment relationship 
and facilitate a family-friendly organisation of working time by means of legislative 
intervention, this was no longer the approach pursued under the leadership of Renate 
Schmidt. The responsibility for a family-friendly ‘world of work’ was delegated to 
employers and employee representatives: in other words, family-friendly working time 
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policy was effectively ‘de-governmentalized’ (Wolf 2006). From 2001 onwards, when 
the Government agreed on the voluntary promotion of equal opportunities for women 
and men in the private sector - distancing itself from its regulatory intentions - the 
BMFSFJ retained merely an informing, motivating and co-ordinating, but non-
regulating, role (see also Klammer and Letablier 2007 p.688). A small amount of 
pressure was exerted by the agreed bi-annual assessment of the voluntary initiatives on 
equal opportunities, which provided impulses for sustained business-led activities in 
this area (Int. De 10, 12/07/06). The emphasis of state policy shifted from regulation of 
the employment relationship to the regulation of the care service infrastructure, while 
responsibility for ‘time’ policies was delegated to the central organisations of business 
and industry and to ‘employers’ in general.  
‘Time’ policies, such as family leave or flexible working time, touch upon the core of 
employment relations, and thereby power relations, and bear high conflict potential 
with employers. Schmidt’s ‘societal’ approach relied on cooperation and consensual 
relations with employers. This might explain the Government’s reluctance since 2003 
to reconsider the case for legislation on equal opportunities and family-friendly 
working options in the workplace. Having ‘learnt’ about the high conflict potential 
associated with legislative endeavours in the context of the planned equal opportunities 
law, the option of legislation was ruled out, so as not to jeopardize the spirit of 
partnership that had been created in (and was fundamental to) the Alliance for the 
Family. Relations with employers and business organisations were managed 
horizontally rather than vertically, which required the choice of information-based 
rather than regulatory instruments.  
In family-friendly working time policy, the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government 
underwent a clear shift in the choice of policy instruments from a marked legislative 
approach in their first term of office to a preference for voluntary measures in their 
second term. Three possible explanations for this shift come to mind. One assumes a 
problem-oriented choice in the sense that information and persuasion instruments were 
seen as the logical next step, aimed to complement the statutory regulations already in 
place by promoting culture and attitude change. The second explanation would be that 
the Government ‘gave in’ to powerful employer interests. This appears to have been at 
least partly the case in the context of the equal opportunities law for the private sector, 
where legislation had clearly been planned. Determined employer opposition and 
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internal party conflict cumulating in the Chancellor’s veto prevented the passing of the 
law (Alemann and Sielschott 2007). While this might in part explain the dropping of 
the equal opportunities law it does not plausibly explain the shift in policy orientation 
leading to the set up of the Alliance for the Family initiative. Here, it seems to be the 
case that the Government strategically turned adversaries into allies in the quest for 
pushing family policy from the margins to the core of socio-political debate and 
attention.  
The three explanations are not mutually exclusive. There might have been a process of 
policy learning within the Government, which had, at first, pursued the same policy 
line as they had pursued during their opposition years, and then, when confronted with 
the pragmatic problems of government (including a powerful employer lobby), they 
realized that ‘equal opportunities can only be realised in cooperation with business, not 
against it’ (BT-Pl. 14/176). This realisation might have led to a recalibration of 
problem formulation and solution finding: in order to improve the conditions for 
successful work-family reconciliation, employers need to be supportive. In this 
interpretation, it is not a question of passing a law but of maximising compliance, 
which might be better achieved by persuasion than coercion. From 2003, the win-win 
situation of family-oriented policy was moved to the centre stage of political discourse. 
The opportunity to return to the initial legislative agenda, which presented itself with 
the Assessment 2003, was not seized. The lack of political will to legislate was more 
than obvious. Instead, the approach of dialogue and voluntary cooperation was 
extended from the equal opportunities realm to the family policy domain through the 
set up of the Alliance for the Family. As a matter of fact, the economically grounded, 
‘sustainable family policy’ agenda, of which work-family reconciliation objectives are 
a key component, have pushed the equal opportunities ‘social justice’ oriented agenda, 
which dominated the policy agenda in the first years in office, to the background. The 
policy choices made by the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition Government over time have 
implications in terms of the empowering potential of the policy strategy pursued. 
The shift in family-friendly working time policy from regulation to information based 
instruments represents a weakening in the empowering potential of the Government’s 
policy strategy over time. While the employment rights introduced in 2000 signalled 
the Government’s willingness to employ authoritative force to increase access to 
family-friendly working time arrangements, the failed equal opportunities law for the 
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private sector, and the strictly voluntary and consensus-based societal approach since 
2002, have lacked intention of shifting the power balance in the employee’s favour. 
Applying Vedung’s framework and its adaptation to family-friendly working time 
policy developed in Chapter Three to the German case in Figure 10 illustrates this 
shift. 
Figure 10: The 'empowering potential' of the German policy strategy over time 
High → Low 
Reform of the Federal Child 
Raising Benefit Act  
Part-time Employment and Fixed-
term Contracts Act  
 Fathers Campaign 
Voluntary Agreement for the 
Promotion of Equal 
Opportunities for Women and 
Men in the Private Sector 
Alliance for the Family 
 
Although the introduction of employment rights shift the power balance in the 
employee’s favour, the lack of financial compensation of the earnings lost through a 
reduction in working time in the case of the TzBfG, and the low level of the Child 
Raising Benefit imply only a moderate empowering potential.  
Conclusions 
This chapter presented a chronological account of the development of family-friendly 
working time policy across policy fields and within the wider context of reconciliation 
policies, analysing policy choices between regulation, economic incentives, and 
information-based instruments over time. German family-friendly working time policy 
strategy underwent two distinct shifts in policy choice over the time period examined. 
The ‘regulatory spell’ of the turn of century was quickly followed by a return to 
information-based instruments. During the first term in office, working parents 
received a limited statutory entitlement to reduce their working hours, encouraging 
them to allocate some time from employment to family care. Works councils were 
entitled by law to address the issue of family-friendly working time arrangements with 
employers on their behalf, and the system of co-determination was adjusted to 
encourage and facilitate the representation of working parents on works councils, 
opening avenues for the representation of their needs and interests. Equal opportunities 
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legislation for the public sector strengthened existing provisions to facilitate family-
friendly working time arrangements, and to protect working parents from disadvantage 
on these grounds. Similar regulations of the employment relationship were planned 
and developed for the private sector, but vetoed by the Chancellor in reaction to fierce 
employer opposition before reaching the parliamentary process. Instead, employer 
organisations agreed to promote family-friendly working time arrangements 
voluntarily among their members. Complementing, and in the latter case substituting, 
legislative reforms, with awareness raising and the encouragement of best practice 
represents the second pillar of family-friendly working time policy in Germany, which 
was coordinated under the roof of the Alliance for the Family from 2003 onwards. 
Economic incentives for the supply of family-friendly working time arrangements 
were not provided. Employee-directed compensation of the financial losses associated 
with reduced working hours was minimal during the ‘Red-Green’ era through the 
introduction of a budget option for the Child Raising Benefit, but an earnings-related 
Elterngeld was planned by Renate Schmidt and later implemented under the 
Conservative-led Black-Red Coalition Government taking over in 2005. 
The shift in policy instruments over time is associated with changing governing styles. 
Following an authoritative approach to increasing access to family-friendly working 
time arrangements through regulatory intervention in the employment relationship - 
with the objective to redress labour market inequalities - in the era of Christine 
Bergmann, a societal rather than state-centrist governance approach was emphasised 
by Renate Schmidt who succeeded Bergmann after the general elections in 2002. The 
cooperation with employer groups and other societal actors played an important role in 
policy development in the non-legislative realm notably in the context of the Alliance 
for the Family since 2003.  
Comparing policy developments since 1998 with the conservative/liberal approach in 
the 1990s, the approach to family-friendly working time policy clearly changed in 
terms of instrument choice. Although the promotion of family-oriented working 
patterns - especially part-time employment - had been promoted by the previous 
governments, policy measures had remained in the voluntary information realm and 
intervention through statutory regulation had been firmly opposed. This changed in 
1998 when employee-oriented working time reforms moved onto the regulatory 
agenda with the incoming centre-left Government. Although policy intervention 
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returned to an information-based approach in 2001, it differed markedly from 
information campaigns in the 1990s. The promotion of family-friendliness through the 
Alliance for the Family had gained a much higher profile, political visibility and 
business support. While family-friendly policies had been framed by equal 
opportunities objectives up until 2002, business support was sought and gained 
through an economic argumentation highlighting the long term economic need for a 
sustainable family policy and family-supportive work organisation (Rürup and 
Gruescu 2005). The development of family-friendly working time policy under the 
‘Red-Green’ Government was part of a wider reform package aimed at enabling 
women’s employment and a more equal sharing of care between men and women. 
Reconciliation policies under the Conservative/Liberal governments of the 1980s and 
1990s had encouraged male breadwinner-female carer arrangements. Policy reforms 
set signals encouraging a more equal sharing of paid work and family care, notably 
through improving flexibility during parental leave. However, the lack of policies 
improving the affordability of ‘time to care’ and the lack of childcare services for the 
under-threes contributed to only a moderate increase in the share of men taking 
parental leave (BMFSFJ 2004a). This insufficient integration of reconciliation 
resources meant that the empowering potential of family-friendly working time policy 
choices was only moderate, as regulation was not adequately backed up with economic 
means making ‘time to care’ more affordable for both men and women. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of employment rights to reduced working and the reform of the works 
council powers represent a notable shift in the power balance between employers and 
employees in favour of the latter. 
British and German policy strategies compared 
Having explored policy strategies in both the United Kingdom and Germany, it is now 
possible to draw out the key similarities and differences from a cross-national 
perspective. With regard to instrument choice between legislative interventions, 
economic means and the promotion of voluntary provision through information and 
persuasion techniques, the British and German approaches were similar at the level of 
instrument choice. Both governments introduced statutory regulations for the first time 
in this policy field, placing their approach in contrast to the information-based, low 
profile, interventions of the Conservative/Liberal governments on the 1980s and 
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1990s. Both governments introduced high profile information campaigns and sought 
cooperative relations with business representatives to promote a more family-friendly 
organisation of working time. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that neither government 
employed economic incentives to encourage the provision of family-friendly working 
time arrangements. 
The chronological analysis of the policy trajectories in the two countries revealed 
opposite trajectories in instrument choice. While the British policy development 
progressively built up from best practice promotion to statutory regulation between 
1997 and 2005, the German policy development moved from the introduction of 
statutory reforms during the first years in office to best practice promotion from 2001 
onwards via a radical shift in policy approach. While the governing style of the British 
Government was from the outset non-confrontational and consensus-seeking, the 
German approach was authoritative during the first years in office, straining 
government-business relations through a number of interventions in the employment 
relationship, peaking in the conflict around the equal opportunities legislation for the 
private sector. Following the change in leadership at the BMFSFJ in 2002, the German 
approach to government-interest group relations became strongly oriented towards 
consensual cooperation with societal actors and business in particular. While the 
British approach served to incrementally prepare the ground for increasingly 
empowering policy interventions, the German approach of extremes led to a policy 
approach that ruled out further regulation. 
With regard to the integration of family-friendly working time policy within the wider 
context of reconciliation policies, in both countries a relative subordination of family-
friendly working time policy to childcare service provision was apparent. A growing 
emphasis on childcare services as time providers, enabling carers to work, was 
noticeable in both countries from 2002 onwards with stronger incentives for the dual-
earner/externalised care model in the UK than in Germany where greater emphasis was 
placed on increasing the share of men in family care, encouraging dual-earner/dual-
carer arrangements. Both the United Kingdom and Germany pursued a mixed targeting 
strategy. Policy interventions targeted directly at working parents included the 
introduction of limited employment rights to request flexible working patterns. 
Information and persuasion campaigns promoting best practice were primarily directed 
at employers.  
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This chapter explored the question of what policy strategies the British and German 
governments pursued to improve access to family-friendly working time arrangements, 
and how they differed at the first level of policy choice: the selection among 
alternative policy instruments. Chapters Six and Seven provide in-depth comparative 
case studies of policy measures within the same instrument type, employment 
regulation and information campaigns, to identify cross-national variation at the 
second level of policy choice: between more or less empowering instrument attributes. 
Chapter Six provides the first comparative case study of the British right to request 
flexible working provided through the Flexible Working Regulations 2002 and the 
German rights to reduced working hours provided through the reform of the Federal 
Child Raising Benefit Act and the Part-time Employment and Fixed-term Contracts 
Act. 
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6. Employment rights in comparative perspective 
In both Germany and the United Kingdom, the introduction of employment rights to 
improve access to flexible working time arrangements constituted a core element of 
the respective family-friendly working time policy packages, and was certainly the 
most controversially debated reform in this policy field passed under the centre-left 
governments around the turn of the century. Having situated the choice in favour of 
legislation within the wider temporal and policy context in Chapters Four and Five, 
this chapter turns to focus on the similarities and differences in the design of these 
employment rights. While both governments chose the same instrument type, 
regulation, significant variation is found at the level of instrument design. In the 
following, I will compare the British ‘right to request flexible working - and to have 
the request seriously considered by the employer’ passed under the Employment Act 
and the Flexible Working Regulations in 2002 (hereafter referred to as Right to 
Request) with the German rights to reduced working hours. These were passed as 
§15 of the Federal Child Raising Benefit Act (hereafter referred to as §15 BErzGG), 
and §8 of the Part-time Employment and Fixed-term Contracts Act (hereafter 
referred to as §8 TzBfG) in 2000. The two legislative reforms in Germany both 
introduced a limited right to reduced hours working for employees during the ‘Red-
Green’ Coalition’s first term in office. They served different policy agendas and were 
formulated in different government departments. The Federal Child Raising Benefit 
Act was formulated at the Federal Ministry for the Family, Senior Citizens, Women 
and Youth (BMFSFJ), and the Part-time Employment and Fixed-term Contracts Act 
was developed at the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS). The 
Flexible Working Regulations in the UK were developed at the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) during New Labour’s second term in office.  
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on a combination of documentary 
research and complementary interviews with civil servants and stakeholders in both 
countries. As confidentiality was assured to interviewees, the insights obtained in 
interviews were mainly used for the triangulation of information obtained from other 
sources. In order to grasp the policy preferences of different actors close scrutiny was 
given to the written statements and oral evidence by stakeholders in the context of 
public consultations and public hearings. Policy programmes, election manifestoes, 
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parliamentary debates and proposals for amendments provided insights into the 
different policy preferences of political parties and government departments. Draft 
Bills and regulations, consultations and explanatory notes allowed me to trace the 
design process from the drafting stage, over consultation to the final letter of the law. 
In the UK case, interviews with members of the Work and Parents Taskforce and the 
taskforce report to Government provided valuable insights into the stakeholder 
negotiations over the details of the right to request. 
The chapter pursues two aims. First, it offers an in-depth analysis of the empowering 
potential of these employment rights in each country, structuring the comparison 
according to the five Empowerment Criteria developed in Chapter Three. These are 
the breadth of coverage, the precision of targeting, the scope of employee control 
over working time flexibility, the enforceability of employee preferences and the 
reduction of opportunity costs. Focusing on just one instrument type the process of 
policy design and cross-national variation in instrument attributes can be 
systematically compared. The second aim of the chapter is to explore the reasons for 
cross-national variation in instrument design. Close attention is paid to the policy 
preferences of interest groups and policy makers, and the opportunities of different 
actors to influence policy design. Of particular interest in this context is the set up of 
a Work and Parents Taskforce involving interest groups in the process of policy 
design in the UK. Further, the influence of the policy context of existing labour law 
and European regulations, but also of the different policy goals that are addressed in 
the two countries explain cross-national variations in policy design. 
The chapter is structured into two parts. The first part is dedicated to the detailed 
comparison of policy design in relation to the five Empowerment Criteria. Each 
subsection will discuss the provisions made and scrutinise their implications for the 
relative empowerment of working parents in comparative perspective. For each 
instrument attribute, the different policy preferences of political actors and interest 
groups are considered, and the process leading to the final policy choices is traced. 
The first part concludes in a comparative assessment of how the employment rights 
‘score’ in terms of empowerment. Despite considerable variation along the different 
Empowerment Criteria, the two countries’ approaches balance out overall, which is 
due to a number of trade-offs between instrument attributes. The reasons for cross-
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national variation in empowerment trade-offs are explored in the second part of the 
chapter.  
I. Policy Design 
As often observed, the devil lies in the detail. This section will compare three 
employment rights that were all designed to facilitate the negotiation of flexible 
working time arrangements. Employee rights are substantiated by employer 
obligations, and the degree to which the power balance in the employment 
relationship between employee and employer is shifted by policy interventions is to a 
considerable extent determined by the details of policy design. The underlying 
assumption on which the choice to organise the comparison around power relations 
is based is the belief that power relations form the core of stakeholder mobilisation 
and represent an important issue for policy makers faced with conflicting interests. 
The empowerment framework pursues the dual aim of, firstly, facilitating a 
meaningful comparison highlighting the implications of policy design for the power 
balance between employers and employees and teasing out cross-national differences 
in this regard and secondly, of pinning down the core issues around which actor 
preferences diverge. The analysis traces in favour of which advocacy side, employee 
empowerment or managerial freedom, policy choices were made. In the following, 
variations in the detail of policy design along the five Empowerment Criteria are 
discussed in turn.  
1. Breadth of coverage 
The criterion breadth of coverage addresses the question of who has access to the 
provisions of a given policy. Eligibility can be selective in terms of a person’s care 
and employment status, but can also depend on the characteristics of the employer 
they work for. The wider the coverage of a given policy, the more empowering the 
policy is to working parents as an aggregate group, simply because more people have 
access. Eligibility criteria in employment rights are clearly defined, which facilitates 
the comparison of regulatory instruments. Figure 11 provides the main differences in 
coverage at a glance.  
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Figure 11: Breadth of Coverage 
 Germany UK 
 BErzGG TzBfG Right to Request 
Care Status Responsibility as a 
parent for a child 
under the age of 3 
No conditionality 
on care status 
Responsibility as a 
parent for a child 
under 6 (under 18, 
if child is disabled) 
Employment 
Status 
Employee Employee Employee  
Qualifying Period Six  months Six months Six months 
Employer size  Over 15 employees 
(excluding 
trainees) 
Over 15 employees 
(excluding 
trainees) 
No small business 
exemption 
Employer sector All sectors All sectors Agency workers 
and armed forces 
excluded 
 
The Flexible Working Regulations 2002 cover employees who have worked for their 
employers for at least 26 weeks and have parental responsibility30 for a child under 
the age of six, or a disabled child under the age of eighteen. In Germany, the 
entitlement is not conditional upon care status. Parents who are not covered by the 
BErzGG are covered by the TzBfG. However, both entitlements are conditional upon 
employee status and a qualification period of continuous employment with the 
employer for at least six months, and they exclude employees working for small 
employers up to 15 employees as these are exempt from the regulations. In sum, 
cross-national variation is most pronounced with regard to coverage by care status, 
which is selective in the UK but universal in Germany. Different approaches were 
taken with regard to the treatment of small employers, who are exempt from the 
                                                 
30 A ‘parent’ is here defined as ‘mother, father, adopter, guardian or foster parent of the child or 
married to or the partner of the child’s mother, father, adopter, guardian or foster parent’ and ‘has, or 
expects to have responsibility for the upbringing of the child’ (SI 2002 No. 3236 Section 3 (1) (a-c)). 
This broad definition of ‘parent’ followed the recommendation of the taskforce to include ‘anyone 
who has responsibility as a parent of an eligible child’.  
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regulation in Germany but not in the UK. In the following, these differences in 
policy design will be explored in more depth. 
In the UK, the Work and Parents Taskforce was instructed by the Government that 
the Right to Request should only apply to parents of ‘young children’, excluding 
from the outset parents of older children, care-givers who do not have responsibility 
as a parent, and carers of ill, disabled or elderly persons (HC Deb 28 June 2001 vol 
370 c 149 W). The precise cut off point was a difficult point for negotiation as 
demand for flexible working was considerable from parents with children of all ages. 
Employers preferred a low cut off age whereas employee and parent representatives 
preferred including school aged children (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001). 
Despite large support from both parents and employers for the cut off point at a later 
stage in the child's life, the taskforce nevertheless recommended the cut off point to 
be at the child's sixth birthday in order not to jeopardise employer acceptance of the 
duty to consider, which was expected to be less likely at a higher cut off point (Work 
and Parents Taskforce 2001). An exception was made for parents of disabled 
children in recognition of the greater challenges they face. In line with the parental 
leave regulations, the cut off age was here set to be 18. 
The narrow eligibility definition was subject to criticism by both advocates and 
opponents of the right to request during the discussions of the Employment Bill at 
Committee Stage and in Parliament. Advocates, such as Vincent Cable, Liberal 
Democrat MP for Twickenham, questioned the limited application to parents of 
young children in the light of evidence that flexibility was needed by all parents and 
by carers of adults (SC Deb 5 December 2002 c010). Opponents of the right, such as 
Mr Hammond, Conservative MP for Runnymede and Weybridge, accused the 
Government of preferential treatment of one group of employees over another, thus 
causing those employees without entitlement to bear the burden of unpopular shifts 
and additional work load (SC Deb (F) 24 January 2002 c603). He further deplored 
that the privileged status of a selected group puts employers in the difficult situation 
of having to turn down requests by very deserving groups such as carers of adults 
because parents of young children enjoy privileged access under the new law (HC 
Deb 12 February 2002 vol 380 c100; SC Deb (F) 24 January 2002 c604). There was 
concern that the privileged treatment of parents of young children might cause 
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resentment among other employees (HC Deb 27 November 2001 vol 380 c877). 
Alan Johnson, at the time Minister for Employment and the Regions at the DTI, 
defended the Employment Bill in the parliamentary process. He justified the 
selective approach taken by the Government indicating a duty of care towards small 
employers. Universal access to the right to request was ruled out on the basis that 
‘such a right would be unmanageable for businesses and place a huge burden on 
smaller employers’ (SC Deb 5 December 2002 c004). Although the needs of working 
carers of adults were emphasised during the eligibility discussions and recognised by 
Alan Johnson, he maintained that the aim to support working carers ‘should be 
achieved by the spread of best practice’ (SC Deb 5 December 2002 c018). 
Legislative intervention to the benefit of parents of small and disabled children, on 
the other hand, was seen as necessary and legitimate, ‘so that an entire generation 
does not miss out while we wait for best practice to spread’ (SC Deb 5 December 
2002 c018). The hierarchy of needs apparent in this argumentation attributes priority 
to young children over other groups of care-receivers.  
In Germany, the right to reduced working hours under §15 BErzGG applies only to 
employees who have responsibility as a parent for a child under the age of three31 
and are eligible for parental leave. The limitation of eligibility to parents of young 
children in this context was predefined by existing law. The entitlement was 
introduced in the context of the reform of the Federal Child Raising Benefit Act. In 
contrast, the right to request under §8 TzBfG is not dependent upon care status. This 
gave rise to political controversy in the parliamentary process. While the Liberal 
Democrats (FDP) in opposition outright opposed the introduction of a statutory right 
in principle, the Christian Democrats (CDU) argued for a limitation in entitlement to 
those employees with care responsibilities. In the first discussion of the Bill in the 
Bundesrat, the Land Bayern proposed an amendment to §8, supported by the Land 
Hessen (both CDU governed) to limit the entitlement to employees with caring 
responsibilities for children under the age of ten or adult relatives, in line with the 
age limit set by the public sector collective agreement (BR-Drs. 591/2/00). This 
proposal did not however find a majority in the Bundesrat32. The reasoning for a 
                                                 
31 The third year of the leave can, if the employer agrees, be deferred to a later point as long as the 
child is under the age of eight. 
32 Following the failure in Bundesrat, the CDU filed an alternative proposal in the Bundestag , 
proposing  a limitation of the part time work entitlement to parents of children under 12, carers of 
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limitation of eligibility on the basis of care status was that the right to reduce one's 
working hours was considered an extensive intervention in the freedom and 
principles of contract which should have an appropriate socio-political justification, 
such as care responsibility for a child or a relative. The right to reduce contractual 
working hours at will was not considered to constitute an appropriate balance of 
interests between employers and employees (BR-Drs. 591/2/00). The Social 
Democrats and the Green Party justified the universal approach on the basis of risk 
diversification. Olaf Scholz of the Social Democrats argued in the second and third 
reading of the Bill that limiting the right to certain groups of employees (working 
carers) would reduce their (de facto women’s) opportunities in the labour market, as 
employers might be hesitant to employ them out of fear that they would demand to 
work part-time (BT-Pl. 14/133 pp.12874-75). The universal approach also has its 
roots in the employment creating purpose of the reform which aims to facilitate 
voluntary part-time employment with the effect of redistributing the liberated work 
volume to the unemployed. Limiting coverage to working carers in this case would 
run counter to the objective of employment creation, which requires a maximum of 
employees voluntarily reducing their working hours (BT-Drs. 14/4374 p.11). 
Therefore employees were entitled irrespective of the reason for their wish to reduce 
their working hours. 
An important difference in policy design relates to the treatment of small employers. 
In the UK, the approach of selective targeting should be seen in the light of the 
emphasis on the needs of small employers that guided the taskforce negotiations. 
Government instructions were to consider whether ‘they should be subject to special 
conditions’ (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001) but the option for a small employer 
exemption or different treatment was ruled out at an early stage of the taskforce 
negotiations. One member of the taskforce commented that ‘everybody on the 
taskforce actually wanted to have a single system’ (Int. UK 07, 15/12/2005). An 
important institutional template for this decision was provided by the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA), under which there is no small business exemption. 
Hence, as the taskforce noted in their report: ‘to say to small businesses that they are 
                                                                                                                                          
disabled relatives, and employees with a disability who are unable to work full time (BT-Drs. 
14/4526). This proposal did not however impact on the passing of the law as it was not scheduled for 
discussion in parliament until June 2002 (BT-Drs. 14/9414; BT-Pl. 14/243) by which time the TzBfG 
had come into force. 
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exempt from considering all requests, when established sex discrimination law 
means this will not always be the case, would lead to confusion’ (Work and Parents 
Taskforce 2001 p.22).  
In Germany, by contrast, a ‘small business clause’ was introduced in the course of 
the negotiations on the BErzGG, and then adopted in the draft Bill for the TzBfG a 
few months later (BT-Drs. 14/4374 pp.17-18). The exemption of small businesses 
was a concession to employers and fiercely debated during the drafting process 
(Bothfeld 2005). Within Government, the preference of the Family Minister was not 
to introduce a small business exemption at all, whereas the Economy Minister 
backed the demand of the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts to exempt 
employers with less than 50 employees (Bothfeld 2005 p.255). In the ministerial 
draft first circulated to stakeholders for consultation, the small business exemption 
was set at the level of five employees in line with other employment legislation in 
place, such as the Works Constitution Act and job protection legislation (KSchG). In 
the draft Bill presented to Parliament, however, the cut off level was raised to 15 
employees. This higher cut off line excluded 87 per cent of work places from the 
regulations, employing 25 per cent of employees (BT-Drs. 14/3553 p.21). The cut off 
line of 15 employees was a negotiated compromise as the chair of the SPD working 
group on the Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, Hildegard Wester, 
explained in the second reading of the Bill (BT-Pl. 14/115 p.10955). In the public 
hearing of stakeholder groups this amendment had been fiercely critiqued by family 
organisations and trade unions. The Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), 
for instance, stated in their written submission to the committee:  
It is not comprehensible [...] why a large group of employees is from the 
outset automatically excluded from the legal entitlement to reduce their 
working hours [...]. A cut off line of 15 employees appears arbitrarily chosen 
and is from our perspective in no way necessary as it is reasonable to expect 
businesses with five employees to assert urgent business reasons when there 
really are problems (DGB 2000, author’s translation).  
While it was not possible for opponents of the small business exemption to negotiate 
a lower cut off line, a compromise was achieved by modifying the calculation base of 
15 employees. At Committee Stage it was decided to calculate the cut off line on the 
basis of a simple headcount (excluding trainees) rather than counting part-time 
employees on a pro rata basis as previously stated (BT-Drs. 14/3808 pp.14, 28; BT-
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Pl. 14/115 p.10947). A further compromise was the agreement to review the effect of 
the law after three years, leaving the option for later revision (BT-Pl. 14/115 
p.10955). In sum, the two laws have a complementary effect for working parents. For 
the first three years after a child’s birth parents are covered by BErzGG, and 
afterwards by the TzBfG, which covers all employees irrespective of care status. 
Working parents employed in small firms with up to 15 employees find themselves 
excluded from all entitlements. 
Both the British and German employment rights make entitlement conditional upon 
employee status and a qualification period of six months in line with other 
employment rights. In the UK, the terms of conditionality on employment status 
were also subject to taskforce negotiation. Employee representatives preferred to 
broaden access to workers in line with the Sex Discrimination Act and the Part-time 
Workers Regulations, which both apply to all workers, including agency workers and 
casual staff, who do not have a specific employment contract (Work and Parents 
Taskforce 2001 p.17). Employers preferred the narrower definition of employees on 
the basis that agency workers and casual staff are often explicitly hired to meet the 
short term needs of the business in which business-oriented working patterns are key 
(Work and Parents Taskforce 2001 p.18). The wider definition of worker raised a 
number of practical complications which the taskforce did not have time to resolve 
and therefore decided to limit eligibility to employees with the recommendation to 
Government to consider widening the scope if considered relevant (Work and 
Parents Taskforce 2001 p.18). Agency workers were subsequently explicitly 
excluded by the Employment Act. There was similar disagreement between 
stakeholders on the subject of qualification periods with employers pointing to other 
family-friendly employment rights that were subject to qualification periods (for 
example six months for Maternity and Paternity Leave and one year for Parental 
leave) while employee representatives referred to the Sex Discrimination Act which 
was not. Out of concern for small employers, agreement was finally found over a six 
month qualification period, in line with the Maternity and Paternity Leave 
Regulations (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001 pp. 18-19).  
In terms of breadth of coverage the German employment rights fare more strongly in 
terms of the degree of empowerment than the British right to request as they do not 
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distinguish by care status. Those working parents not covered by the BErzGG are 
covered by the TzBfG which does not select by care status. However, about a quarter 
of all German employees are excluded through the small business exemption. This 
creates inequity of access as entitlement to flexible working patterns varies across 
employers and is not oriented at employee needs. In Britain, a choice was made 
between groups of carers in favour of the one which was deemed to be most in need, 
parents of young and disabled children. Access by those in need was ensured by 
avoiding a small business exemption so that parents are entitled irrespective of 
employer size33. An access restriction applying to both countries is conditionality to 
employee status and a qualification period of six month, excluding workers in 
atypical employment relations.  
2. Precision of targeting 
The criterion precision of targeting refers to the question of whether a policy is 
directly targeted at working parents or only indirectly targeted at them, for example 
via employers, or intermediary actors such as employee representatives. A directly 
targeted policy is more likely to reach those intended to benefit from it than a policy 
that relies on intermediary actors for delivery. Employment rights are an example of 
regulation that is directly targeted at the individual and all three policy measures 
under scrutiny here share this characteristic. The rights accorded to employees are 
matched by a duty on employers to accommodate them. Employee representatives at 
the workplace level were only given a marginal role in the process of working time 
negotiation regulated by the laws.  
In the UK, the role of trade union representatives in relation to the right to request is 
restricted to the role of companion for the employee when discussing a request with 
the employer. The taskforce recommended to allow parents to take a ‘fellow 
employee, friend or appropriate, recognised trade union representative to accompany 
them’ (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001 p.28). The right to be accompanied was 
passed under Section 80 G (2) (k) Employment Act, conferring powers on the 
Secretary of State to specify the characteristics of eligible companions. DTI 
consultations found that employee representatives advocated a consistent approach 
                                                 
33 Following the recent Work and Families Act 2006, coverage was extended to carers of adults. 
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with the statutory right to be accompanied at disciplinary and grievance hearings 
provided for in the Employment Relations Act 1999, which entitles employees to be 
accompanied by fellow workers or union officials. Employers and their 
representatives, on the other hand, preferred a restriction to fellow workers from the 
same workplace, excluding external trade union representatives. They justified their 
position with the concern that ‘the presence of a representative, like a full-time 
official of a union, from outside the work place is likely to be perceived as being 
more formal and will work against fostering an open discussion’ (DTI 2002a p.19). 
Public consultations on the draft regulations confirmed this division in stakeholder 
positions (DTI 2002b). The DTI finally went with the employer preference by 
limiting the definition to ‘workers employed by the same employer as the employee’ 
(Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 3207), excluding external union representatives in 
the final regulations. This amendment reduced the possible sources of expertise and 
support available to the employee in negotiating their case with the employer. 
In the German case, works councils were not given a support role in negotiating 
working time reduction with the employer. There is no workplace appeal procedure 
or conflict resolution included in the design in which mediation via the works council 
could have come to play as is the case in other laws, such as the Working Time Act. 
The Works Constitution Act (§87 (1) 5 BetrVG) for example gives the works council 
a right of co-determination in relation to annual leave when no consensual agreement 
can be found between the employer and the employee). The lack of works council 
involvement did not incite much stakeholder debate however. In the public 
consultations, only the Trade, Banks and Insurances Union raised this issue and 
recommended that the involvement of works councils would provide a workplace 
based and timely conflict resolution mechanism that might help to avoid the use of 
employment tribunals (HBV 2000 p.48).  
In the context of the TzBfG, the promotion of part-time employment goes beyond the 
individual right of employees to claim a reduction in working hours to include a 
number of additional measures which are targeted at employers. Employers for 
instance have the duty to advertise new jobs as part-time jobs if they are suitable, and 
to inform employee representatives about part-time positions in the company to 
create greater transparency about part-time employment (§7 TzBfG). Furthermore 
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the law regulates minimum working time standards for work on demand and job 
sharing (§12 and 13 TzBfG). Collective bargaining parties are targeted by the TzBfG 
as collective agreements may be concluded to agree on the business grounds on the 
basis of which applications for reduced workings can be refused (§8(4) TzBfG). 
Furthermore, other aspects covered by the TzBfG, such as job sharing and work-on-
demand, can be regulated by collective agreements as long as they regulate to the 
advantage of the employee. Collective agreements are bound by the non-
discrimination principle according to which part-time employees should not be 
treated less favourably than comparable full-time employees.  
Overall, entitlements in all three policy measures are directly targeted at employees 
and their employers. Intermediary actors such as trade union representatives or works 
councils are given only marginal roles in the process of working time negotiation. 
Rather, employees are intended (and directly empowered) to initiate the dialogue for 
change with their employer, and to request the flexible working time pattern that suit 
their individual needs. Employers in turn have an obligation to accommodate such 
individual requests if it is possible on business grounds to do so. In terms of the 
precision of targeting, all three instruments score highly in terms of empowerment.  
3. The scope of employee control over working time flexibility 
The scope of employee control over working time flexibility refers both to substantive 
and procedural aspects. In substantive terms, the scope of working time flexibility 
that is covered by the policy refers to variation in the length and distribution of 
working time, and the location of work. In procedural terms, employee control over 
working time is delineated by the type of statutory entitlement (a right to request or a 
right to have), notification periods and the frequency at which requests for flexible 
working arrangements can be made. Figure 12 provides a quick overview of the 
provisions made and cross-national differences between them. 
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Figure 12: Scope of employee control over working time flexibility 
 Germany UK 
BErzGG TzBfG Right to Request 
Length of 
working time 
Reduction to between 15-
30 hours per week 
No limitation to 
the scope of 
working time 
reduction  
No limitation to 
the scope of 
working time 
reduction 
Distribution 
of working 
hours 
At employer's discretion  Yes, unless 
business reasons 
oppose claim 
No, but a request 
can be made 
regarding the 
times at which to 
work 
Control over 
location of 
work  
No  No  A request can be 
made 
Employee 
“right” to 
flexible 
working? 
Yes, unless urgent 
business reasons oppose 
claim 
Yes, unless 
business reasons 
oppose claim 
No 
Notification 
Period before 
starting date 
8 weeks (6 weeks when 
change in working hours 
directly after birth or the 
end of maternity leave) 
3 months  It can take 14 
weeks or longer, if 
parents appeal 
employer 
decision. 
Mobility Working time reduction 
limited to period of 
parental leave, afterwards 
right to return to previous 
working hours 
Working time 
reduction 
permanent;  
Preferential 
treatment for 
full-time 
vacancies if 
desired. 
Contract variation 
permanent 
No statutory 
support for return 
to full-time 
Frequency of 
request 
Twice within the 36 
months of parental leave 
Once every 24 
months 
Once every 12 
months 
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In terms of the scope of flexible working time arrangements covered by the right to 
request, the Employment Act 2002 uses a wide definition covering ‘the number of 
hours worked, the times of work (distribution of hours), and the location of work‘ 
(Section 80 F (1) a). The wide scope was based on the finding that had emerged 
during the Work and Parents Review that part-time work was not necessarily what 
parents wanted (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001 p.1).  Parents received a right to 
request, not a right to have. It is a right to have one’s flexibility request seriously 
considered by the employer, which was intended by Government to speed up best 
practice. Employee control over their working pattern is thus conditional upon the 
good will of employers and operational feasibility, as requests can be opposed on 
business grounds. This means that employers remain in control over working time as 
long as they provide business reasons for declining a flexibility request.  
Employees can indicate their preferred date for the new working arrangement to start 
but approval is subject to employer consent. The negotiation procedure allows 
employers up to 14 weeks until a decision on the request is finalised, including the 
appeal period. Employee control over working time flexibility is further limited by 
the fact that their negotiated flexibility represents a permanent contract variation. It is 
not possible to return to one’s previous working pattern once care responsibilities 
change. When a request for contract variation is agreed to, the change is permanent, 
and an employee has to wait for 12 months before making a new request for contract 
variation. In sum, while the scope of flexible working arrangements covered by the 
policy is wide, the type of entitlement does not shift much control to the employee. 
They can request, not claim, flexibility to suit their needs. Employers remain largely 
in control over working time organisation.  
In Germany, in comparison, both regulations entitle employees to reduce their 
working hours, and to indicate their preference regarding the distribution of the 
reduced number of working hours.  The BErzGG specifies a working hour volume of 
between 15 and 30 hours per week, for at least three consecutive months, to which 
employees may reduce their working time while on parental leave (§15 (7) 3).  The 
minimum working hour limit of 15 hours per week is set to avoid employees falling 
below the social insurance threshold (§8 SGB IV). The upper limit of 30 hours 
relates to the policy objective of providing parents with time to care for their 
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children. The increase from the previously 19 hours to 30 hours was criticised by 
some family organisations, which feared that the original purpose of parental leave, 
to dedicate time to parental care, was counteracted by such a long working hour 
threshold (Deutscher Familienverband 2000). Government justified the decision by 
emphasising parental sharing of the care work: ‘the care of the child is not thereby 
threatened as both parents can take parental leave at the same time’ (BT-Drs. 
14/3118 p.11)34. The condition that the period of reduced hours working is at least 
three consecutive months long was drafted following the Austrian parental leave 
reform that came into force in 2000 (BT-Drs. 14/3118 p.21). These restrictions on 
the control over working time organisation were introduced to facilitate the 
organisation of work for employers. No limitation as to the scope of working time 
reduction is specified by the TzBfG. Policy makers deliberately maximised employee 
flexibility with regard to the length and distribution of working hours. Against the 
background of the employment creating policy objective motivating the law, policy 
makers were eager not to discourage the voluntary reduction in working hours by 
imposing flexibility restrictions. The Bill stated:  
the law foregoes imposing a blanket weekly working time reduction that 
contradicts the wishes of employees and thus counteracts the employment-
creating effect of part time employment (BT-Drs. 14/4374 pp.16-17).  
Regarding the distribution of working hours, employees under § 8 TzBfG are entitled 
to indicate the desired distribution of working time as well as the extent of the 
reduction, and employers are required to accommodate the employee's wishes 
regarding working time distribution unless business reasons oppose them. The 
employee’s control over the distribution of working hours is however weakened 
again by the employer’s right to change the distribution of working hours unilaterally 
at a month’s notice, when business interests outweigh employee interests (§8 (5) 
TzBfG). The BErzGG encourages employees and employers to agree on the extent of 
the working time reduction and the distribution of working hours without specifying 
an employee right to a particular distribution of working hours.  
The entitlement to reduced working hours is limited in time under §15 BErzGG as it 
is tied to the parental leave entitlement of a maximum of 36 months. Periods of 
                                                 
34 Some actors considered 30 hours too close to full-time employment and therefore at cross-purposes 
with the original principle of the parental leave act. It was opposed by the Land Bayern in BR (BR-
PL. 751 Anlage 4; Deutscher Familienverband 2000). 
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reduced working have to be at least three months at a time, and two applications may 
be made during the 36 month period. An additional option is to postpone 12 months 
of the leave to a later point in the child’s life up to the age of eight, for example to 
cover the first year in school. This additional flexibility however depends on the 
good will of the employer. At the end of the parental leave period, parents have the 
right to return to their previous working hours (§15 (5) BErzGG). Under § 8 TzBfG, 
by contrast, the change to contractual working hours is permanent and employees 
have to wait for at least two years before making a new application for working time 
reduction. While there is no statutory right to return to full-time hours, employers 
have the duty to treat part-time employees who indicate a preference to increase their 
working hours preferentially when full-time vacancies become available, unless 
urgent business reasons or the working time preferences of other employees oppose 
this (§9 TzBfG). Overall, the TzBfG offers greater flexibility for employees with 
regard to the length and distribution of hours worked. This greater scope for 
flexibility, however, can be more easily opposed by the employer on ‘business 
grounds’. The BErzGG on the other hand restricts the scope of employee flexibility 
but makes it more difficult for employers to refuse, as ‘urgent business grounds’ 
must apply.  
In comparison, the Right to Request has the widest scope of flexibility as it includes 
variation in length and distribution of working hours and the location of work. Both 
employment rights in Germany are biased towards working time reduction, with 
some scope for the distribution of working time but not with regard to the place of 
work. In this respect, the British law gives employees the greatest scope of 
substantive flexibility. In terms of procedural flexibility, parents on parental leave in 
Germany fare better: they have the shorter notification periods, can change their 
working time arrangement twice during their parental leave status and importantly 
have a right to return to full-time hours after the end of their parental leave status, 
which increases the mobility between full and part-time employment. In the other 
two cases, contract variation is permanent with no obligation on the employer to 
accept a return to full-time hours, although employers have to inform part-time 
employees of full-time vacancies when these become available under TzBfG. British 
employees have no support by the law to return to full time hours if they wish so. 
Under §8 TzBfG, employees have to wait for two years to make another demand for 
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working time reduction, which makes it difficult to react to sudden changes in one’s 
care responsibilities. In the UK, this period is only 12 months, which however also 
does not facilitate flexible adjustments to changing care responsibilities. Overall, 
there is a trade off between the scope of flexibility and the degree of procedural 
control. While employees in Germany have a greater degree of control over a more 
limited scope of flexibility, in Britain the opposite is the case. A wider scope of 
flexible arrangements is covered but employees have to rely on the good will of their 
employers to accommodate their working time requests as they only have a right to 
request, not a right to have. The next section turns to consider the employer defence 
against the working time requests of their employees, considering differences in the 
enforceability of the three employment rights. 
4. Enforceability 
The degree of enforceability refers to how easy it is for employers to ignore or refuse 
employee requests for flexible working, how non-compliance is sanctioned, and to 
what degree employees are empowered to challenge employer refusals of their 
requests. Cross-national differences are shown at a glance in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Enforceability 
 Germany UK 
 BErzGG TzBfG Right to Request 
Grounds for 
refusal  
Urgent business 
reasons  
Business reasons 
 
Business reasons 
 
Legal 
consequence 
of failure to 
reach internal 
agreement 
Employee can take 
case before an 
employment 
tribunal for 
resolution 
Employee can take 
case before an 
employment 
tribunal for 
resolution 
Internal appeal 
procedure. 
If case was not given 
serious consideration, 
employee can 
complain to 
employment tribunal 
Appeal 
procedure 
No No Yes  
Tribunal 
powers 
To examine the 
business reasons 
provided by the 
employer and to 
order contract 
variation if refusal 
not found to be 
justified; no 
remedy is awarded 
To examine the 
business reasons 
provided by the 
employer and to 
order contract 
variation if refusal 
not found to be 
justified; no 
remedy is awarded 
To examine disputed 
facts; to order case to 
be reconsidered; to 
order compensation of 
up to eight weeks pay 
to be paid; No power 
to challenge business 
reasons given by 
employer 
 
In the UK, employers can refuse an application for flexible working if they find it to 
be in conflict with business needs. Based on their consultations with employers, the 
taskforce provided concrete examples of acceptable business grounds, which were 
set in law in Section 80G (1) b as follows: (i) burden of additional costs, (ii) 
detrimental effect on ability to meet customer demand, (iii) inability to re-organise 
work among existing staff, (iv) inability to recruit additional staff, (v) detrimental 
impact on quality, (vi) detrimental impact on performance, (vii) insufficiency of 
work during the periods the employee proposes to work, and (viii) planned structural 
changes. Employers wanting to refuse a request must explain the business reasons in 
writing to the employee, after having given serious consideration to the request 
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made. The duty to ‘seriously consider’ involves a face-to-face meeting with the 
employee within 28 days of receiving the request to discuss the request and consider 
alternatives if necessary. In the case of refusal, employees are given the possibility to 
appeal a negative decision within two weeks. The internal appeal procedure was 
recommended by the taskforce following the Government’s encouragements to place 
emphasis on resolving requests within the business rather than through application to 
employment tribunals. The aim of the internal appeal procedure is to encourage both 
parties to resolve a disputed request at the workplace. This failing, the use of 
mediators, such as the binding arbitration scheme offered by the Advisory 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) was encouraged, leaving the resolution 
of disputes before employment tribunals as a last resort. 
The involvement and power of employment tribunals was subject to fierce 
negotiations between taskforce members as stakeholders held very strong views on 
the question of the appropriate test of the business reasons for declining requests:  
The key issue was whether this was a right to have with a very limited 
defence or whether it was a right to request balanced out by a business case 
and it almost broke down on that because the unions, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, family groups, were insistent until the twelfth hour that 
employment tribunals would have the right to overrule an employer on 
whether the request had been met or denied (Int. UK 07, 15/12/2005).  
Employee representatives, equality and family groups advocated the objective 
justification test used in the Sex Discrimination Act according to which business 
reasons have to be demonstrated as justifiable (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001 
p.31). The objective justification test was seen as a safeguard to ensure that 
employers would give serious consideration to employee requests and give 
employees the power to challenge negative decisions. As one taskforce member 
explained when interviewed:  
If there were the possibility at the end of the day that employees could to go a 
tribunal and demand that the employer objectively justifies what they are 
saying, then the employer wouldn’t make the refusal in the first place. So it’s 
not that we want to make it easier for them to go to court to get their rights, 
it’s just it’s better to have your rights established because that will determine 
the employer’s behaviour (Int. UK 05, 13/12/2005) 
Employers strongly opposed tribunal powers to question the employer’s actual 
reasoning for declining a request. This was an aspect of the new right that employers 
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and their representatives were not willing to negotiate, and in which regard they were 
backed by the Government, who had, from the outset, emphasised the ‘light-touch’ 
nature of the legislative approach. In the bargaining process, advocates of legislation 
in the taskforce had a weaker bargaining position as they more strongly depended on 
a consensus than employers, who were prepared not to sign the consensus report if it 
came to it. When asked whether not arriving at a consensus report was considered an 
option, one taskforce member reflected:  
It might have been, but then we wouldn’t have had anything. Obviously that 
was considered. The basic problem was that we wanted some legislation and 
the employers didn’t particularly. So when you were trying to get a consensus 
that put us in a rather weak position (Int. UK 12, 31/01/2006). 
The recommendations of the taskforce reflect this uneven power balance. One 
interviewee stated:  
No, there wasn’t a balance. All along the work was heavily weighted towards 
employers’ interests and that was very, very clear but that was just in the 
wider deregulatory context and it became increasingly obvious throughout the 
organisation, both when we were in meetings and outside, that we were on 
the back foot and that the employers were always going to get a better 
outcome than we were (Int. UK 05, 13//12/2005). 
The outcome of the negotiations was that while employment tribunals can be called 
upon, which was a concession by employers, whose preference had been to handle 
requests at the workplace, the scope for the tribunal case is lower than employee, 
equality, and family representatives had bargained for: the employers’ business 
reasons for refusing a request cannot be challenged by tribunals.  
Employers do not have to prove at any instance that the business reasons justifying 
their refusal actually do apply. This also means that employees do not have a 
statutory right to have their requests granted where business grounds allow it, as 
refusals on business grounds cannot be challenged. Rather, the employee’s right 
relates to the employer’s duty to ‘seriously consider’ the request brought before 
them. If an employer breaches the procedure laid out in the Flexible Working 
Regulations, or bases a rejection on incorrect facts, the employee can take the case 
before an employment tribunal. In this case, the employer needs to demonstrate to 
have gone through the procedure of face-to-face meetings and written 
communications. The employment tribunal has the power to verify whether the 
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employer has followed the correct procedures and to examine any disputed facts. 
They may send the case back to the business for reconsideration and order 
compensation where appropriate. Tribunals do not have the power to question the 
business reasons given by the employer or to order an employer to implement a 
flexible working arrangement (DTI 2002a).  
The level of compensation that an employment tribunal can order in the case of non-
compliance by an employer was subject to regulation by the Secretary of State who 
consulted with stakeholders on the issue. A high level of compensation is generally 
thought to be a more effective incentive for employers to comply than a low level. 
Unsurprisingly, employers advocated a low maximum compensation level ranging 
from four to thirteen weeks and most employee representatives argued for the 
permitted maximum remedy to be set at a much higher level of 52 weeks pay in 
order to be ‘meaningful to all potential breaches of the right’ (DTI 2002a pp.11-12). 
The DTI decided ‘to set the maximum amount of compensation at eight weeks’ pay’ 
staying closely with employer preferences (DTI  n bbbbvvbv2002b p.4). Failure to 
allow the employee to be accompanied at the meeting to discuss the application or 
appeal was treated separately with an employment tribunal able to make an award of 
up to two weeks pay, consistent with the remedy set out in Section 11 of the 
Employment Relations Act 1999.  
When the regulations were discussed in the 9th Standing Committee on Delegated 
Legislation, the DTI’s decision was critically received by Mr Lloyd, Labour MP for 
Manchester, Central, who noted:  
The gap between employers’ organisations which asked for a maximum 
award of four week’s pay, and the TUC which recommended a maximum 
award of 52 weeks’ pay, is not a matter of detail – it is a gaping chasm. Even 
with tongue in cheek, I would not talk about splitting the difference between 
four week’s pay and 52 weeks pay and concluding that eight weeks’ pay is 
the right amount [...]. We are discussing employers who are in breach of the 
spirit of the regulations [...], for that reason, I am troubled by the level of the 
penalty (SC Deb 5 December 2002 cc011-012).  
Alan Johnson (DTI) replied to his concern:  
A completely new and fairly radical right is being proposed and people have 
to get used to it. One must not start by saying to the employer that there is a 
draconian punishment waiting down the road, but the employer must know 
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that it is serious. Two thousand pounds is serious, particularly to small 
businesses. We need to treat this matter differently from the way in which we 
would deal with unfair dismissal cases or other cases that go to tribunals (Sc 
Deb 5 December 2002 c019).  
Emphasis was to be laid on constructive and consensual dialogue and to avoid a 
connotation of conflict and hostile employment relations. Again, the Government 
priority was not to antagonise employers. 
In Germany, both laws strongly encourage the employer and employee to discuss 
applications and come to a consensual agreement about the desired working time 
reduction (BT-Drs. 14/3118 p.20). A significant difference therefore exists between 
the two laws with regard to what happens when such a consensual agreement is not 
found. Under §15 BErzGG, employees have the right to take their claim before an 
employment tribunal, whereas §8 TzBfG stipulates that in the case that no agreement 
is found between employer and employee, and the employer fails to refuse the 
request in writing one month before the desired starting date, the arrangement 
(working time reduction and distribution) requested by the employee comes into 
force on the desired date as if agreement was reached. The ‘fictional agreement 
clause’ is used to promote the internal agreement between employer and employee 
(Kohte 2004). As failure to communicate leads to an automatic right for the 
employee, employers are encouraged to give requests their serious and speedy 
attention. If employers refuse the request, employees also can challenge their 
decision before an employment tribunal.  
In Germany, employers can also refuse employee requests for working time 
reduction and distribution, if business reasons oppose it. The grounds on which a 
claim to reduced working hours can be refused by the employer differ between the 
two laws. Employers may only refuse an employee's claim to working time reduction 
under §15 (7) 4 BErzGG if ‘urgent’ business reasons oppose it. The use of the term 
‘urgent’ was adopted from §7 (2) 1 BUrlG, whereby an employee’s annual leave can 
only be interrupted on the basis of urgent business reasons (BT-Drs. 14/3118). The 
ministerial draft of §8 TzBfG also stipulated ‘urgent business reasons’, but this was 
subsequently weakened to ‘business reasons’ as a concession to employers before the 
Bill was presented to Parliament. Business reasons, on the grounds of which 
employers can refuse requests, are for example ‘when reduction of working hours 
Chapter 6 
187 
 
would significantly affect work organisation, work process, safety issues and incur 
disproportionate costs’ (§8 (4) TzBfG). No examples of urgent business reasons were 
provided in §15 BErzGG. It is easier for employers to reject applications under §8 
TzBfG than it is under §15 BErzGG. The difference between the two regulations has 
been justified by some commentators with reference to German basic law, which 
stipulates the special protection of the family (Kohte 2004 p.120, 25). An alternative 
interpretation, which emerged from discussions with the civil servants interviewed, is 
that employer lobbying in the case of parental leave reform was less insistent than in 
the later universal right to part-time work. The basis on which a claim to reduced 
working hours can be refused by the employer was the most controversial issue in 
the design process. Employer organisations and the Liberal Democrats fiercely 
opposed the statutory right to working time reduction (Ausschussprotokoll 14/63; 
BT-Drs. 14/4625 p.20). Trade unions and family organisations critiqued the 
weakening of the entitlement under §8 TzBfG (Ausschussprotokoll 14/63). 
In contrast to the UK regulations, the business defence used by employers to decline 
requests can be challenged before employment tribunals. If cases are brought before 
an employment tribunal for resolution, employers have to demonstrate and prove that 
the (urgent) business reasons opposing the request objectively apply. Employer 
organisations critiqued the legal uncertainty associated with the business defence 
accorded to employers. The German Confederation of Skilled Crafts (ZDH) for 
instance wrote to the Labour and Social Order Committee (Ausschuss für Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung) with reference to the BErzGG:  
This legal uncertainty and the imminent conflict before an employment 
tribunal in which the burden of demonstration and proof lies with the 
employer, reduce the possibility of employers of using their right to refuse 
requests when urgent business reasons oppose them (ZDH 2000, author’s 
translation).  
In their opposition to the statutory right, employer organisations emphasised the 
conflict of the statutory right to part time work with constitutionally protected rights 
of employers. In their written submission to the Committee on the Family, Senior 
Citizens, Women and Youth, the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations 
(BDA) argued that:  
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such an obligation to contract is in breach with the constitutionally protected 
contractual and occupational freedom as well as the freedom of managerial 
decisions. It stands in blatant cross-purposes with the necessary flexibility 
and liberalisation of employment law (BDA 2000b, author’s translation).  
Following the concessions made during the design process, employers have a 
stronger business defence under the TzBfG than under the BErzGG, however in both 
cases, they must be prepared to demonstrate and prove their business reasons for 
refusal before an employment tribunal. Neither law has integrated an internal appeal 
procedure, which indicates that workplace resolution of conflict was not a priority, 
even though the desirability of consensual agreement on working patterns was 
emphasised in principle (BT-Drs. 14/3553; BT-Drs. 14/4374). 
There are interesting differences in the way in which the regulations are designed to 
ensure that cases are given serious consideration. The British regulations lay out set 
procedures of face to face meetings and written explanations that employers have to 
follow. Compliance is encouraged through the possibility of a financial penalty of a 
maximum of eight weeks’ pay, ordered by employment tribunals if they do not. A 
more compelling feature is used in the German TzBfG. Here, a ‘fictional agreement 
clause’ was introduced, according to which the employee’s request automatically 
comes into force if the employer ignores the application or fails to refuse it within the 
given time period. This is a strong incentive to give the request consideration. The 
British regulations place more emphasis on workplace resolution of requests by 
providing an internal appeal procedure which is not included in the German case. 
Given that most employees do not want to take their case to an employment tribunal, 
this provides an important alternative option of challenging refusals which German 
employees do not have.  
Out of the three laws, §15 BErzGG is least easy to refuse on the grounds of ‘urgent 
business reasons’. This is followed by §8 TzBfG and finally by the Right to Request. 
In the latter two, employers can refuse requests with reference to business reasons. 
The key difference between the two countries is that British employers have a 
stronger business defence against the working time demands of their employees than 
German employers. While the acceptable business grounds on which refusals can be 
made are similar, the crucial difference is that German employers face the possibility 
of having to objectively justify their case, whereas the reasons of British employers 
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cannot be challenged by employment tribunals. This means that it is easier (without 
legal consequence) for British employers to refuse cases than for their German 
counterparts. Critics in the UK have stressed that it is easy to come up with a 
business explanation if employees do not have the power to challenge them. The 
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers commented:  
In our experience the criteria for assessing requests is not rigorous enough 
and requests to work flexibly are being lazily refused. It is not enough to 
simply state the needs of the business.  There should be clear criteria against 
which requests can be measured and refusals challenged (USDAW 2005 
p.13).  
Overall, the German employment rights have a higher degree of empowerment in the 
measure of enforceability than the British Right to Request. The next section 
considers how opportunity costs for employees were dealt with. 
5. Opportunity costs 
Working time flexibility often comes at a price which, if esteemed to high, can act as 
a deterrent for working parents to request family-friendly working time 
arrangements. Such opportunity costs can be financial, in the form of lost earnings 
associated with a reduction in working hours. Another important opportunity cost, 
which research has shown to play a significant role in people’s attitude towards 
flexible working is a fear of career penalties associated with the lower time and 
flexibility commitment shown to the employer (Kodz et al. 2002). State policy can 
attempt to reduce these opportunity costs to make family-friendly working a more 
affordable and attractive option for working parents and to protect them from 
discrimination and less favourable treatment by their employers on the grounds of 
their working time patterns. This section considers the regulatory precautions taken 
by the two governments. Figure 14 provides a quick overview of the provisions 
made. 
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Figure 14: Opportunity Costs 
 Germany UK 
 BErzGG TzBfG Right to 
Request 
Protection from detrimental treatment No Yes Yes 
Protection from (unfair) dismissal Yes Yes Yes 
Financial compensation of lost 
earnings related to a reduction in 
working hours  
Child Raising 
Benefit. 
/ / 
 
British law protects employees from detrimental treatment and unfair dismissal on 
the grounds of making a request for flexible working, and making use of their 
associated right of appealing, or bringing procedures against their employer if their 
case was refused or not seriously considered (Sections 47D and 104C Employment 
Act 2002). The Flexible Working Regulations complement the protections laid out in 
the act by further protecting the employee from detriment and unfair dismissal on the 
grounds of making use of the right to be accompanied to meetings by a fellow 
worker. The law further protects the fellow worker accompanying the employee to 
the meetings from detriment and unfair dismissal. The protection from detriment and 
unfair dismissal mirrors the Part-time Workers (Prevention of less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2000, which implemented the European Directive on Part-
time Work.  
Safeguards to reduce the opportunity costs of part-time employment were introduced 
in German legislation through the prohibition of discrimination and detrimental 
treatment related to working part-time. The principle of non-discrimination against 
part-time employees, which constitutes a key element of the European Directive on 
Part-Time Work (Clause 4, 97/81/EC), was implemented through §4 (1). In its 
content it covered provisions already made by §2 (1) 1 Employment Promotion Act, 
which it replaced (BT-Drs. 14/4374 p.15). It states that:  
a part-time employee must not be treated in a less favourable manner than a 
comparable full-time employee because of working part time unless different 
treatment is justified on objective grounds. A part time employee is to be paid 
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at least on a pro rata basis relating to the working time of a comparable full-
time worker (author’s translation). 
The TzBfG further stipulates that that employees must not be subjected to any 
detriment on the ground of making use of their rights provide by the legislation (§5 
TzBfG).  
Career related opportunity costs related to part-time employment, such as the general 
lack of acceptance of working time reduction in management positions were 
addressed by clause §6 TzBfG according to which the employer has to provide 
access to part time employment to employees in management positions. Employers 
have further to ensure access to training for part-time employees unless ‘urgent 
business reasons’ or the training preferences of other full-time or part-time 
employees oppose this (§10 TzBfG). Employees are protected from dismissal on the 
ground of refusing to transfer from full-time to part-time hours or vice versa at the 
will of the employer (§11 TzBfG). Finally, to counteract the common fear of ‘dead-
end’ part-time employment, the German Government made provisions for part-time 
employees who have indicated to their employers that they wish to increase their 
working hours to be informed of, and preferentially considered for, available full-
time vacancies in the company if they have equal aptitude and no urgent business 
reasons or working time preferences of other part-time or full-time employees 
oppose it (§9 TzBfG). The Government justified this measure of reducing career 
obstacles with the purpose of ‘increasing the acceptance and attractiveness of part 
time employment’ (BT-Drs. 14/4374 p.12). The parental leave regulations, by 
contrast, do not include provisions against discrimination or detrimental treatment. 
However, employees eligible for parental leave are protected against dismissal 
throughout the period of their parental leave status35 (§18 BErzGG) and have the 
right to return to their previous working hours once their parental leave period has 
come to an end (§15(5) BErzGG).  
The loss in earnings is an important opportunity cost associated with care related 
working time reduction. This was partly addressed by the Child Raising Benefit to 
which parents are eligible under the BErzGG, but not under the TzBfG. The Child 
                                                 
35 Protection against dismissal starts eight weeks prior to the start of the parental leave period, to 
ensure protection as soon as the employer is notified of the employee’s intention to make use of their 
parental leave entitlement (including working time reduction instead of full time leave), given the 
employee does not notify the employer prior to the eight week cut-off point. 
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Raising Benefit of up to 300 Euros per month for a maximum of 24 months (or 450 
Euros for a maximum of 12 months), however, is means-tested and paid per child 
rather than being an individual benefit. With low family income thresholds, a 
majority of parents were not eligible to the full benefit (Gerlach 2004a). No 
compensation for lost earnings is paid to employees reducing their working time 
under the TzBfG. 
In terms of opportunity costs incurred by employees, the law in both countries 
includes protecting clauses referring to detriment and unfair dismissal. Following the 
implementation of the European Part time work directive, the state counteracts less 
favourable payment of part-time workers. However, the pro rata payment principle 
does not offset the loss in earnings that working parents experience when they reduce 
their working hours in order to meet their care responsibilities. With the exception of 
the Child Raising Benefit in Germany, which provides some recognition of the costs 
of caring, neither government compensated carers for the care related working time 
reduction36. Financial transfers are limited in the UK to full time maternity and 
paternity leave, but not for part-time leave from work beyond the first year of the 
child’s life. The Child Raising Benefit in Germany is a flat rate allowance paid to the 
family up to a certain income ceiling and as long as part-time employment does not 
exceed 30 hours per week.  
The empowering potential of employment rights 
To close the comparative discussion of policy design, Figure 15 provides a summary 
how the three employment rights ‘score’ comparatively in terms of the five 
Empowerment Criteria. The comparative consideration of Empowerment Criteria 
raises a number of problems for the judgment of which aspects should be weighted 
as more important for empowerment than others. For instance, is it more problematic 
to exclude working parents on the basis of their care status or because they work for 
a small employer? What affects the scope of employee control over working time 
flexibility more: substantive or procedural constraints? To avoid normative 
judgment, no weighting was attempted. The scores of ‘low’, ‘moderate’, and ‘high’ 
                                                 
36 The Elterngeld reform in Germany in 2006 has since introduced an earnings-related benefit of up to 
14 months per child. 
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empowerment were distributed on the basis of how each measure performs in 
relation to the other two measures. 
Figure 15: The empowering potential of employment rights 
 Germany UK 
Empowerment Criteria BErzGG TzBfG Right to 
Request 
 1. Breadth of Coverage 
Care Status Characteristics of Care 
Receiver 
Low High Moderate 
Employment 
Status 
Employee/Worker Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Qualification Period Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Employer Size Low Low High 
Sector High High Moderate 
 2. Precision of Targeting 
 Targeting High High  High 
 3. Employee Control over Working Time  
Substantive Length of working time Moderate High High 
Distribution of working 
time 
Low Moderate High 
Location of work / / High 
Procedural Type of entitlement High Moderate Low 
Frequency of requests Moderate Low High 
Notification period High Moderate Moderate 
Mobility High Moderate Low 
 4. Enforceability 
 Grounds for Refusal High Moderate Moderate 
Consequence of Refusal High High Moderate 
Appeal procedure / / High 
Tribunal Powers High High Low 
 5. Opportunity Costs 
 Protection from 
Detriment 
/ High High 
Protection from unfair 
dismissal 
Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Financial compensation Moderate / / 
 
Although the three employment rights vary considerably along the different 
Empowerment Criteria, the overall empowering potential is ‘balanced out’ by a 
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number of trade-offs in policy design (Figure 16). Two empowerment trade-offs are 
particularly pronounced. The first relates to the breadth of coverage. British 
selectivity by care status stands in contrast to non-selectivity in the German 
legislation. The empowering potential of inclusiveness on the basis of care status is 
in Germany weakened by the introduction of a small business exemption that 
excludes employees working for small employers from the entitlement. In the UK, 
the empowering potential of applying the Right to Request to employers of all sizes 
is weakened by eligibility restrictions by care status, as only parents of young 
children are covered.  
The second trade-off exists between the scope of employee control over working 
time flexibility on the one hand, and the strength of the employer defence on the 
other hand. The British regulations endorse a wide definition of flexible working 
including length, distribution of working time and the location of work. In contrast, 
both German rights revolve around the reduction of working hours. In the UK, this 
wider scope of substantive flexibility is offset by a lower degree of procedural power 
attributed to employees and a strong employer defence. British employers merely 
have a procedural duty of giving serious consideration to an employee’s request; 
employees do not have a statutory claim to a change in working patterns. Further, 
employers are not required to objectively justify the business reasons they may 
provide against the working time wishes of the employee before employment 
tribunals. In contrast, German tribunals can order an employer to accommodate 
employee requests if their business defence is found to be invalid. While refusals 
must be based on business grounds in both cases these can be challenged by 
employment tribunals in Germany, but not in the UK. 
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Figure 16: Inversed Empowerment Trade-offs 
1. Inclusion on the basis of employee characteristics versus employer 
characteristics 
 Employee 
Characteristics 
Employer Characteristics 
United Kingdom Lower Higher  
Germany Higher  Lower 
2. Substantive flexibility versus procedural control and enforceability 
  Substantive Flexibility  Procedural control and enforceability 
United Kingdom Higher Lower 
Germany Lower Higher 
 
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to exploring the reasons for these inversed 
trade-offs in cross-national comparison.  
II. Explaining variations in policy design 
The empowerment trade-offs identified through the comparison of policy design 
reflect a compromise between employer and employee interests. Advances to the 
advantage of working parents in one area of policy design are met by protections of 
employer interests in another area. In the following, the reasons for each trade-off are 
discussed in turn exploring the interaction between the policy goals of policy makers 
and interest group preferences, and the influence of past policy choices on policy 
design.      
Trade-off 1: Inclusion on the basis of employee characteristics versus employer 
characteristics 
Cross-national variation in the breadth of coverage by employee characteristics can 
be partly explained by the different overarching policy goals that were served by the 
reforms. A central aim of the German TzBfG, which was developed by the 
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Department for Labour and Social Affairs, was employment maintenance and job 
creation through the redistribution of work through working time reduction. While 
the temporal needs of working parents were clearly instrumentalised, it was not in 
the interest of policy makers to limit eligibility on the basis of care status as the 
policy goal was best served if a maximum of employees made use of the new right. 
The European Part-time Work Directive, which gave significant impulse for the 
introduction of the TzBfG, further did not select by care status but encouraged the 
general promotion of part-time employment.  
The situation in the UK was different as the Right to Request was developed as a 
policy measure specifically to support working parents in reconciling work and 
family responsibilities. The decision to legislate on flexible working was very much 
framed by the Work and Parents Agenda at the Department of Trade and Industry 
(Cm 5005 2000). Against the policy legacy of non-intervention in this policy area, 
the selective approach targeting government support at those considered most in need 
was in line with New Labour’s commitment to ‘better regulation’, targeting policy 
carefully to keep regulatory burdens low. A universal entitlement was perceived to 
‘be unmanageable for businesses and place a huge burden on smaller employers’ (SC 
Deb 5 December 2002 c004). Narrow eligibility criteria served to keep the impact of 
the legislation on employers low, improving employer acceptance of government 
intervention in this area (Doern and Phidd 1983). This created the option of 
expanding the scope later through incremental reforms (as was indeed the case when 
the expansion of the Right to Request was extended to carers through the Work and 
Families Act 2006). Interest group acceptance and legitimation of government 
intervention was further sought by delegating the precise definition of ‘young 
children’ to the Work and Parents Taskforce. To a certain degree, then, the limitation 
of eligibility to parents of children under six was a result of interest group bargaining 
and within the parameters defined by policy makers, advocates of employee 
empowerment (trade unions, family and equality groups) managed to negotiate a cut-
off age considerably higher than that preferred by employers. Respectively high or 
low coverage by employee status was balanced out by the treatment of small 
businesses. 
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The duty of care towards small employers was differently addressed by the two 
governments. In the British approach, the needs of small business where emphasised 
from the outset, leading to an approach to policy design which was guided by the 
principle of ‘thinking small first’, again in line with New Labour’s commitment to 
‘better regulation’ to avoid unnecessary regulatory burden for businesses and 
targeting policies at those who need them. This approach fits within the liberal and 
business friendly cognitive frame favouring a limited regulatory role of the state that 
was endorsed by the Department of Trade and Industry.  The terms of reference for 
the taskforce were therefore to design ‘light touch’ legislation with small employers 
in mind and to consider the case of treating small employers differently. A small 
business exemption was not of great concern to employers in the UK where attention 
was focused on a strong employer defence for all employers. A unified approach was 
further prompted by the desire to keep the Flexible Working Regulations in line with 
existing law to avoid confusion about the status of small employers. The Sex 
Discrimination Act did for example not have a small employer exemption. As the 
burden to employers was kept low from the outset, there was no perceived need to 
treat small employers differently.  
In Germany, a small business exemption was considered appropriate in principle 
given similar provisions in existing employment law, which exempted very small 
employers with up to five employees (BetrVG, KSchG). As in the British case, 
existing law provided a template for policy design. However, the cut-off line was 
subsequently raised following a process of employer bargaining. The ministry in 
charge of the parental leave reform was the Federal Ministry for Family, Senior 
Citizen, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ) whose stakeholder constituency was a 
different one. In the BMFSFJ the ‘duty of care’ was more strongly oriented towards 
parents. The defence of employer rights came from the Federal Ministry for the 
Economy, leading to conflict between Family Minister Christine Bergmann and the 
Economy Minister Werner Müller, who backed business demands for a small 
business exemption up to a threshold of 50 employees. A compromise of 15 was 
negotiated (BT-Pl. 14/115 p.10955). Here, different policy priorities and actor 
allegiances between different government departments and interest groups influenced 
the treatment of small employers in policy design.  
Chapter 6 
198 
 
Trade-off 2: Substantive flexibility versus procedural control and enforceability 
As with employee coverage, variations in the scope of substantive flexibility can also 
be attributed to different overarching policy goals. In Germany, the right to working 
time reduction in the context of the BErzGG was intended to make the existing 
parental leave entitlement more flexible by enabling parents to remain partially 
attached to employment while providing care for their children. Within the context of 
parental leave reform, the purpose of the law was primarily to enable parents to 
allocate time to care for their child. The aim of the TzBfG, which implemented the 
European Council Directive on Part-time Work was to ‘distribute the existing 
volume of work to more people through the individual reduction of working time in 
the form of part time employment’ (BT-Drs. 14/4374 p.11). Working time reduction, 
rather than other forms of flexibility, was therefore instrumental to the policy goals 
in both cases. The policy context in the UK was different. Although the Government 
initially considered the introduction of a right to part-time employment after 
maternity leave, a large scale review of parents’ needs through the Work and Parents 
Review found that part-time work was not necessarily what parents wanted (Cm 
5005 2000). The Government’s aim was to facilitate work-family reconciliation in 
order to enable parents to return to, or remain in, the labour market, and therefore the 
goal of maximal parental flexibility to do so was driving policy design.  
The wide scope of substantive flexibility provided to parents in the UK was carefully 
balanced with employer interests in that the actual entitlement was not a ‘right to 
have’ but to have one’s request seriously considered by the employer. An absolute 
right was considered ‘a step too far’ by employers and this option, which had been 
considered in the Work and Parents Green Paper consultation, was dismissed by 
policy makers out of consideration for employer concerns (Work and Parents 
Taskforce 2001 para 1.1). The chosen approach stayed in line with New Labour’s 
policy emphasis on best practice promotion and concern not to ‘undermine best 
practice or stifle innovation’ through regulation (Cm 5005 2000 para 1.18).  
In Germany, employees received greater procedural control as their entitlement was 
a ‘right to have’ unless business reasons oppose it. The redistribution of control over 
working time to employees was congruent with the goals of policy makers and 
facilitated by existing law. In the case of the BErzGG, employees already enjoyed a 
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statutory right to full-time parental leave. The right to part-time leave represented an 
amendment to the statutory right to full-time leave which was an already strong 
intervention in the employment relationship for a selected group of employees. The 
dual goal of enhancing mothers’ attachment to employment (counteracting the 
effects of long parental leave) and encouraging fathers to take a greater share in 
parental care both necessitated a strengthening of parental negotiation positions with 
their employers. Policy makers at the BMFSFJ advocated employee-empowerment 
in the interest of their constituents: families, women and children. In the case of the 
TzBfG a strong negotiation position of employees was favourable to the policy goal 
of work redistribution, which necessitated a maximum number of employees willing 
to reduce their working hours to be able to do so. Employee-empowerment was here 
instrumental in employment creation and therefore supported by policy makers at the 
BMAS. 
With regard to the enforceability of employee requests, British employer 
representatives managed to negotiate a stronger defence of managerial freedom than 
German employers. Policy makers at the DTI had a greater institutional affinity with 
employer interests than policy makers in the respective government departments in 
Germany. The DTI’s departmental policy priorities of economic competitiveness and 
growth were congruent with the advocacy of managerial freedom. The DTI further 
provided employers with the opportunity to directly shape policy design through the 
Work and Parents Taskforce. While the choice for legislation had been a concession 
to employee and family groups, who had lobbied for its introduction, the design 
criteria set by the terms of reference to the taskforce were from the outset oriented 
towards the needs of employers, particularly small employers (Appendix E). The bias 
towards employer interests in the design of the law is also apparent in the set up of 
the taskforce on which more employers were represented (see Appendix E for full 
membership of the taskforce). In the Work and Parents Taskforce, the necessity of 
producing a consensus report enabled employers to remain firm on their priorities of 
a strong business defence and minimal tribunal involvement. Compared to the 
Employee Empowerment advocates, employers had less to lose if no consensus was 
found which gave them a stronger negotiation position. Employers were further 
backed by the Government’s terms of reference, which emphasised a ‘light touch’ 
and thereby business-friendly legislative approach on flexible working.  
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In Germany, interest groups were not as closely involved in the design process. 
Nevertheless, employers were able to obtain a strengthened business defence in the 
context of the TzBfG where the grounds for refusal were changed from ‘urgent 
business reasons’, as implemented in BErzGG, to ‘business reasons’ in favour of 
employers. In comparison to the parental leave reform, the TzBfG received much 
greater attention by employers and their organisations. They exerted more pressure 
on Government, via the Economy Ministry (which was more amenable to their 
interests than the BMFSFJ) than in the case of the selective entitlement under 
BErzGG. This might have been in part because a higher impact of legislation on 
managerial freedom was feared due to universal rather than selective coverage, but 
also because the TzBfG reform had a higher political profile and more significant 
relevance to the employment relationship, covering both part-time employment and 
fixed term employment contracts.  
Overall, the case study of variation in policy design in the context of employment 
rights has pointed to the influence of departmental policy priorities on the normative 
and cognitive frames of policy makers (Linder and Peters 1989). The DTI, which 
was in charge of formulating the Right to Request in the UK, was more strongly 
oriented towards furthering economic competitiveness and growth than the BMFSFJ 
in Germany, where policy priorities were more congruent with the needs and 
interests of families, women and children. In the case of the BMAS, the policy goal 
of employment creation and protection was congruent with employee empowerment 
due to the chosen approach of addressing labour market objectives through the 
promotion of voluntary part-time employment. Different policy contexts influenced 
choices on the breadth of coverage and substantive flexibility accorded to parents. 
Variation in the strength of the business defence that protects managerial freedom 
can be attributed to a more business-friendly orientation of policy makers at the DTI 
steering interest group negotiations within the Work and Parents Taskforce towards 
employer-friendly outcomes and to the stronger bargaining position of Managerial 
Freedom advocates within the taskforce.  
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Conclusions 
Although both governments chose to introduce employment rights to support 
working parents in their negotiation of working time flexibility, they made very 
different decisions with regard to policy design. This chapter was dedicated to a 
detailed analysis of cross-national variations in instrument design using the examples 
of individual employment rights to flexible working time arrangements in Germany 
and the UK. Using the five Empowerment Criteria as a framework for systematic 
comparison, a fair degree of variation across the different criteria emerged from the 
analysis. Overall, however, instrument designs fared similar in terms of 
empowerment. This was due to two trade-offs. In Germany, a stronger element of 
employee control over working time arrangements, and the ability to challenge 
employer refusals at employment tribunals was traded off against a lower substantive 
scope of flexible working time arrangements and a small business exemption 
excluding a large number of employees from entitlement all together. In the UK, the 
opposite was the case. Employees have greater choice over working time patterns 
suiting their individual needs but are dependent on employer good will to have their 
requests accepted, as they cannot challenge the business case for refusal. The 
emphasis of government intervention in the German case was to provide employees 
with a statutory claim to working time reduction, which was subsequently weakened 
through a number of concessions to employers. In the UK, on the other hand, the 
emphasis was on giving statutory encouragement to best practice. Rather than 
providing an automatic right, the Government's approach from the outset was to 
‘encourage both parties to think creatively about flexible solutions’ (SC Deb 5 
December 2002 c004) through dialogue and ‘serious consideration’ without taking a 
threatening attitude towards employers. The British employment right provides 
working parents with more choice which is arguably not backed up by the power to 
substantiate this choice. In Germany on the other hand, working time flexibility is 
limited to working time reduction which might not cover the actual flexibility needs 
of working parents. While they have a stronger negotiation position to claim reduced 
working hours than their British counterparts, this type of flexibility incurs non-
compensated financial loss and a stronger career penalty than other forms of working 
time flexibility.  
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Variation in policy design could be explained with reference to the different policy 
contexts within which the employment laws were formulated, both with regard to 
existing legal frameworks of past policy choices within which the new regulations 
were integrated as well as the different policy goals which were being addressed by 
policy makers in the two countries. Overall, the greater employer-friendliness of the 
design of the Right to Request appears to be more a result of the business-friendly 
disposition of policy makers than of employer bargaining as the DTI set tight 
parameters for negotiations by the taskforce. The different policy priorities of the 
government departments within which policy was designed might provide a partial 
explanation for the different ideas and interests of policy makers, which in the UK 
showed greater affinity with the managerial freedom advocacy than with employee 
empowerment, whereas in Germany, the opposite was the case. 
Taking a closer look at variation within the same category of instruments has 
highlighted the need to consider policy choices at the level of instrument design, not 
only between different types of policy instruments (Woodside 1986). The choice of a 
potentially empowering instrument such as regulation does not per se mean that it 
will be designed to empower. With this in mind, we now turn to the second case-
study which will examine two non-legislative, information-based policy measures: 
the British Work-Life Balance Campaign and the German Alliance for the Family.   
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7. Information campaigns in comparative perspective 
Information based policy instruments differ from regulation in an important regard: 
they do not rely on coercion, or state authority, in their attempt to steer behaviour. 
Rather, they aim to incite the desired behaviour change through information and 
persuasion techniques, the dissemination of knowledge and know-how, convincing 
argumentation, moral suasion, and benchmarking. According to Vedung, ‘information’ 
based instruments include any form of ‘amassing, packaging, and diffusion of 
knowledge and recommendations’ (Vedung 2003 p.33). This chapter is dedicated to 
the in-depth exploration of the use of information-based instruments in Germany and 
the UK, focusing on two case studies drawn from the wider context of family-friendly 
working time policy: the Work-Life Balance Campaign in the UK and the Alliance for 
the Family in Germany. Focusing on two policy initiatives that fall within the same 
category of policy instruments allows one to consider in more detail cross-national 
variation in policy design. These two campaigns were chosen for in-depth comparison 
as they both aimed to encourage the voluntary provision of family-friendly working 
time arrangements. The Work-Life Balance Campaign ran over a five year period from 
2000 to 2005. The Alliance for the Family was set up in early 2003 and was continued 
under the new Christian Democratic leadership of the Federal Ministry for Family 
Affairs following the general election in 2005. In line with the time frame of this 
thesis, the discussion of the Alliance for the Family will focus on the time span 2003 to 
2005 while the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition was in power. 
The development of information campaigns differs from legislation in that decisions 
regarding the details of policy design are made by ministers and civil servants at the 
level of government departments, rather than undergoing parliamentary scrutiny, 
debate and voting. The institutional context within which policies are designed differs 
significantly between instrument categories with implications for data availability. 
While the development of a piece of legislation is formally documented through the 
publication of draft Bills, consultation documents, consultation responses and minutes 
of committee meetings and parliamentary debates, the design process of information 
campaigns is not formally documented. Internal documentation is not made available 
to researchers, and access to civil servants for interview is notoriously difficult. The 
description and analysis of the two information campaigns presented in this chapter 
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has relied on a mix of documentary research and interviews with civil servants and 
stakeholders. Government publications documenting the policy agenda and policy 
measures undertaken by government provided some indication with regard to 
objectives pursued and content of the campaigns, but the reliance on interviews with 
civil servants was comparatively stronger than in Chapter Six. However, as 
confidentiality was assured to interviewees, the insights obtained in interviews were 
mainly used for the triangulation of information obtained from other sources. A 
comprehensive review of the campaigns’ information and communication materials, 
guidance and consultancy, and knowledge production was undertaken. Speeches by 
ministers, which are archived on government websites and publicly available, provided 
a valuable information source on government discourse complementing the analysis of 
printed government publications and interviews.   
This chapter pursues two aims: the first aim is to provide a detailed, comparative 
analysis of how British and German policy makers endeavoured to encourage 
voluntary change at the workplace level through encouragement and persuasion rather 
than statutory regulation. As in the previous chapter, the two information campaigns 
are systematically compared along the five Empowerment Criteria developed in 
Chapter Three to scrutinise the implications of policy design for the power balance 
between employers and employees. The second aim of the chapter is to provide 
explanations for cross-national variation in policy design by placing choices within the 
context of past policy choices, the wider policy agendas that are being served by the 
two campaigns, as well as the ideas and interests of actors, their interactions and inter-
dependent relationships within nationally specific institutional settings. The chapter is 
structured in two parts. Part I systematically compares the policy design in terms of the 
breadth of coverage, the precision of targeting, the scope of employee control over 
flexibility, the enforceability of employee preferences and opportunity costs, closing 
with a comparative assessment of the empowering potential of the two campaigns and 
a summary of the main similarities and differences between the two approaches. Part II 
will then explore the reasons for variation between the two campaigns.  
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I. Policy Design 
A few words should be said about the use of the comparative framework across 
instrument categories. Information based instruments ‘fit’ the five criteria of employee 
empowerment differently than regulatory instruments. In Chapter Six, two 
employment rights were compared which both directly targeted employees. In other 
words, the impulse for change at the workplace is given by the employee, 
communicating her or his request for flexible working time arrangements to the 
employer. The two information campaigns chosen for comparison in this chapter in 
contrast are mainly directed at employers. Here the impulse for change is to come from 
the employer, accommodating the time needs of their employees. While government 
intervention in the first case intended to support employees in negotiating the working 
time arrangements they individually need, in this second case it was intended to 
address the access problem of insufficient and unequally spread provision across 
workplaces. The impact in terms of empowerment of employees will necessarily differ 
as the comparative framework is employee-oriented. A policy measure directed at 
employers will necessarily score lower in terms of employee empowerment than a 
policy measure that is directly targeted at employees. Both governments chose to target 
their information campaigns at employers rather than employees. Let us now explore 
the different dimensions of policy design at the example of information campaigns.  
1. Breadth of coverage 
The breadth of coverage of an information campaign on flexible working time 
arrangements addresses the question of who is intended to benefit, in other words of 
how selectively the beneficiaries are delineated. To whose benefit was flexible 
working promoted in these information campaigns? In contrast to statutory regulation, 
where eligibility criteria are rigorously defined, coverage in information based 
instruments is less clearly delineated. Comparing the two campaigns, different 
approaches to coverage were pursued: while the British campaign explicitly covers 
‘everyone’ irrespective of care responsibilities, the German campaign centres around 
the family and the need to make work and family life more compatible to encourage 
more employees to have children. Both campaigns emphasised the benefits to 
employers and society more generally by stressing the win-win effect of good practice 
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in work-life balance and family-friendliness. Not only parents and carers, but society, 
the economy and businesses were said to benefit (DfEE 2000a p.3; Prognos AG 2005).  
The British Work-Life Balance Campaign grew out of the Government’s National 
Childcare Strategy in which family-friendly employment was identified as an 
important condition to make family life and employment more compatible (Cm 3959 
1998). Despite being rooted within the Government’s Work and Parents Agenda, the 
Work-Life Balance Campaign addressed 'everyone'. The impulse for the inclusive, 
universal approach came from employers rather than Government, which is apparent in 
the choice of terminology. Employers for Work-Life Balance, whose partnership was 
sought by policy makers, insisted on the use of the term ‘work-life balance’ in the 
campaign rather than ‘family-friendly’ (Int. UK 06, 14/12/2005). The term family-
friendly was felt to be too strongly associated with mothers and children. One 
employer explained: 
The language around work-life balance was very specifically chosen to be 
inclusive, to take the agenda beyond just family. The best practice that we had 
in our own organizations was that it wasn't just about people with families, it 
was about everyone (Int. UK 16, 04/10/2006).  
Margaret Hodge, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment and in charge of developing the campaign, preferred to call it the family-
friendly campaign. However, as terminology turned out to be a make or break issue for 
the cooperation with the employer group it was finally agreed to and the campaign was 
called the Work-Life Balance Campaign (Int. UK 02, 21/09/2005; Int. UK 06, 
14/12/2005).  
The different preferences regarding the terminology to be used can be understood 
against the backdrop of different underlying justice principles. The Government’s 
perspective was based on an understanding of a hierarchy of needs according to which 
those in need of flexibility to meet their care responsibilities are considered more 
deserving of government support than those who want time off to play golf or attend a 
flower arranging course. The campaign was initiated to support parents in combining 
employment and family life. Employers on the other hand were primarily concerned 
with the justice principles prevalent within their organisations, in which the 
preferential treatment of some groups of employees over others on the basis of need, 
rather than merit, could be perceived as unfair and lead to tensions. A key motive for 
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an inclusive approach was to avoid ‘work-family backlash’, that is resentment among 
colleagues about parents being entitled to family-friendly working practices when they 
are not (see for example Young 1999). Overall, the business-case for flexibility, rather 
than individual need, was considered the key determining factor for provision (Int. UK 
16, 04/10/2006).  
Although it was not the initial objective of the campaign to take a wide coverage, a 
more inclusive approach was recognised to serve the flexibility needs of other 
government policy constituents, notably carers, disabled employees, and jobseekers, 
who were not currently in employment due to their care responsibility or own 
disability (DfEE 2000a p.4). In her address to the House of Commons on 9th March 
2000, when the campaign was launched, Margaret Hodge, explained that the term 
‘work-life’ was to replace the term ‘family-friendly’, which was too strongly 
associated with women and young children. Instead, the Government aimed to 
‘respond to the needs of carers, as well as parents, and everyone who wants a life’ – a 
broad objective better captured by the term work-life balance (HC Deb 09 March 2000 
vol 345 c236WH). 
In Germany, the political discourse very much emphasised the need for family-
friendliness. The policy objective of the Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Renate 
Schmidt, was to move ‘the family’ to the centre of societal and political debates. 
Family policy from 2002 onwards was driven by clearly pronounced pronatalist 
arguments. A key line of argumentation was that a more family-friendly environment, 
both at work and outside work, is needed to encourage more people to become parents. 
A central aim of the Alliance for the Family was to promote culture change to facilitate 
the reconciliation of work and family life (BMFSFJ and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003 
p.5). While the emphasis in policy discourse was laid on the ‘family’, not parents in 
particular, parents were clearly the main beneficiaries of the measures promoted in the 
information and guidance materials (see Prognos AG 2003; BMFSFJ 2004d). 
In comparison, the Work-Life Balance Campaign has a wider breadth of coverage than 
the Alliance for the Family by explicitly targeting ‘everyone’ and not reducing the 
work-life balance debate to family responsibilities. Along this dimension the British 
campaign is more empowering.  
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2. Precision of targeting 
The question of how precisely a policy is targeted investigates whether beneficiaries 
are directly addressed by a policy measure or whether these are indirectly targeted via 
intermediary actors, such as employers or interest groups. Both campaigns were 
primarily directed at employers rather than employees with the aim to address the 
problem of insufficient family-friendly working time practice. The purpose of the 
respective campaigns was to motivate employers to accommodate the working time 
needs and preferences of their employees. A central strategy common to both 
approaches was the strategic alliance formation with intermediary actors to help 
communicate and spread the message to employers. However, the choice of alliance 
partners differed significantly between the two countries. The British Government 
sought to cooperate with organisations that were already offering work-life balance 
policies to accommodate the time needs of their employees, and were leading by good 
example. While a broad range of work-life balance experts were invited to advise the 
Minister on work-life balance, the Ministerial Advisory Committee had a consultative 
function but not the explicit purpose of communicating best practice beyond 
government. The Alliance for the Family encompassed a wide range of actors who 
committed to promote family-friendliness within their spheres of influence. German 
policy makers approached central employer and business organisations and trade 
unions as well as individual employers to join the Alliance. It also included 
foundations and academics. In the following, both approaches are analysed in turn. 
The Work-Life Balance Campaign in the UK was mainly targeted at employers ‘with 
the aim of raising awareness of the benefits of work-life balance and spread good 
practice in this area’ (Johnson 2001). In the first phase of the campaign, government 
publications and publicity were also directed at the general public and addressed 
employees directly, providing advice about how to request flexible working patterns. 
One of the first government publications under the campaign, the Essential guide to 
work-life balance published in 2001 was specifically targeted at employees and at 
people who were not currently in work but interested in entering or re-entering the 
labour market (DTI 2001c). A website on work-life balance was created by the DfEE 
providing information, advice and guidance for employers, employees and jobseekers 
(DfEE 2000a p. 29). Most of the information, advice and guidance materials published 
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as part of the campaign targeted employers, disseminating best practice case studies 
and providing advice to employers on how to set up policies and working practices 
which enable their employees to achieve a better work-life balance (DfEE 2000c). The 
guide for employers The Business-case. Your Business can’t afford to miss it provided 
information about the benefits of work-life balance and the costs of ignoring it through 
a number of case studies (DTI 2001a). Although the guide for employees was reprinted 
in 2002, no further materials providing information and advice for employees were 
produced under the Work-Life Balance Campaign. This was in part due to the growing 
focus on the development of the Right to Request from 2001 onwards, which was 
supported through information materials on how to make a request under the 
employment right from 2003 onwards (DTI 2004e). Another explanation is the 
relocation of the campaign from the Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE), where the Work-Life Balance Campaign was initially developed within the 
context of the childcare strategy and with the needs of parents and children in mind, to 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which placed a stronger focus on 
productivity and competitiveness. The incorporation of the campaign into the DTI’s 
wider policy agenda may have contributed to a stronger employer orientation. 
In effect, when the campaign moved to the DTI after the general elections in 2001 
there was a shift in emphasis of government communication as work-life balance was 
incorporated into the DTI’s theme of Achieving best practice in your business37 (Int. 
UK 09, 11/01/2006). Information materials published by the DTI were henceforth 
framed more explicitly as support tools to increase business performance and were 
targeted at employers (DTI 2004a; 2004b). A few information materials were targeted 
at specific industrial sectors, such as the hospitality industry (DTI 2001b; 2002d), the 
construction industry (DTI) and the IT sector (DTI 2004f; 2004d). 
The move to DTI also had the effect of conceptualising work-life balance more 
strongly in terms of employment relations, which, as a policy field, was also under the 
responsibility of the DTI (Int. UK 01, 25/07/2005). While trade unions were 
represented on the Advisory Committee and provided expertise and case studies for the 
                                                 
37 In DTI publications, ‘Achieving best practice in your business’ was described as a ‘key theme within 
DTI’s approach to business support, providing ideas and insights into how to improve performance 
across your business. By showing what works in other businesses, we can help you see which 
approaches can help you, and support you in implementation’ (DTI 2004b). 
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campaign at the DfEE, they were not explicitly targeted with information, advice and 
guidance as to their role of negotiators of flexible working or support providers to 
employees. At the DTI, trade unions were more explicitly incorporated, albeit to a far 
lesser extent than employers. In April 2002, Alan Johnson gave recognition to the 
contribution of the TUC by speaking at the launch of the TUC’s Changing Times 
Website and training courses on work-life balance (Johnson 2002). In 2004, the case 
study report on Flexible Working in 2004 stated that it that was directed at: 
All employers who want to retain and recruit quality staff and employer and 
employee representatives, including trade unions, who advise employers 
willing to look past the traditional way of doing things in order to maximise the 
potential of their businesses (DTI 2004b).  
Furthermore, the DTI initiated a partnership project with the CBI and the TUC on long 
working hours leading to the jointly published report Managing Change in 2005  
presenting nine ‘top tips’ on introducing change as well as case studies (DTI et al. 
2005).  
Not all government communications were directly targeted at employees and 
employers. Intermediary actors played an important role in the Work-Life Balance 
Campaign, both in an advisory and consultative function to Government in the policy 
formulation process, and as promoters of work-life balance to the employer 
community in policy implementation. A number of employer organisations, trade 
unions and family groups were represented on the Ministerial Advisory Committee 
whose role was to advise Government (see Appendix D for full membership). Through 
the committee, policy makers were informed about ongoing projects, which were in 
turn promoted and publicised through government publications (see for example DfEE 
2000a). The Government and TSB Lloyds co-sponsored the Employer of the Year 
Award by the family group Parents at Work. The Caring about Carers award was 
developed in cooperation with the three leading carers’ charities (Carers National 
Association, Princess Royal Trust for Carers and Crossroads Caring for Carers) to give 
recognition to employers who deal sensitively with the needs of carers (DfEE 2000a 
pp. 27-28).  
When the campaign was set up by the DfEE, cooperation with individual employers 
rather than their representative organisation was sought by policy makers as they 
formed an alliance with the employer group Employers for Work-Life Balance. As 
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‘best practice’ employers they could convincingly communicate the benefits of work-
life balance practices, which they were experiencing in their organisations, share their 
experiences and lead by example. Employers for Work-Life Balance represented an 
important communication channel to employers. The strategic cooperation with 
businesses provided the DfEE not only with direct access to best practice case studies 
and business insight, but importantly with a credible communicator of the business-
case message: employers themselves. This clearly emerged from the interviews:  
The credibility is usually employer to employer. That is not to say that 
Government don't have credibility but government use government language, 
government report on and measure the things that are important to Government. 
Business talks in business language. Business readily understands each other... 
Business leaders will respect the voices of successful business leaders. And that 
is what we had in the alliance (Int. UK 16, 04/10/2006).  
I also think the relationship between Government and employers, and having 
Government and employers saying the same thing, and agreeing and standing 
on the same platform, jointly, and saying this is a good idea, that is quite 
powerful (Int. UK 02, 21/09/2005).  
Employers for Work-Life Balance committed to promoting work-life balance by 
disseminating best-practice case studies and guidance on how to implement work-life 
policies. Concrete activities announced in Changing Patterns included publishing case 
studies to show the positive effect of work-life policies on their organisations, setting 
up a website and helpline for employers, run practical seminars across the country and 
develop a voluntary standard on work-life balance. Between July and November 2000, 
Employers for Work-Life Balance hosted eight practical regional seminars which were 
presented by the family organisation Parents at Work (DfEE 2000b). 
Government, in their function of a public sector employer, supported the campaign by 
leading by good example. The Changing Patterns document stated: ‘one of the most 
effective levers for promoting cultural change is for the Government to lead by 
example as a provider of services’ (DfEE 2000a p.31). From April 2000 good practice 
on work-life balance was included in diversity action plans of all government 
departments and the improvement of work-life balance was included in the 
Modernising Government Agenda (DfEE 2000a). A Cross-Departmental Ministerial 
Group, chaired by Baroness Jay, was put in place to look at work-life balance in the 
public sector (health and local government sectors in a first step) and make 
recommendations. One outcome was the NHS Improved Working Lives Campaign 
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which encouraged NHS employers to introduce more flexible and family-friendly 
employment practices for all staff.  Let us now turn to consider the German targeting 
approach. 
In the German approach to alliance formation the underlying motives and the form of 
cooperation differed from the British case. Chapter Five showed that a key motive for 
establishment of an Alliance with societal partners was the shift from a state-centrist 
conceptualisation of family policy to a societal conceptualisation, which implied a 
division of labour between state and societal actors in the provision of money, time and 
services. The provision of ‘time’ fell under the responsibility of employers as the 
following quote by Family Minister Renate Schmidt illustrates:  
If we want that more children are again born in Germany, we need a family-
friendly corporate policy. No parent, no lone mother, envisage to bring their 
child to a nursery straight after birth and pick it up at age 18 from a full-day 
school, equipped with the previously agreed attributes. Children need time with 
their parents and parents want to spend time with their children. Time is the 
magic word for a successful family life. Here, we call upon companies to 
develop an innovative working culture, which is also in their very own business 
interest (Schmidt 2004b, author’s translation).  
Against the backdrop of the conceptualisation of the workplace as the primary arena 
for time provision, the Government primarily targeted employers and their 
organisations, as well as trade unions, to participate in the Alliance for the Family. By 
mobilising the social partners, the campaign specifically addressed actors who were 
not traditionally associated with family policy. The key family organisations, for 
instance, were not asked to be part of the Alliance as they already maintained close 
working ties with the BMFSFJ and were not a strategic lever for change at the 
workplace level (Int. DE 14 28/09/2006). The BMFSFJ strategically sought to 
mobilise the social partners as intermediary actors who were well placed to reach out 
to individual employers and trade unions. In contrast to the British alliance with 
Employers for Work-Life Balance, the German approach was to gain the support of the 
influential central employer and business organisations and trade unions in order to 
move family policy from the margins to the centre of socio-political debate. An 
important ideational and financial partner was found in the Bertelsmann Foundation. 
Family Minster Renate Schmidt and Liz Mohn, vice-chair of the Bertelsmann 
Foundation, jointly launched the Alliance for the Family in 2003. In cooperation with 
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the Ministry, the Bertelsmann Foundation initiated the project Balance von Familie 
und Arbeitswelt, which produced a number of publications and an internet portal 
providing advice for small and medium-sized businesses to become more family-
friendly (www.mittelstand-und-familie.de).  
Intermediary actors were mobilised at the national as well as the local level. At the 
national level, a high-profile ‘impulse group’ was set up with the presidents of the 
central employer and trade union organisations, the Bertelsmann Foundation, 
academics and employers with the task to publicise family-friendliness within their 
respective spheres of influence and provide the campaign with a high profile, attract 
media interest, and public attention (Schmidt and Mohn 2004). ‘The implementation of 
more family-friendliness’, as Renate Schmidt stated in a speech at a management 
seminar in Munich in March 2004, ‘must primarily occur in a decentralised way’ 
(Schmidt 2004b). Therefore, she launched, together with the president of the German 
Association of Chambers of Commerce, Ludwig Georg Braun, the initiative ‘Local 
Alliances for the Family’ in January 2004.  
The aim of the Local Alliances for the Family initiative was broadly ‘to improve the 
concrete living conditions of families’ (Schmidt and Mohn 2004 p. 179) by 
strengthening family-friendly structures at the local level with the help of all societal 
and political groups, and to connect and expand existing initiatives (BMFSFJ 2006d). 
It aimed to support communes, companies, churches, associations, organisations, trade 
unions, chambers of commerce, charities, families and other local actors in their 
cooperation through local alliances, according to the principle that 'unusual 
partnerships enable unusual solutions' (BMFSFJ 2006c). A separate board of trustees 
was set up to support the initiative, including both national and local actors. The Local 
Alliances for the Family initiative is an example of very indirect targeting. The 
Government acted as facilitator on the formation of new alliances by providing help 
with their set up through the provision of free information, advice and support through 
a service point. Further, it facilitated networking between the local alliances, creating a 
platform for contact and the exchange of ideas and mutual learning. While help on 
organisation and procedural aspects was provided, the Government did not give any 
direction on the actual content or objectives of the projects initiated by local alliances.  
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In Germany, family-friendly working was more strongly conceptualised as an 
employment relations issue in which the role of employee representatives was more 
explicitly addressed than in the UK. Firstly, the presidents of the German Trade Union 
Association (DGB), Michael Sommer, and of the Mining, Chemical and Energy 
Industrial Union (IG BCE), Hubertus Schmoldt, were asked to participate in the 
Alliance. In 2005 two publications were produced, one overview of good practice in 
collective agreements and works agreements (Flüter-Hoffmann 2005) and one 
guidebook were targeted at employee representatives (BMFSFJ 2005a). Individual 
employees, however, were not directly targeted by Alliance publications. 
Both the British and German governments strategically used alliances with employers 
to promote flexible working time arrangements, frame the benefits of family-friendly 
working in business language and maximise employer attention through the use of 
credible transportation channels. A key difference between the two approaches, 
however, was that the UK Government formed an alliance with best practice 
employers rather than their interest organisations, whereas in Germany the Alliance for 
the Family specifically targeted the central business and employer organisations and 
trade unions. Different types of actors were targeted for cooperation, based on different 
underlying motivations. While British policy makers sought to promote best practice 
with the help of a group of employers leading by example, the German alliance with 
societal partners was driven by the motivation to gain broad societal support for 
families, which was reflected by the choice of influential alliance partners in the 
business world and civil society who were not traditionally associated with family 
policy. These partners were persuaded to cooperate with reference to the long-term 
economic and social implications of demographic change caused by falling birth rates 
within the family-unsupportive environment of German society in general and 
workplaces in particular.  
Although both governments cooperated with a wide array of societal actors including 
charities, academics, interest organisations, academics, employers and local 
government, they instrumentalised these cooperative relationships in different ways. In 
the British context, the DfEE united expertise on work-life balance in a Ministerial 
Advisory Committee with the main purpose of information exchange. In Germany 
however, actors were expected to commit to promoting family-friendly working within 
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their respective spheres of influence. While the DfEE brought together actors on the 
basis that they were already promoting work-life balance, German policy makers 
deliberately targeted influential actors who had not previously been known as active 
promoters of the family-friendly cause and it was part of the policy strategy to win 
them as new powerful allies (Int. DE 09 12/07/2006; Int. DE14 28/09/2006). Overall, 
both campaigns focused on employers and included employee representatives more 
marginally. They were more explicitly included in the German campaign than in the 
British one. The British campaign did address employees directly in the early years of 
the campaign, but less so after the campaign moved to the DTI. In Germany, 
employees were only indirectly targeted via their representative organisations. With 
the main focus on employers and their representatives in both campaigns, the precision 
of targeting is low in both countries, implying a low degree of empowerment for 
employees. The next section addresses the degree of employee control over working 
time flexibility. 
3. The scope of employee control over working time flexibility 
The degree of employee control over working time flexibility is a central question 
regarding the balance of power between employees and their employers. Information-
based instruments can empower employees through the transfer of information, know-
how and skills. Knowledge about the different forms of family-friendly working time 
arrangements, their benefits and practical knowledge on how work patterns can be 
redesigned to accommodate the time needs of both employees and businesses are an 
important advantage for employees wanting to negotiate a change in working patterns 
with their employer. Similarly, an ‘enlightened’ employer with the knowledge and 
know-how of family-friendly working might be more likely to agree to such changes, 
to be able to accommodate them, or even to offer them without being prompted by 
employee demand. In as far as information instruments can ‘empower’ employees they 
do so through the provision of knowledge, advice and guidance rather than 
entitlements in law. They can inform about the different forms of flexibility and their 
advantages, and provide know-how regarding their negotiation and implementation.  
The range of tools that were employed by both German and British policy makers to 
inform and advise spans across information brochures, publicity through the media, 
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conferences and seminars, websites, guidebooks, help lines, and consultancy services. 
These tools aimed to address one or more of the three barriers to provision discussed in 
Chapter Two: information was provided to increase awareness of work-life balance 
and family-friendly working practices, to increase the willingness of employers to 
introduce them by publicising the benefits and spreading examples of good practice, 
and finally to increase the ability of employers to introduce such measures by 
providing relevant know-how and support. Neither campaign can be said to have 
explicitly addressed the cognitive barriers to family-friendly working that exist on the 
employee side. Media coverage contributed to increase public visibility of the issue 
and to raise awareness of work-life balance and family-friendly employment measures 
among employees as well as employers. No explicit guidance, however, was provided 
regarding the negotiation of flexible working patterns with the employer, with the 
notable exception of one employee guide printed in the early years of the Work-Life 
Balance Campaign (DTI 2001c). The majority of information, guidance and know-how 
were targeted at employers.    
An interesting similarity between the two campaigns is the apparent underlying 
assumption that employers’ behaviour, rather than that of employees, has to change. 
The fact that employees want to work more flexibly seemed a given, supported by 
according survey data on working time preferences (see Chapter Two). This 
assumption contributed to the problem definition driving the information campaigns 
that there was a general employee need for flexible working arrangements. Similarly, 
there was an understanding by policy makers in both countries that there was 
insufficient provision by employers. Both campaigns therefore targeted employers 
rather than employees in an attempt to motivate them to provide. Low and female-
biased take up of flexible working patterns and its causes, on the other hand, were only 
marginally addressed (Palmer 2004). There appeared to be the latent assumption that 
once employee-oriented flexibility is offered, employees will gladly take up such 
arrangements helping them to balance their work with family and private life. In line 
with this targeting bias, policy tools to increase the awareness, willingness and ability 
to introduce flexible working time arrangements were developed to address employer 
ignorance, unwillingness and lacking know-how rather than employee’s lack of 
knowledge, fear of career penalty, and lack of confidence in negotiating time needs 
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with the employer. In the following, two initiatives providing employers with hands-
one support with the implementation of flexible working options are compared. 
In the UK, free and customised advice to employers willing to introduce work-life 
balance practices in their organisations was provided through the Work-life Balance 
Challenge Fund. Employers from the private, public and voluntary sectors in England 
and Scotland38 were invited to apply for funds to support the design and 
implementation of work-life balance projects (DfEE 2001; DTI 2002c; 2003). 448 
successful applications resulted from five applications rounds between 2000 and 2004. 
Challenge fund projects ran over 12 months. The successful applicants received 
customised advice from consultants39 to help them develop and implement work-life 
balance policies and practices through customised projects. From 2002 onwards, 
special solution toolkits which were developed on the basis of knowledge gained 
during the first three rounds of the Challenge Fund were offered to employers. They 
included a work-life balance pack for HR specialists, a diagnostic and implementation 
toolkit, policy development and implementation guidelines, advice on developing 
management skills to promote work-life balance and to remove cultural blocks to 
change (for details on the Challenge Fund Process, see Nelson et al. 2004). All 
challenge fund projects were required to measure financial savings, reductions in 
absenteeism, staff retention levels and the take-up of work-life balance options by 
staff. This information was intended to generate concrete data on the business-case for 
work-life balance to be fed into case studies and to be disseminated to other employers 
through a government-run website and brochures (DTI 2004b; DTI 2004f; Nelson et 
al. 2004).  
In Germany, hands-on advice for medium-sized employers was provided via an 
internet-based information portal (Mittelstand und Familie). Launched in June 2005, it 
was a joint initiative by the BMFSFJ and the Bertelsmann Foundation. It offers a 
‘virtual human resources department’ to small and medium sized businesses, providing 
support and advice around questions of work-family reconciliation 
(http://www.mittelstand-und-familie.de). While it mainly addresses decision makers in 
medium sized businesses, it also provides information for employees and works 
                                                 
38 A separate fund was set up by the National Assembly for Wales for projects in Wales (DfEE 2000a). 
39 In 2000, the DfEE outsourced the consultancy service to PricewaterhouseCoopers (Nelson et al. 2004 
pp. 14-19)  
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councillors, and more generally to experts in the field. In particular, the service 
consists of three components: ‘Solutions’, ‘Acadamy’, and ‘Infoline’. ‘Solutions’ 
describes possible solutions to work-family reconciliation problems in the areas of 
childcare and working time, tailored to the needs of small and medium-sized 
employers with step-by-step advice on implementation supported by working materials 
such as questionnaires and check lists. Support is organized around different themes 
such as pregnancy, parental leave or the care for dependent relatives. In the ‘Academy’ 
section, employers can access basic information on work and family, including 
articles, studies and book reviews. This is complemented by different materials for 
download, such as presentation slides, the latest research as well as the possibility of 
participating in telephone conferences with experts in the field. The ‘Infoline’ provides 
a free consultancy hotline for decision makers complementing the internet based 
service: employers have the possibility to directly speak with experts providing 
comprehensive advice and information.  
Both the British and German campaigns placed emphasis on information, advice and 
guidance on increasing the provision of employee-oriented flexibility. These where 
however primarily provided for employers rather than employees, encouraging the 
unilateral provision of family-friendly working time options rather than joint 
negotiation of change. In contrast to the employment rights discussed in Chapter Six, 
where employees were encouraged to initiate change, the information campaigns 
focused on motivating and enabling employers to pursue good practice in work-life 
balance and family-friendliness. To the small extent that guidance was directed at 
employees, the British employee guide addressed individual employees and job 
seekers, whereas information materials in Germany were addressed to employee 
representatives illustrating good practice in collective agreements and works 
agreements.   
If policy efforts to change the attitudes of employers are successful, then they benefit 
employees. Supportive employers and a family-friendly workplace culture may 
encourage more employees to request the working patterns that suit their individual 
circumstances, and to have these requests accepted. However, neither campaign placed 
emphasis on empowering employees through government-provided guidance and 
hands-on support on how to negotiate change with their employer. The information 
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campaigns therefore did not attempt to shift the power balance between employees and 
employers. Employers remain in control over flexibility and it is up to their good will 
to take employee needs into account. In terms of employee control over working time 
flexibility both campaigns therefore fare low. A similar situation evolves regarding the 
issue of enforceability of employee preferences. 
4. Enforceability 
Information based instruments cannot coerce, nor sanction to enforce, compliance with 
the policy intended behaviour. Rather, information instruments rely on persuasion 
techniques such as reasoned arguments and positive incentives to induce behaviour 
change voluntarily by changing attitudes towards family-friendly working 
arrangements. A key feature of information campaigns, and distinguishing aspect from 
regulatory instruments, is that they aim to incite voluntary behaviour change. There are 
a variety of methods of persuasion employed ranging from case studies, research 
findings, competitions, certificates and publicity. Having discussed the conditions of 
awareness and ability to provide in the previous section, this section considers how the 
two campaigns addressed the question of willingness.  
A key strategy pursued by both governments was to demonstrate the business-case for 
work-life balance and family-friendly working patterns. Central to this approach was 
to frame work-life balance and family-friendliness in business terms, in a language that 
was relevant to employers, and to highlight the impact of employee-oriented flexibility 
on the bottom line. The key benefits which were highlighted were improved 
recruitment and retention rates, and reduced absenteeism. To demonstrate the business-
case to employers, the UK relied primarily on business testimonials. These were case 
studies of companies that had positively experienced the introduction of work-life 
balance policies and reported the savings they made (Bevan et al. 1999; DTI 2001a; 
2004f). The German approach was different. Although company case studies of good 
practice were also used, the key instrument ‘proving’ the business-case was 
government-commissioned research on the basis of ten medium-sized companies, in 
which the costs and benefits of family-friendly measures for parents of young children 
were modelled for the average medium-sized firm, and a 25 per cent positive return on 
investment was found (Prognos AG 2003).  
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The aim of the business-case argumentation was to appeal to the self-interest of 
employers. Both governments took care in framing family-friendliness not as an 
altruistic act towards employees in need but rather as an economically sensible 
investment in one’s workforce. The win-win effect was underlined: not only 
employees benefit but the business, and society as a whole, can win. This is illustrated 
by the following quote taken from Margaret Hodge’s speech in Parliament the day the 
campaign was launched: ‘These policies are not about altruism, but about sheer 
common sense and business interest’ (HC Deb 09 March 2000 vol 345 c236WH). 
A notable difference between the British and German argumentation was that the 
British business-case argumentation focused on the micro-level, whereas the German 
argumentation emphasised the macro-level implications of family-friendliness. In the 
UK, the benefits for individual employers and their bottom line formed the core of the 
business-case argumentation, supported by individual business testimonials, stories of 
improvements in recruitment and retention rates, reduced absenteeism and improved 
staff morale. In Germany, the emphasis in the argumentation was on the macro-
economic implications of demographic change, such as anticipated staff shortages, 
reduction in consumption, etc. The argument built was one that showed that negative 
economic implications of demographic trends could be counteracted by creating a 
more supportive environment for families (Bertram et al. 2005). Commissioned 
experts depicted that a more family-friendly society and world of work were necessary 
means to encourage more individuals to have children (Rürup and Gruescu 2003; 
Bertram et al. 2005). Research was further commissioned to calculate the micro- as 
well as macroeconomic positive economic and social returns on investments in family-
friendly employment policies (Prognos AG 2003; 2005) and public childcare services 
(Spieß 2002). Research by well-established academics supported the German 
Government’s message ‘Familie bringt Gewinn’ meaning ‘the family is profitable’ - 
with the aim of establishing family policy on the economically-oriented agenda of 
employers and their organisations. The governmental persuasion strategy was to 
highlight the ‘economic charm of the family’ (Schmidt 2004c). Alliance partners 
played an important role in underlining the credibility of this message. Research and 
publications were jointly commissioned and published with Alliance partners and 
jointly presented to the press (BMFSFJ 2004d; DIHK et al. 2004). The fact that 
presidents of the central business organisations stood on the same platform as the 
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Family minister, promoting the same objective, sent out a powerful signal (Int. DE 09, 
12/07/2006). 
Another strategy used by both governments was the use of positive public relations 
incentives. One instrument used to attract attention and provide non-monetary 
incentives to employers were awards and certificates. Employer competitions and 
family-friendly certificates were at once visible benchmarks, publicity generating 
events and means for employers to gain a competitive edge. Work-life balance and 
family-friendliness were marketed as a business trademark offering a competitive 
advantage in the competition for skilled labour and customers. This public relations 
incentive was stimulated through employer competitions and certificates. The British 
Government co-sponsored the Parents at Work Employers of the Year award. In 
cooperation with Investors in People, a national benchmark for good practice in work-
life balance was developed and launched as the Work Life Balance Model by Investors 
in People in 200340. In Germany, the BMFSFJ continued to run the employer 
competition for the most family-friendly employer, which had been first introduced in 
the early 1990s. Under Family Minister Renate Schmidt, the employer competition in 
2005 ran under the theme The Family: Factor of Success, and attracted 366 
applications from employers of all sizes and sectors (www.erfolgsfaktor-familie.de). 
The Alliance for the Family further promoted the berufundfamilie audit, which was 
developed in the late 1990s by the non-profit Hertie Foundation with the aim of 
promoting a family-conscious personnel policy in companies and institutions 
(berufundfamilie gGmbH, www.beruf-und-familie.de). In 2004, the audit was revised 
to attract more companies to apply for the certificate. The central business 
organisations DIHK, BDA, ZDH and BDI were involved in the new coordination 
committee and from 2004, the Federal Ministers for Family Affairs and the Economy 
took over the joint patronage taking turns in hosting the award ceremonies.  
The appeal to self-interest and competition was also used by German policy makers to 
persuade local actors to increase their commitment to family-friendliness. Advantages 
                                                 
40 The Work-Life Balance Model formed part of the wider Investors in People Standard, which is a 
national quality standard which sets a level of good practice for improving an organisation's 
performance through its people. It provides a framework for improving organisational performance and 
competitiveness through a planned approach to setting and communicating business objectives and 
developing people to meet these objectives. It was first introduced in 1991 and is administered by 
Investors in People UK www.investorsinpeople.co.uk  
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for communes and regions were highlighted, notably that family-friendliness could 
counteract the out-migration of young employees which is a problem in many parts of 
East Germany. A family-friendly infrastructure was said to increase the attractiveness 
of a commune as a location for economic development (Beck 2004; BMFSFJ 2006a). 
Similar to the positive public relations effects for employers who strive to be ‘an 
employer of choice’, communes, towns, and Länder were incited to strive to be the 
most family-friendly. Peer pressure and benchmarking were promoted through the 
publication of the Familienatlas, published in January 2005, which mapped out the 
more and less family-friendly areas in the country (BMFSFJ 2005b; Schmidt 2005b). 
Within this spirit, the ‘Red-Green’ Government set itself the ambitious goal of 
establishing Germany as the most family-friendly country in Europe (Schmidt 2005a). 
In the absence of the power to coerce compliance through law and impose sanctions 
for non-compliance, information based instruments have to rely on voluntary 
compliance. There are many similarities in the persuasion strategies pursued by the 
British and German governments, notably the construction of a business-case for 
work-life balance and family-friendly working and the promotion of benchmarking 
and peer-pressure through competitions and certificates that promise a competitive 
edge in public relations and positive publicity. The comparison revealed differences in 
the way the business-case was demonstrated. The UK relied primarily on best practice 
case studies and employer testimonials, while the German campaign referred to 
economic research which calculated a positive return on investments in family-friendly 
employment measures. Overall, the German approach emphasized the macro-
economic and social benefits while in the British case the benefits to individual 
employers were highlighted. These efforts, whether appealing to self-interest or good 
will, remain fully dependent on the voluntary action of employers. Employees have no 
means of enforcing their working time preferences other than attempting to persuade 
their employers of the business-case themselves. Guidance on how to do this, as 
discussed in the previous section, was not directly provided to them by the two 
campaigns. In terms of enforceability, therefore, both campaigns fare low on the 
degree of empowerment. Let us now turn to consider how the opportunity costs 
attached to work-life balance and family-friendly working were addressed by the two 
campaigns.  
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5. Opportunity costs 
Statutory regulation can rule out less favourable treatment and discrimination as a 
result of requesting flexible working hours (Chapter Six). Economic instruments can 
compensate the financial loss following a reduction in working hours (Bertram et al. 
2005). Information-based instruments, in turn, can play an important role in tackling 
prejudice against family-friendly working arrangements, which can lead to less 
favourable treatment by employers, as well as reluctance by employees to work 
flexible hours. Examples of policy interventions aiming to reduce the opportunity costs 
of flexible working patterns in the context of information campaigns are attempts to 
change attitudes through persuasion and to increase the acceptability of work-life 
balance and family-friendly working patterns such as part-time employment (DfEE 
2000a; BMFSFJ and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003).  
It can be argued that by promoting an inclusive approach to work-life balance, the 
British campaign worked towards diversifying the risk of disadvantage by 
mainstreaming family-friendly working, divorcing flexible working patterns from care 
status. If flexible working is available to anyone, it may progressively become 
disassociated from working parents, reducing the risk especially for women to 
experience discrimination in the workplace on the basis of their assumed or anticipated 
care responsibilities. Risk diversification with regard to gender role assumptions would 
however require a substantial amount of men to actually change their working patterns. 
Neither of the campaigns pro-actively encouraged men to take up flexible working 
options. In Germany, the relative absence of equal opportunities concern in the 
Alliance for the Family communications is all the more apparent when compared to the 
efforts to encourage fathers to work flexibly and share in parental care which were 
made under the leadership of Christine Bergmann between 1998 and 2002 through 
both an information campaign directed at fathers and an employer competition 
focusing on father-friendly policies in 2000. The discourse from 2002 onwards no 
longer expounds the problems of the gendered differences in the division of care.  
The problem of women’s relative discrimination on the basis of gender role 
assumptions contributes to the attitudinal barriers to flexible working. However, even 
if men and women made equal use of flexible working patterns, this does not per se 
reduce the opportunity costs associated with part-time employment versus full-time 
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employment in terms of financial remuneration and career progression. An important 
signal here is the attempt to divorce employee competence and commitment from 
working patterns, in other words to address the prejudice that part-time employees are 
less committed to their jobs (Harrington 1999). Another barrier is the prevailing 
attitude that management positions require very long hours and cannot be subject to 
job-sharing. Employees in management positions are often required to work very long 
hours, effectively barring them from accessing family-friendly working patterns 
(Chapter Two) and in turn barring employees working reduced hours from accessing 
these management positions. A core barrier to family-friendly working in positions of 
responsibility is the prevailing longs hours working culture (Sheridan 2004; TUC and 
Working Families 2004).  
The two campaigns addressed these problems only marginally. One of the principles of 
good practice in work-life balance that were defined in the discussion document 
Changing Patterns, for example, was to ‘value employees for their contribution to the 
business, not their working pattern’ (DfEE 2000a p.4). While the problem of Britain’s 
long hours working culture was addressed in campaigns by trade unions, notably the 
TUC’s It’s About Time campaign, the British Government sent out conflicting signals 
in this respect by maintaining the opt-out from the 48 hours ceiling in the statutory 
working time regulations on the one hand, and promoting voluntary solutions on the 
other hand (DTI et al. 2005). In Germany, the issue of long hours working was not 
explicitly addressed in the policy debate. However, one of the guide books published 
by the BMFSFJ specifically addressed the question of family-friendly working in 
management positions (BMFSFJ 2004e). On the whole, neither campaign explicitly 
addressed the opportunity costs of flexible working for the employees as the emphasis 
was firstly on addressing the costs for employers and attempting to offset them by 
emphasising the benefits in the cost-benefit calculations in order to construct a 
business-case. For the sake of persuasiveness, the positive scenario of a win-win 
situation was painted, in which there was no place for a critical evaluation of possible 
negative side effects of employee-oriented flexible working.  
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The empowering potential of information campaigns 
Overall, the British and German approaches shared many similarities in their use of 
information instruments to promote family-friendly working time arrangements. Both 
campaigns aimed for more widespread availability of family-friendly arrangements by 
motivating employers to provide. The strategy pursued in both cases was to convince 
employers of the business-case for work-life balance and family-friendly working, 
which was constructed as a ‘win-win, or even ‘win-win-win’ scenario, in which not 
only employees, but employers and society as a whole would benefit. Both 
governments sought allies in the business community who could credibly 
communicate this message to employers. Similar was also the use of communication 
tools such as web information portals, information brochures, guidebooks and 
consultancy services as well as seminars and conferences. Information, advice, and 
know-how were targeted primarily at employers and only to a marginal degree at 
employees themselves or their representatives. Similar incentives for employers were 
provided through competitions and certificates promising a competitive edge and good 
public relations publicity. The impulse for provision was expected from the employer 
who was to be encouraged to voluntarily improve the work-life balance of employees, 
or in Germany, the family-friendliness of the work environment.  
In spite of the many similarities, a number of cross-national differences in policy 
design were revealed in the policy discussion. For instance, the Work-Life Balance 
Campaign covered all employees, going explicitly beyond the family-friendly 
provisions which were the focus of the Alliance for the Family. The two approaches 
further differed in the choice of alliance partners. With Employers for Work-Life 
Balance, Margaret Hodge chose to cooperate with a group of best practice employers 
whereas the German Family Minister sought the cooperation of the central business 
and employer associations, trade unions and social foundations, and academics as well 
as individual employers. Both campaigns relied on the business-case for work-life 
balance and family-friendly working arrangements but chose different strategies of 
demonstrating it. In the British case, the business-case was communicated through 
employer testimonials and business-case studies, whereas the German approach relied 
on research findings calculating the return on investment in family-friendly measures. 
The British approach emphasised further the micro-economic benefits to the individual 
Chapter 7 
 
226 
 
employer whereas the emphasis in Germany was laid on the macro-economic benefits 
for the German economy overall. To the degree that information and know-how were 
addressed at employees, communication in Britain addressed employees directly 
whereas in Germany information was provided to works councils and trade unionists 
disseminating best practice in collective and works agreements.  
In terms of their relative empowering potential, both information campaigns fared 
poorly when analysed against the five Empowerment Criteria. The low empowering 
potential was accentuated by the fact that both campaigns were indirectly targeted, 
targeting employers via intermediary actors. Intermediary actors have a dual role in the 
transportation of information: they can act as multipliers through which the targeting 
of communication becomes more efficient and spreads more widely. But they can also 
act as ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis 2002), blocking communication or reducing both 
outreach and visibility of information. Coverage and targeting are inter-dependent. 
Intermediary actors are more likely to act as multipliers, not veto-players, if their 
constituents are beneficiaries of a policy. Nevertheless, indirectly targeted information 
instruments are less likely to reach those intended to benefit from them than directly 
targeted ones. Imprecise targeting can affect coverage in so far that by relying on 
intermediary actors to channel information, government has less control over whether 
a policy measure reaches those intended. Thus, although the beneficiaries of the 
campaigns are widely defined, how many of them are likely to benefit from the 
campaigns is uncertain. This can undermine the principally empowering effect of a 
universal, inclusive approach of the British Work-Life Balance Campaign which 
promoted flexible working time arrangements for everyone, irrespective of care status. 
In this respect its empowering potential was higher than the German campaign, which 
framed flexibility more firmly by family-related time needs.  
Due to the focus on voluntary provision by employers, the balance of control over 
working time flexibility was not intended to shift in the employees’ favour. Employees 
continue to depend on the good will of their employers. Employees were only 
marginally provided with relevant information and know-how to assist them in 
negotiating change with their employer. The opportunity costs associated with flexible 
working patterns were not explicitly addressed as both campaigns focused on 
emphasising the benefits of flexible working. The main empowerment trade-off in both 
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campaigns is that while in principle flexibility is advocated widely for all working 
parents needing it parents are not empowered to negotiate their time needs with 
employers. The uncertain benefit of increased voluntary provision by persuaded 
employers, which might benefit some working parents, is very imprecisely targeted. 
The power balance between employees and employers is not shifted by government 
intervention.  
Having explored cross-national similarities and variation at the level of policy design, 
the remainder of this chapter will consider why the design of the German and British 
campaigns differed in the ways identified.  
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II. Explaining variation in policy design 
Both information campaigns aimed to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family 
responsibilities by promoting flexible working arrangements. The fact that the British 
campaign, which was originally planned as a family-friendly employment campaign 
(Home Office 1998), was eventually called the Work-Life Balance Campaign was due 
to the preference of Employers for Work-Life Balance, whose own business policy did 
not differentiate by care status (Int. UK 09, 11/01/2006; Int. UK 06, 14/12/2005; Int. 
UK 16, 04/10/2006). Whereas the UK Government’s priority target group were 
individuals who needed help balancing work and care responsibilities (Home Office 
1998), employers were motivated by the business-case for work-life balance, which 
was not restricted to work-family reconciliation (DfEE 2000a). Selective provision by 
care status could even cause resentment among employees without care 
responsibilities, leading to undesired tensions in the workforce (Int. UK 07, 
15/12/2005). An inclusive policy accommodating the diverse reasons for which 
employees wish to work flexibly was what many of these best practice organisations 
were practicing (Int. UK 16, 04/10/2006). The question of terminology represented a 
key issue in the negotiations of the terms of cooperation between Government and the 
employer group. It is a clear example of policy makers accommodating interest group 
demands in a relationship of inter-dependence. In order not to jeopardize the alliance, 
policy makers gave in to employer preferences regarding coverage. 
In Germany, coverage on the basis of care status was not a point of debate between the 
Government and interest groups. Rather, participation in the alliance was very much 
motivated by pronatalist objectives as family-friendliness was conceptualised as a 
solution to the demographic problem of falling birth rates and its anticipated economic 
implications. Due to the invoked socio-economic implications of demographic change, 
family-friendliness became an issue for the alliance partners, who were in the majority 
presidents of national interest groups rather than individual employers. They were 
concerned with macro-economic trends rather than workplace dynamics. In Germany, 
therefore, the campaign was framed by pronatalist concerns which focused coverage 
on the family, rather than ‘everyone’. A central purpose of the alliance was to promote 
a climate in which the decision to have children would be encouraged by the 
knowledge that childcare and employment could be successfully combined (BMFSFJ 
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and Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003). Variation in coverage can be explained by the 
different policy preferences by the different interest groups with which the two 
governments co-operated. This leads to the question of what led to the different 
choices of alliance partners in the first place?  
Why did German policy makers mobilise the social partners while British policy 
makers sought to cooperate with a group of individual organisations rather than their 
representative bodies? One possible explanation that immediately springs to mind is 
that this could be due to the different institutional set ups characterising the German 
and British employment relations systems (Chapter Two). In Germany, industrial 
relations are still more centralised than in the UK with employer organisations 
retaining a higher membership and a more influential position in collective bargaining 
than their British counterparts, who have gradually lost influence as collective 
bargaining is increasingly occurring in a decentralised way at the workplace level 
(Zagelmeyer 2004). Against this background, it appears plausible in the British context 
to target individual employers rather than employer organisations. Nevertheless, key 
employer and business organisations in the United Kingdom, such as the 
Confederation of British Industry or the Institute of Directors, represent influential 
voices on business matters which could have been powerful communication channels 
to promote work-life balance to the business community. They were not however 
mobilised to this purpose by policy makers. In the same vein, it was not an obvious 
choice to mobilise the central business organisations in Germany to promote family-
friendliness as family matters were hitherto not an issue that employer and business 
organisations were concerned with. If anything, following the hostile exchange on 
equal opportunities in previous years, relations between the BMFSFJ and employer 
and business groups were at a low point and cooperation seemed unlikely (Int. DE 10, 
12/07/2006). In this context, the Family Ministry’s approach to mobilise the support of 
these actors was against the odds. The strategy pursued was to attempt to gain their 
support precisely because they were not supporting the cause so far (Int. DE14, 
28/09/2006).  
In neither Britain nor Germany did the government departments in charge of 
developing the campaigns have long-established, institutionalised working ties with 
industry which would make cooperation plausible. The Work-Life Balance Campaign 
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in the UK was originally rooted in the childcare section of the DfEE rather than in the 
DTI. In Germany, the Alliance for the Family was initiated by the BMFSFJ rather than 
the Federal Ministry of Labour or the Federal Ministry of the Economy, which 
entertained close working ties with industry. Given historical ties with interest groups, 
therefore, cooperation with employer and industry associations was not an obvious 
choice. In Germany, however, the approach to form tripartite alliances to address 
socio-economic problems jointly with the social partners was pursued in other policy 
fields, notably in employment and training, which provided an institutional template. 
The ‘Red-Green’ Government had placed high hopes in the Alliance for Jobs in the 
late 1990s to address unemployment and training issues with the social partners. 
Renate Schmidt initially wanted to promote family policy through the Alliance for 
Jobs but then, when this tripartite body failed, she went on to set up a separate body to 
specifically promote family-friendliness (see Chapter Five). The central business and 
employer organisations which represented an influential national voice with economic 
authority represented important actors whose cooperation was needed to gain the 
desired attention and for family policy to be understood as an issue of central socio-
economic and political importance. The targeting of these organisational actors, then, 
can be interpreted as strategic alliance-seeking. 
The UK’s approach was to mobilise existing expertise, especially existing good 
practice, and to disseminate those examples to guide the way for other employers. 
Employer organisations who had to represent the diverse interests of their membership 
were not considered as apt for this purpose as best practice employers who were 
wholeheartedly promoting the benefits of work-life balance experienced in their 
organisations, unhampered by the need to balance between different membership 
views (Int. UK 16, 04/10/2006). A facilitating factor was that policy makers at the 
DfEE already had working ties with some of the employers who were to form 
Employers for Work-Life Balance. Organised in the group Employers for Childcare, 
they had lobbied the Government to provide public childcare services (Int. UK 16, 
04/10/2006). Some of these organisations proactively approached policy makers on the 
issue of family-friendly employment as the Government announced that it would 
develop policy in this area (Int. UK 02, 21/09/2005). Cooperation was in the interest of 
both sides, as there was a relationship of inter-dependence between policy makers and 
employers. Employers had an interest to participate in the government campaign as it 
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allowed them to influence the direction government policy was taking. If employers 
were seen to promote change voluntarily, the introduction of regulation could maybe 
be prevented (Int. UK 02, 21/09/2005). Government in turn was interested in 
cooperating with employers as these contributed expertise, credibility and resources to 
the policy initiative (Int. UK 02, 21/09/2005; Int. UK 16, 04/10/2006).  
Policy makers in the two countries sought different resources from their alliance 
partners. The British campaign, which focused on best practice promotion, sought to 
cooperate with best practice employers who would lead by example, and whose own 
experience with work-life balance policies could be used to provide guidance to other 
employers. Direct employer-to-employer communication was perceived to be a more 
credible source of advice than if it was coming from the Government (Int. UK 02, 
21/09/2005; Int. UK 16, 04/10/2006). Employers for Work-Life Balance provided the 
case studies based on their own experience. The dissemination of ‘best practice’ was 
the core policy objective of the campaign of which the underlying rationale is to show 
what others have done well. The publication of case studies was in line with the 
principle of best practice dissemination. In contrast, the German approach followed the 
rationale of making the issue of family-friendliness important, pushing it onto the 
agenda and moving it from the margin of socio-political debate to its core (Int. DE 09, 
12/07/2006). The resource which alliance partners could offer in the German context 
was their high societal profile, which would give a hitherto marginal policy issue a 
high socio-political and economic profile. The purpose of the high-profile impulse 
group of the Alliance for the Family was primarily promotional: to promote family-
friendliness at the national level and to their respective memberships.  
These different rationales are rooted in the relative functions of the two campaigns 
within the wider policy agendas. The Work-Life Balance Campaign emerged out of a 
subsection of the National Childcare Strategy which pointed to the role employers 
could play in facilitating work-family reconciliation. It was very much conceptualised 
as a policy tool that was complementing parallel policy developments, notably the 
expansion of childcare services and maternity rights with the clear purpose of 
promoting best practice in the workplace. The formation of the Alliance for the Family 
on the other hand stands for a profound reconceptualisation of family policy in 
Germany signalling a new policy approach under departmental leadership following 
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the general elections in 2002. Family policy was henceforth constructed as a ‘hard’ 
economic issue and the alliance with economic actors formed a central component of 
this new approach. Much of the discourse revolved around firmly establishing the 
economic argumentation in the discourse on family policy following the new credo: 
Familie bringt Gewinn (the family brings profit). Knowledge production therefore was 
intended to establish that investments in the family, notably in a comprehensive 
childcare infrastructure, would yield sound economic returns (Spieß 2002; Prognos AG 
2003; Rürup and Gruescu 2003; Bertram et al. 2005; Prognos AG 2005). A key pillar 
on which the new approach rested was the objective to address the implications of 
demographic change through pronatalist efforts. The Alliance for the Family therefore 
had a stronger political dimension than the British campaign with the purpose of 
constructing family policy as economic policy of which family-friendly employment 
practices are one pillar complemented by childcare services and financial transfers. Let 
us now turn to differences in the way employee-oriented flexibility was promoted.  
The emphasis of both campaigns was laid on attempting to persuade employers that 
family-friendliness or work-life balance was in their interest. An important cognitive 
influence on policy design was the underlying idea that business is not altruistic, and 
that in order to persuade an employer to be family-friendly one needs to speak business 
language, create a business-case. This approach is based on the rationalist assumption 
that employers are self-interested and that in order to maximise the likelihood of 
compliance, their self-interest rather than their corporate social responsibility needed to 
be appealed to. This is a perspective policy makers in both countries embraced. 
Variation in emphasis was that the British and German approaches placed different 
emphases regarding the benefits of work-life balance and family-friendly working 
practices. In Britain micro-economic benefits were emphasised whereas discourse in 
Germany focused heavily on the macro-economic benefits of family-friendliness. This 
difference can be well explained by considering the location of the respective 
campaigns within the wider policy context as well as the differences in government-
interest group relations.  
In the UK, the Work-Life Balance Campaign aimed to communicate the benefits of 
work-life balance to employers. To this purpose, the Government allied with a group 
of individual employers to share best practice. Both policy objective and available 
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resources revolve around the micro-economic benefits concerning the individual 
employer. There were disseminated through employer case studies and testimonials. In 
Germany, the strategy pursued by the BMFSFJ was to construct family-friendliness as 
an economic policy issue and to convince hitherto unconvinced economic actors, 
notably the presidents of the national employer and business organisations and trade 
unions that this was an issue relevant to them (Int. DE 09, 12/07/2006). The economic 
importance of family policy had to be both justified politically and to be persuasively 
communicated to alliance partners. The driving principle was to establish family-
friendliness as a hard economic issue. Objective scientific research served this 
objective better than employer testimonials as policy makers aimed to scientifically 
back up the economic argumentation they constructed. Cost-benefit calculations were 
used (Prognos AG 2003) (BMFSFJ 2004d). The political rather than problem-oriented 
strategy explains the focus on aspects of socio-political and macro-economic 
relevance, notably the consequences of demographic change on the national social 
security systems, the labour market, national competitiveness and growth and with less 
argumentative emphasis on the micro-economic relevance for individual organisations 
(Prognos AG 2005; BMFSFJ 2006a). 
Variation between the two campaigns is influenced by a confluence of factors. Two 
influences have emerged as particularly useful explanatory factors: the relative 
instrumental purpose of the campaigns within the two governments’ wider policy 
agendas on the one hand, and the different constellations of alliances formed with 
societal actors, which led to different emphases in policy design. In contrast to 
regulation based instruments discussed in Chapter Six, in the case of information 
campaigns, employer groups did not object, in the British case even favour, a wide 
coverage as no enforceable obligations to employers are associated with information 
campaigns. The choice of instrument type here per definition safeguards managerial 
control as change is subject to voluntary action. The key trade-off between a wide 
breadth of coverage and employee control over working time flexibility can be 
associated with the limits of empowering potential associated with information based 
instruments. 
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Conclusions 
In their attempt to stimulate the voluntary provision of employee-oriented flexible 
working time arrangements, both governments pursued a strategy of trying to convince 
employers that work-life balance, or family-friendliness, was in their very own 
business interest. The explanations of why this was so differed in detail, but in both 
cases constructed a positive business-case, a ‘win-win’ scenario. Both campaigns 
aimed to change employer attitudes and behaviour, which, as many scholars in the 
field argue is a key condition for change (Rapoport et al. 2002).   Employee demand 
was assumed to be a given. This assumption led policy makers to gloss over the 
cognitive barriers to requesting and using flexible working time options (Kodz et al. 
2002; Sheridan 2004). Opportunity costs to flexible working were neither 
acknowledged (everyone benefits!) nor for that matter addressed by the campaigns. If 
policy makers were aware of the opportunity costs and negative implications of 
family-friendly working patterns on equal opportunities between women and men 
(gender role differences remaining unchallenged) then these were omitted for the sake 
of constructing a ‘feel good’ message.  
The power of information based instruments relies on the ability to appeal and 
persuade as policy makers cannot take recourse to state authority and sanctions to 
achieve behaviour change. In a non-authoritative governing approach, interest group 
cooperation has to be won voluntarily, consensus has to be sought. Thus, the nature of 
government-interest group relations determines which issues are taken up, and which 
ones are deliberately contained as they could threaten consensus and the willingness of 
employers to cooperate. Both governments sought the cooperation of businesses as 
their resources and direct communication channels to employers were instrumental in 
attaining the campaign’s objectives. This created a dependence on alliance partners 
which provided these with considerable influence on policy design. This influence was 
not only expressed through successful bargaining (as illustrated by the terminology 
question in the British case) but from the outset shaped the overall orientation of policy 
design.  
The choice of alliance partners was guided by the overarching policy goals pursued by 
policy makers in the first place and an important source of variation was that the two 
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campaigns had different instrumental functions in the wider policy context. The Work-
Life Balance Campaign had the concrete purpose of promoting best practice in the 
workplace, whereas the Alliance for the Family constituted a core element in the 
overall conception of family policy from 2002 onwards, which emphasised a societal 
division of labour moving away from a statist approach to family support. In 
comparison, thus, the Work-Life Balance Campaign had a relatively more limited 
purpose of implementing the policy goal of best practice promotion than the Alliance 
for the Family, which had the function of establishing a new economically oriented 
family policy agenda.  
The comparison of the two in-depth case studies of regulatory instruments in Chapter 
Six and information-based instruments in this chapter has confirmed the argument 
made by theorists of instrument choice that different instrument categories have 
different characteristics, in this case ‘inherent’ empowerment potentials, which are 
determined by the government resources applied. For instance, regulation can provide 
sanctions to improve enforceability, whereas information instruments cannot enforce 
compliance but rely on the uncertain effects of persuasion (Vedung 2003). Regulation 
can be more precisely targeted at those intended to benefit from the policy than 
information-based instruments which are more diffused (government consultancy 
services cannot benefit every employer, employment regulations can). However, the 
in-depth exploration of both regulation and information-based instruments has shown 
most of all that intra-instrument variation in policy design can be as significant as 
inter-instrument variation (Woodside 1986).  
Chapters Four and Five provided chronological accounts of the development of family-
friendly working time policy in Germany and the UK placing the choice of policy 
instruments within the wider context of reconciliation policies and the government 
agendas these served. Chapters Six and Seven chose policy case-studies from 
regulation and information-based instruments for detailed comparison of policy design, 
highlighting similarities and differences in the national approaches and exploring the 
factors behind them. As we now turn to the concluding discussion, let us once again 
take a step back to holistically consider the British and German policy approaches.  
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8. Conclusions and implications for research and policy 
This thesis explored the developing field of family-friendly working time policy in 
comparative perspective. It set out to answer the research question of what policy 
strategies the British and German governments pursued to improve access to family-
friendly working time arrangements, in what ways these differed, and why. Formally 
strong male breadwinner regimes in which female employment was not actively 
encouraged or facilitated through government policy, Germany and the United 
Kingdom provided useful case studies to analyse the development of government 
strategies to improve access to family-friendly working time arrangements.  
The first exploratory component of the research question investigated what policy 
strategies were developed in each country to improve access to family-friendly 
working time arrangements over time. Policy strategies were analysed in terms of the 
policy choices between best practice promotion, financial incentives, and statutory 
working time regulation. The analysis further contextualised the development of 
family-friendly working time policy within the wider work-family reconciliation 
agenda, exploring which work-family arrangements were facilitated by government 
policy. Given the contested nature of working time flexibility between the time needs 
of employers and working parents, the second comparative component of the research 
question focused on the extent to which the policy strategies were designed to 
empower working mothers and fathers to negotiate the time flexibility they need, and 
how they differed. Finally, the third explanatory component of the research question 
sought to find explanations for the identified differences between the British and 
German policy strategies.  
This concluding discussion summarises the key findings in answer to the three 
components of the research question, reflects on the conceptual approach of the thesis, 
and discusses the implications for further research and policy. 
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Summary and key findings 
 (1) What policy strategies were pursued? 
The German and British governments both pursued a dual strategy of best practice 
promotion and statutory regulation to improve access to family-friendly working time 
arrangements. Neither of the two governments however employed economic incentives 
to encourage the provision of family-friendly working time arrangements. 
With the Work-Life Balance Campaign and the Alliance for the Family, both 
governments initiated high profile information campaigns involving a number of 
different non-legislative instruments aimed at raising awareness of the benefits of 
family-friendly flexible working arrangements, sensitise and persuade employers of 
their importance, and provide guidance on their implementation. Both governments 
further introduced individual legal rights to request flexible working time 
arrangements, and an obligation on employers to accommodate such requests if 
possible. By introducing statutory regulations in this policy field, they signalled their 
commitment to support working parents and placed their approach in contrast to the 
information based and low profile interventions of the Conservative/Liberal 
governments in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The chronological analysis of the development of national policy strategies revealed 
opposite trajectories in instrument choice. While the British policy development 
gradually built up from best practice promotion to statutory regulation between 1997 
and 2005, the German policy development moved from the introduction of statutory 
reforms during the first years in office to best practice promotion from 2001 onwards 
via a radical shift in policy approach. While the governing style of the British 
Government was from the outset non-confrontational and consensus-seeking, the 
German approach was authoritative during the first years in office. This governing 
style strained government-business relations through a number of interventions in the 
employment relationship, peaking in the conflict around the equal opportunities 
legislation for the private sector (Alemann and Sielschott 2007). Following the change 
in leadership at the BMFSFJ in 2002, the German approach to government-stakeholder 
relations became strongly oriented towards consensual cooperation with societal actors 
and with business leaders in particular.  
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Chapters Four and Five placed the development of family-friendly working time policy 
within the wider context of reconciliation policy reforms, including leave policies, 
childcare services, and financial support through the tax and benefit system to explore 
the policy orientations underlying the British and German approaches. If accessible to 
both parents, family-friendly working time arrangements can facilitate gender 
equitable dual-earner/dual-carer family arrangements if these are also supported by 
care services and financial support. In order to examine the potential implications of 
family-friendly working time policy for gender time relations, the wider reconciliation 
policy packages developed by New Labour and the ‘Red-Green’ Government were 
considered to address the following question. 
What work-family arrangements were facilitated by family-friendly working time 
policy?  
In both Germany and the United Kingdom, entitlements to flexible and reduced 
working hours were explicitly gender neutral and thus accessible by both mothers and 
fathers. However, the lack of financial compensation for a reduction in working hours 
implicitly reinforced the one-and-a-half-earner model prevalent among parents in both 
countries (Fagan et al. 2001). Although the opportunity costs associated with part-time 
employment were partially addressed by regulations against less favourable treatment 
of part-time workers, the financial loss associated with a reduction in working hours 
continues to represent a significant barrier to take-up, particularly by men, who still 
bear the primary breadwinning responsibility in the majority of German and British 
families (Vaskovics and Rost 1999).  
Despite this general limitation, the German policy reforms were found more promoting 
of a gender equitable division of family care than British reforms. Departing from a 
policy legacy of long and inflexible family leave entitlements which parents could take 
in turns, the 2001 parental leave reform individualised the leave entitlement and 
enabled parents to simultaneously share family care by both reducing their working 
hours to between 15 and 30 hours (Bothfeld 2005). Although the parental leave reform 
signalled a move from the male breadwinner/family carer model by removing 
regulatory barriers to equal access to ‘time to care’ for both parents, dual-carer 
arrangements were not substantially encouraged as the Child Raising Benefit was paid 
per child rather than being an individual entitlement to the parent. The introduction of 
an earnings-related benefit to parents (Elterngeld) in Germany in 2007 marks an 
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important improvement in financial support, particularly as the benefit can be used to 
top-up part-time earnings. However, similar to the Child Raising Benefit which it has 
come to replace, the Elterngeld is only paid to one parent at a time, which provides an 
incentive for sequential rather than simultaneous sharing of childcare where both 
parents reduce their working hours at the same time (BMFSFJ 2007a).  
British reconciliation policies, in contrast, were explicitly gender-biased. Although 
men received for the first time statutory entitlements to family leave through the 
introduction of 13 weeks unpaid parental leave and two weeks paid paternity leave 
(Kilkey 2006), the simultaneous extensions to Statutory Maternity Pay to a total of six 
months by 2004 revealed a strong gender bias in resource allocation (Lewis and 
Campbell 2007).  As the British leave entitlements have to be taken on a full-time 
basis, policy incentives reinforce a strict gender division of labour within the first 
months of parenthood. The strong ‘time to care’ orientation during the child’s first year 
was justified with reference to child development research advocating the value of 
continuous care (DTI 2005a). For parents of older children, however, dual-
earner/externalised care arrangements were facilitated through financial support 
towards the purchase of childcare but not for parental care in the home. Financial 
support backing up ‘time to care’ remains limited to full-time leave. The opportunity 
costs associated with working time reductions remain an important access barrier that 
has not been addressed. 
When considering how family-friendly working time policy was nested within the 
wider reconciliation policy packages developed by the New Labour and ‘Red-Green’ 
governments since the late 1990s, the policy emphasis over time increasingly shifted 
towards improving the childcare infrastructure as a key instrument addressing 
employment barriers. While family-friendly working time arrangements and childcare 
provision are complementary resources for parental employment, comparatively more 
resources were allocated to the externalisation of childcare than to family-friendly 
working time policy. The improvement of the childcare infrastructure was advanced 
through the National Childcare Strategies 1998 and 2004 in the UK and the Day Care 
Expansion Act 2005 in Germany focusing on the provision of early education places 
for three and four-year-olds (Cm 3959 1998; HM Treasury et al. 2004). In Germany, 
where part-time provision was already statutorily regulated from age three, policy 
reforms under the ‘Red-Green’ Government focused on provision for the under three-
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year-olds. Both governments increasingly emphasised the time-providing function of 
childcare providers by exploring avenues to extend opening hours and enable ‘wrap 
around care’ (HM Treasury et al. 2004). The externalisation of child care was backed 
up by financial transfers to subsidise the purchase of childcare services making ‘time 
to work’ more affordable through the introduction of targeted tax benefits and 
allowances to support parents with the costs of purchased childcare. This trend has 
continued since the 2005 elections. In Germany, financial support towards the 
purchase of childcare has increased significantly. The tax allowance to working 
parents towards the costs of purchased childcare was raised from 1,500 to 4,000 Euros 
p.a. in 2006 to cover up to two thirds of childcare costs for children under 15 (BMFSFJ 
2007b). In the UK, the Child Care Act passed in 2006 started to implement the Ten 
Year Strategy.  
 (2) What were the differences in the empowering potential to working mothers 
and fathers? 
At the level of policy choice, the British and German policy strategies were similarly 
empowering as both governments pursued a dual strategy of information campaigns 
and individual employment rights. Overall, the German policy package was more 
comprehensive than the British as it included measures to strengthen works councils in 
their negotiation of family-friendly policies with the employer. Further, the voluntary 
agreement with business and employer associations to promote equal opportunities for 
women and men in employment exerted additional pressure on employer organisations 
to promote family-friendly employment practices. The two in-depth case studies of 
individual employment rights and information campaigns in Chapters Six and Seven 
explored cross-national variation in the empowering potential of the British and 
German policy strategies at the level of policy design.  
The introduction of employment rights represented an empowering shift from the 
information-based policy strategies pursued by the Conservative/Liberal governments 
in the early to mid-1990s, when family-friendly policies by employers were 
ideationally supported through brochures and conferences but not regulated. The 
detailed analysis found, however, that although at the level of instrument choice the 
introduction of legislation was empowering to employees, the empowering potential of 
the individual employment rights was weakened through a number of trade-offs 
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between employee and employer interests at the level of policy design. Advances to 
the advantage of working parents in one area of policy design were met by protections 
of managerial freedom in another area. Interestingly, the two most prominent 
empowerment trade-offs were found to be inversed in Germany and the United 
Kingdom.  
The first trade-off related to the breadth of coverage (Empowerment Criterion 1). In 
Germany, the two employment rights under the BErzGG and the TzBfG jointly 
provided universal coverage on the basis of care status whereas the British Right to 
Request was limited to parents of children under the age of six. However, the stronger 
empowering potential of the German rights was weakened by the introduction of a 
small business exemption through which parents working for small employers with 
less than 16 employees were automatically excluded from the entitlement.  
The second trade-off related to substantive flexibility versus procedural control 
(Empowerment Criterion 3) and enforceability of employee working time preferences 
(Empowerment Criterion 4). The wider scope of working time flexibility provided by 
the Right to Request was offset by a lower degree of procedural power attributed to 
employees. In other words, while there were no limits to the type of flexible working 
arrangements that could be requested, British employees had no statutory claim to 
obtaining these, leaving UK parents with a ‘toothless’ entitlement (Kilpatrick and 
Freedland 2004). In Germany, greater restrictions on managerial freedom were 
balanced out by the lower scope for flexibility offered to working parents as both 
employment rights were limited to working time reduction.  
The comparative analysis of employment rights highlighted that regulation, which can 
significantly affect the power balance between employers and employees, does not 
necessarily fulfil this potential. In both cases, concessions were made to Managerial 
Freedom advocates at the level of policy design and these were particularly 
pronounced in the UK. In comparison to regulations, information campaigns from the 
outset have a lower potential to shift the power balance between employers and 
employees. In addition, both campaigns analysed in Chapter Seven were targeted 
predominantly at employers, leaving the benefit to working parents uncertain, 
particularly as provision remained subject to the good will of employers. They did not 
address the concern of access inequality through variable provision across workplaces.  
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The analysis of employer-directed information campaigns highlighted the low 
empowering potential of indirectly targeted information instruments when analysed in 
terms of the five Empowerment Criteria. Although coverage and the scope of 
flexibility were not treated selectively as in the case of employment rights, this 
potential advantage to employees was offset by the lack of employee control over 
working time flexibility. Provision of family-friendly working time flexibility was 
subject to employer agreement and could not be enforced. While overall provision 
might increase through higher awareness levels among employers and more favourable 
attitudes, it is unlikely that it will reach all who need it as the business-case for family-
friendly working time arrangements varies by the level of organisational exposure and 
employee characteristics (see Chapter Two). Although the design of the Work-Life 
Balance Campaign and the Alliance for the Family was shown to differ significantly, 
both campaigns fared similarly poorly when compared in terms of employee 
empowerment. Placing information campaigns in comparison to employment rights 
highlighted the weaker empowering potential of information-based instruments 
compared to regulation on the one hand, but also showed that both campaigns were 
biased towards encouraging voluntary, unilateral provision by employers.  
(3) Why did the British and German policy strategies differ? 
The final research challenge was to find explanations for the variations in the British 
and German policy strategies. Actors involved in the policy making process were 
either favourable to increase employee empowerment or to protect managerial 
freedom. These different orientations towards policy choice and design where shaped 
by their wider ‘normative and cognitive frames’ (Surel 2000). These were influenced 
by the institutional setting within which actors operated, such as interest groups and 
government departments, and by the nationally specific policy context of past policy 
choices and overarching policy goals. Evidence was found in favour of the 
propositions advanced by ideational approaches to policy making that actors are more 
likely to select policy instruments and attributes which are congruent with their wider 
normative and cognitive frames (Surel 2000), and by interaction-oriented approaches 
that policy makers are more likely to take into account the policy preferences of 
interest groups when they are in an inter-dependent relationship with them (Rhodes 
1997; Bressers and O'Toole 1998; Kooiman 2003).  
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The different policy contexts within which family-friendly working time policy 
strategies in Germany and the United Kingdom were embedded represented a valuable 
explanatory factor for differences in the policy trajectories over time and cross-national 
differences at the level of policy design. Both the different policy legacies inherited by 
the incoming governments and the different overarching policy goals they were 
pursuing helped to account for differences in the choices made. In the UK, the legacy 
of relative non-interventionism in the organisation of working time and parental 
reconciliation choices meant that New Labour had to gradually build up business 
acceptance of government intervention in support of working parents, moving 
gradually from less to more empowering policy interventions, very much in line with 
the observations by Doern and Phidd (1983) in the liberal Candian context. In 
Germany, where past governments had already regulated employment relations, policy 
reforms came in the form of amendments to already existing regulations. Policy 
change resulted from dissatisfaction with previous policy choices (Palier 2005). At the 
level of policy design, existing regulations influenced choices as policy makers in both 
Germany and the United Kingdom attempted to integrate new regulations with existing 
law to avoid unnecessary complexity (see Chapter Six). In the case of the small 
business exemption, for example, past policy choices influenced policy design in 
opposite ways, leading to a small business exemption in Germany, and the decision 
against it in the UK (Work and Parents Taskforce 2001; Bothfeld 2005).   
While both governments aimed to improve access to family-friendly working time 
arrangements in order to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life, their 
motivations were guided by different overarching policy goals. In the UK, the ability 
to reconcile work and family life was considered instrumental in achieving economic 
independence and poverty prevention, particularly as New Labour committed to 
eliminating child poverty by 2020 (HM Treasury 2004a). Labour market inclusion of 
parents was a central policy goal within the wider welfare reform agenda (Home 
Office 1998). In Germany, by contrast, family-friendly working time policy was driven 
by three different policy goals: firstly, employment creation and protection through the 
redistribution of work; secondly, gender equality through the facilitation of maternal 
employment of men’s greater share in parenting; and thirdly, encouragement of 
families to have more children by improving the compatibility of work and family life 
to address the problems associated with demographic change.  
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These different policy goals were associated with different emphases in policy 
orientation. In the UK, where labour market inclusion was of central importance, 
reconciliation policies were more strongly oriented towards enabling parents to work. 
The Right to Request accordingly provided a wide scope of flexible working 
arrangements to suit individual time needs. In Germany, in contrast, both goals of 
employment creation and gender equality through a greater share of fathers in family 
care were more strongly oriented towards providing ‘time to care’ through working 
time reduction. Although different policy goals were pursued by the two government 
departments in charge of the BErzGG and the TzBfG, both employment creation and 
gender equality goals were congruent with employee empowerment to reduce their 
working hours.  
Family-friendly working time policy serves different overarching policy goals. 
Therefore its development was spread across different policy agendas and government 
departments. Actors working within government departments were influenced in their 
policy decisions by the respective institutionalised policy priorities. These influenced 
policy makers either in favour of employee empowerment or in favour of managerial 
freedom. Policy makers at the BMFSFJ in Germany, particularly under the leadership 
of Christine Bergmann (1998-2002), were more strongly in favour of employee 
empowerment as departmental policy priorities advocated the interests of families and 
women. The DTI’s institutional commitment, in contrast, was to promote economic 
growth and competitiveness. It therefore placed greater emphasis on managerial 
freedom. Policy initiatives for working parents that were developed at the DTI were 
from the outset designed within the parameters of a business-friendly approach. When 
the Work-Life Balance Campaign transferred from the DfEE to the DTI in 2001, it 
became more strongly oriented towards employer interests. Managerial freedom in the 
German context tended to be advocated by the Economy Ministry leading to policy 
proposals being blocked or amended at a later stage of policy formation through 
processes of inter-departmental bargaining and negotiations (see Chapters Five and 
Six; Bothfeld 2005; Alemann and Sielschott 2007). The fact that family-friendly 
working time policy was developed within differently oriented government 
departments with regard to employee empowerment and managerial freedom in the 
two countries appears to have had an influence on policy choices.  
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Policy makers were expected to be more likely to choose instruments and instrument 
attributes which were congruent with their wider normative and cognitive frames 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Surel 2000). The analysis of party documents and 
parliamentary debates found the German Social Democrats to have a more favourable 
disposition towards government intervention in the labour market to redress market 
created inequalities by regulation than New Labour, who endorsed the neo-liberal 
advocacy of minimal and selectively targeted government intervention in the economy, 
protecting managerial freedom. These orientations were reflected in the way statutory 
regulation was introduced and designed as the German employment rights constrained 
managerial freedom more strongly than the Right to Request, which was explicitly 
designed to be ‘light touch’.  
A notable example how different actors with different ideas influenced policy choice 
and design was the radical shift in governing style following the change in leadership 
at the BMFSFJ, where Renate Schmidt initiated a radically different vision of family 
policy and the respective roles that government and societal actors should play in 
promoting family-friendliness. Family policy in general and reconciliation policy in 
particular, were conceptualised as a societal responsibility, placing more weight on the 
cooperation of societal actors in implementing government policy.  
The establishment of the Alliance for the Family, which implemented this new 
approach, created a relationship of inter-dependence with stakeholders. The wish to 
cooperate with business and employer associations to promote more family-
friendliness in the world of work influenced the shift from an authoritative, regulatory 
approach to a consensual governing style that was associated with a shift in instrument 
choice from regulation to voluntary cooperation and best-practice promotion. Another 
example for inter-dependent relations with stakeholders was the British Government’s 
aim to work in partnership with Employers for Work-Life Balance. This provided 
opportunities for the employer group to shape policy design. Thus they were able to 
negotiate that the campaign should promote work-life balance rather than family-
friendly employment, leading to a wider breadth of coverage.  
In this respect, the influence of interest groups on policy making was analysed by 
exploring their opportunities to influence policy design. The success of family-friendly 
working time policy strongly depends on the cooperation of the actors who control the 
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negotiation of working time in the employment relations system. Due to the limited 
capacity of the state to steer the organisation of work in market-based economies, the 
desire to maximise compliance by employers was shown to have had a favourable 
influence on the choice of less empowering instruments and instrument attributes in 
both Germany and the UK.  
Demographic change - to return to the opening paragraphs of the thesis – has created 
opportunities for both more gender equitable family time arrangements and increased 
working time sovereignty by contributing to push the reconciliation of work and 
family life onto political agendas. At first sight, family-friendly working time policy in 
both Germany and the UK represented a leap in employee empowerment compared to 
earlier policy approaches. Being addressed to both men and women, they seemed 
supportive of more gender equitable family arrangements. However, this thesis has 
shown that when analysed in detail, family-friendly working time policy was not as 
empowering as it first seemed as government policy strategies included a number of 
compromises between employee empowerment and managerial freedom, which 
potentially reinforce rather than redress market created access inequalities. Further, the 
high opportunity costs associated with working time reduction were not systematically 
addressed by government policy. The lack of adequate financial support, particularly in 
the UK, constrained the affordability of working time reduction to allocate time to care 
which did not challenge the established male breadwinner arrangements. 
One may argue that family-friendly working time policy is still a ‘young’ policy field. 
In order to increase employer acceptance, policy makers may start by choosing less 
empowering instruments first moving gradually up the scale when policies do not 
engender the desired outcomes (Doern and Phidd 1983). In this case, it might only be a 
question of time until governments are prepared to subsidise the provision and use of 
family-friendly working time arrangements financially to improve access (Hood 1983). 
However, given the contested nature of working time flexibility and the strong conflict 
potential associated with government interventions in the organisation of work, it 
seems more probable that they will continue to channel government resources towards 
more consensual policy alternatives, such as childcare services, for which there is a 
broader societal consensus. While, as Bonoli has argued, there is a ‘convergence in 
interests’ between women and employers in support of improved public childcare 
provision (Bonoli 2005 p.443), interests are diverging between parents and employers 
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when it comes to control over working time. Where governments are seeking to 
reconcile employer and employee interests, childcare provision - not family-friendly 
working time regulation – provides a consensual policy solution to the problem of 
work-family reconciliation. Childcare provision being an ‘employer-friendly’ policy 
solution provides one possible explanation why policy makers may be more likely to 
allocate government resources to promote the externalisation of childcare, enabling 
parents to be flexibly available for work. Government promotion of dual-
earner/externalised care arrangements is likely to incur less conflict with employers 
than the promotion of more gender equitable dual-earner/dual-carer arrangements.  
Reflections on the comparative framework 
This thesis has applied an empowerment perspective to the study of government 
interventions in the work/family interface. It took into account the triangle of state-
individual, state-employer and employee-employer relations and has thereby helped to 
understand the interest politics at play, which were motivated by the implications of 
government policy for the power balance between employees and employers in the 
employment relationship.  
Exploring these dynamics and implications across countries constituted a particular 
methodological and analytical challenge. In order to be able to systematically compare 
policy strategies both over time and across countries, the thesis benefited from the 
literature on policy instruments (Woodside 1986; Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Vedung 
2003). The instrument choice approach as applied in this thesis breaks down policy 
strategies into different levels of choice between instruments and instrument attributes 
and provides distinct dimensions along which variation can be systematically 
identified. Five Empowerment Criteria were derived from the literature on working 
time flexibility and the key themes of concern that have been highlighted by it. They 
were grounded in the access problematic in order to be able to identify relevant 
variations along dimensions which are of immediate concern to the study of work-
family reconciliation. By breaking down policy measures into smaller components, it 
was possible to capture complexity while enabling systematic comparisons. Thus it 
was possible to identify the nature of compromises that were struck between the needs 
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of parents and those of employers, and to reflect on the potential implications for the 
power balance between them.  
The empowerment perspective has helped to better understand the link between the 
empowering potential of instrument attributes and the dynamics of the policy process 
through which certain instruments and instrument attributes are chosen over others. 
These insights informed the explanatory approach used to explain policy variation. The 
explanatory framework drew from the policy making literature to explore the influence 
of the ideas and interests of actors operating within nationally specific institutional 
settings and policy contexts. The framework merged insights from ideational 
approaches (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Surel 2000), the interaction-oriented 
governance literature and historical institutionalism emphasising the role of 
institutional settings and past policy choices (Immergut 1992; Pierson 2000b; Kooiman 
2003). Given the different policy legacies identified in Chapter Two, which implied 
different starting points for policy development, and the instrumentality of work-
family reconciliation to a variety of policy goals, the policy context within which 
policy choices were made was given particular attention in cross-national comparison.  
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993) concept of advocacy coalitions between actors 
sharing a particular belief system was useful to distinguish between Employee-
Empowerment and Managerial Freedom advocates across political parties, government 
departments and interest groups. This conceptualisation was a helpful device to move 
beyond the structural divisions of government institutions, interest groups, and 
political parties but instead to focus on the structuring effect of the empowering 
potential associated with certain instruments and instrument attributes. Thus change in 
policy strategies over time could be explained in a context where variables such as 
political parties in power and government departments in charge of policy 
development were stable.  
Compromises in the empowering potential were often the result of bargaining and 
negotiation between actors belonging to different advocacy groups. Particularly in non-
regulatory policy the influence of societal actors on policy design through inter-
dependent relations in government-interest group alliances was found. Insights from 
the interaction-oriented literature provided a useful complement to the ideational 
perspective as it drew attention to the nature of relationships between different 
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government and societal actors (Rhodes 1997; Bressers and O'Toole 1998; Kooiman 
2003). 
While the ideas and interests of actors were an important factor, the explanation of 
cross-national variation between the approaches was much facilitated by taking the 
nationally specific policy contexts into account within which policy makers operated. 
The historical institutionalist approach of placing policy developments within their 
temporal context, both in terms of the different policy legacies inherited by New 
Labour and the ‘Red-Green’ Coalition governments, and the sequential policy choices 
in their policy strategies, advanced understanding of how policy strategies were 
developed over time. This approach highlighted temporally important events such as 
general elections, which involved staff turnover and agenda changes, creating new 
opportunities for actors and ideas to shape policy strategies (Kingdon 1995; Sabatier 
1998). 
The empowerment perspective developed in this thesis contributes to the study of the 
work/family interface as it enables researchers to critically examine the empowerment 
trade-offs which are more or less implicit in government policy aimed at supporting 
working parents in the workplace. By being sensitive to the power relations between 
employees and employers and the polarised interests around the control over working 
time flexibility, the empowerment framework has helped to better understand 
bargaining dynamics and tensions between interest groups and policy makers in the 
policy process.  
In both the British and German policy strategies these tensions produced only 
moderately empowering policy advances which stayed behind their potential due to the 
compromises that were made. While the scope of this thesis was limited to analysing 
government policies for working parents, the findings of the research have wider 
relevance for the study of temporal relations in employment and between the work and 
family spheres. The last section of this concluding discussion therefore raises a number 
of issues for further research and policy makers that have emerged from the research. 
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Implications for further research and policy  
At least three possible directions for future research have emerged from the findings of 
this thesis. One research project would be to expand the focus from working parents to 
consider differences in government support for different groups of workers with care 
responsibilities. The empowerment framework developed in this thesis could be used 
for the systematic comparison of government support towards different groups of 
workers within the same country. Of particular interest would be a comparison 
between parents and carers of adults. In both Germany and the United Kingdom, 
government support is still biased towards supporting parents in reconciling care with 
employment. However, in the context of demographic change, rising pension ages and 
growing efforts to include older workers in the labour market, work-family 
reconciliation problems of those caring for the elderly are receiving increasing 
attention by policy makers as the recent extension of the Right to Request to carers of 
adults in the UK illustrates.  
A second research direction is to address the question of outcomes. Having identified 
the nature of empowerment trade-offs between the British and German policy 
approaches, an important question that arises from the research is the relative impact of 
these trade-offs on working parents. For instance, are narrow eligibility criteria by 
employee status, as in the UK, or by employer size, as in Germany of more concern 
regarding parental access to family-friendly working time arrangements in the 
workplace?   
A third research direction would be to apply the empowerment framework developed 
in this thesis to analyse government strategies in other countries, thus further 
increasing our understanding of how governments have been dealing with the 
challenge of mediating between the temporal needs of employers and families. 
Interesting further case studies would be the Netherlands and Sweden where statutory 
rights to flexible working have been implemented (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Fagan et 
al. 2006). 
In both Germany and the United Kingdom recent research on the prevalence of flexible 
working time arrangements in workplaces indicates an increase in overall provision. 
However, variation across and within workplaces persists (Flüter-Hoffmann and Seyda 
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2006; Hayward et al. 2007; Hooker et al. 2007). While the overall increase in provision 
levels is to be welcome, attention must be focused upon how existing access 
inequalities might be further reduced to improve equality of access. In this respect, it is 
important to reflect on the danger that selective government policy can create 
inequities of access between different groups of employees (Fagan et al. 2006).     
An important question which dominates policy debates on the family-friendly 
organisation of working time remains what policy strategy would be most promising to 
achieve widespread change in working practices. While employer-oriented information 
and persuasion campaigns in this research were categorised as less empowering than 
regulation, it must be stressed that this does not mean that they are not beneficial to 
working parents. Employer supportiveness, which is needed to foster constructive and 
consensual working time arrangements in the workplace, will more likely be gained 
through voluntary cooperation rather than coerced compliance. Many governments are 
reluctant to regulate the organisation of working time (OECD 2007). Even with non-
binding, voluntary policy approaches, the empowering potential can be better exploited 
by targeting policy directly at employees, works councils and trade unions as well as 
employers. Attitudes on both sides need to change to facilitate more family-supportive 
workplace cultures (Fagan et al. 2006). One of the findings of the research was that 
government policy was biased towards encouraging employers to change. Government 
policy could more explicitly promote awareness of the benefits of family-friendly 
working time arrangements and provide guidance and support on how these can be 
effectively negotiated with employers.  
The research has highlighted the importance of employer cooperation in this policy 
field and the dilemma of finding policy solutions which strike a balance between 
employee empowerment and managerial freedom. One concern that has been raised in 
this thesis is that the reliance on a win-win scenario of family-friendly working time 
arrangements which was depicted in both information campaigns bears the risk for 
policy makers of becoming trapped within a consensual policy style. This might lead 
to self-censorship of asking uncomfortable questions on how family-friendly flexible 
working arrangements offered by employers really are. Survey research commissioned 
to evaluate the spread of family-friendly working, such as the German industry-led 
family-friendly monitors (Flüter-Hoffmann and Solbrig 2003; Flüter-Hoffmann and 
Seyda 2006) may overestimate provision levels by counting flexible arrangements 
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which are not in practice oriented at employee needs. Critical evaluation of the degree 
of actual time sovereignty by employees is needed to be able to grasp what barriers to 
a more family-friendly working time organisation are remaining.  
Neither Germany nor the UK made use of economic incentives to encourage the 
provision of family-friendly working time arrangements. Tax allowances for 
employers or public subsidies for the introduction of more employee-oriented working 
time arrangements may create a business-case for employers who fear the additional 
administrative costs associated with flexible working. Economic incentives could 
especially help small employers. Financial benefits alleviating the financial loss 
associated with care-related working time reductions could create financial incentives 
for men to share more equally in family care. The new Elterngeld in Germany 
represents a step in this direction. Similar reforms in the UK would encourage more 
gender equitable work-family arrangements. 
In the light of recent policy developments which emphasise the expansion of childcare 
provision in view of creating the ‘economy friendly family’, as the Equal 
Opportunities Commission has commented (Equal Opportunities Commission 2005b), 
efforts to create a more ‘family-friendly economy’ must not be neglected to promote 
genuine choice in the allocation of time to earning and caring for both men and 
women. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
No. Date of 
Interview 
Place of 
Interview 
Interview Method Type of Actor 
UK 01 25/07/2005 London Telephone Civil Servant 
UK 02 21/09/2005 London Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
UK 03 28/09/2005 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 04 23/11/2005 London Telephone Interest Group Representative 
UK 05 13/12/2005 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 06 14/12/2005 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 07 15/12/2005 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 08 22/12/2005 London Telephone Interest Group Representative 
UK 09 11/01/2006 London Telephone Interest Group Representative 
UK10 23/01/2006 London Telephone Civil Servant 
UK 11 27/01/2006 London Telephone Interest Group Representative 
UK 12 31/01/2006 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 13 02/02/2006 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 14 02/02/2006 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 15 03/05/2006 Sheffield Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
UK 16 04/10/2006 London Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 01 27/06/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 02 28/06/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 03 28/06/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Member of Parliament 
DE 04 28/06/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 05 29/06/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Political Party Representative 
DE 06 29/06/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 07 11/07/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 08 12/07/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
DE 09 12/07/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
DE 10 12/07/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 11 01/08/2006 Düsseldorf Face-to-Face Interest Group Representative 
DE 12 02/08/2006 Bonn Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
DE 13 19/09/2006 Bonn Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
DE 14 28/09/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
DE 15 28/09/2006 Berlin Face-to-Face Civil Servant 
DE 16 30/10/2006 Berlin Telephone Member of Parliament 
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Appendix B: List of Informants 
Name Institution Country 
Kattrin Bauer B90/Die GRÜNEN Germany 
Anne Dohle ZHD Germany 
Bernhard Franke BMFSFJ Germany 
Beate Hesse BMFSJF Germany 
Alexandra Hoffert DIHK Germany 
Christel Humme SPD Germany 
Maria Kathmann DGB Germany 
Carlotta Köster-Brons BDA Germany 
Ina Lenke FDP Germany 
Heide Pfarr WSI Germany 
Malte Ristau-Winkler BMFSFJ Germany 
Jutta Struck BMFSFJ Germany 
Rocco Thiede Bertelsmann Foundation Germany 
Hans-Peter Viethen BMAS Germany 
Clemens Volkwein BDI Germany 
Thomas Wieseler BMFSFJ Germany 
Stephen Alambritis FSB United Kingdom 
Kay Carberry TUC United Kingdom 
John Cridland CBI United Kingdom 
Lucie Daniels Parents at Work United Kingdom 
Mike Emmot CIPD United Kingdom 
Alexandra Jones The Work Foundation United Kingdom 
Sue Monk Parents at Work United Kingdom 
Jo Morris TUC United Kingdom 
Mary Pooley DfEE United Kingdom 
Mark Pullen DTI United Kingdom 
Rachel Roe Working Families United Kingdom 
Mark Sayers DTI United Kingdom 
Pam Walton New Ways to Work United Kingdom 
Caroline Waters Employers for Work-Life Balance United Kingdom 
Laura Williams The Work Foundation United Kingdom 
Richard Wilson Institute of Directors United Kingdom 
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Appendix C: Employers for Work-Life Balance 
FOUNDER ORGANISATIONS 
ASDA Stores Limited 
BBC 
BMW Group 
British Telecommunications plc 
Classic Cleaners 
Druid 
Eli Lilley and Company Limited 
Heygate and Sons 
HSBC Bank plc 
KPMG 
Littlewoods Organisation plc 
Lloyds TSB Group plc 
Marks and Spencer plc 
Nationwide Building Society 
NatWest Group 
Northern Foods plc 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Prudential plc 
J Sainsbury plc 
Shell Companies in the UK 
Unilever plc 
Xerox (UK) Limited 
 
Source: Changing Patterns, DfEE 2000, Appendix A
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Appendix D: Ministerial Advisory Committee on Work-Life Balance 
 
Terms of Reference 
To advise Ministers on how best to promote awareness and take-up of voluntary 
practices in employment in both the public and private sectors that: 
a. enable employees and potential employees to achieve what is for them individually a 
better balance between work and their other responsibilities and interests; and 
b. in all cases benefit the organisation for which they work, whether by helping it to 
become more productive and profitable or by enabling it to provide a better standard of 
service to its customers. 
Membership 
Stephen Alambritis, Head of Parliamentary Affairs, Federation of Small Businesses 
Fiona Cannon, Head of Equal Opportunities, Lloyds TSB Group 
Kay Carberry, Head of Equal Rights at the Trades Union Congress 
Shirley Conran, Journalist, best-selling author and Chair of Mothers in Management 
Pat Corcoran, Diversity Director, Business in the Community, and Operations Director 
for Opportunity Now 
Joanna Foster, Chair, National Work-Life Forum, the BT Forum and the Lloyds TSB 
Foundation and Deputy Chair of Governors at Oxford Brookes University 
Will Hutton, Chair, The Industrial Society 
Sue Levett, Director, Family Friendly UK Ltd. 
Mary MacLeod, Chief Executive, National Family and Parenting Institute 
Jeremy Miller, Director of Marketing and Financial Affairs at the Engineering 
Employers’ Federation 
Richard Mills, Personnel Services Manager, Surrey County Council 
Jill Mortimer, Equalities Issues Adviser, Employers’ Organisation for Local 
Government 
Surinder Sharma, Corporate Equal Opportunities Manager, Littlewoods 
Pam Walton, Research and Policy Manager, New Ways to Work 
Diana Whitworth, Chief Executive, Carers’ National Association 
Sheila Wild, Acting Head of Policy, Equal Opportunities Commission 
 
Source: Changing Patterns, DfEE 2000, Appendix B
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Appendix E: Work and Parents Taskforce 
Terms of Reference  
The taskforce will: 
• building on best practice, design a light-touch legislative approach to giving 
parents of young children a right to make a request to work flexible hours and 
to have this request considered seriously by the employer; 
• take fully into account the particular needs of small employers in designing 
such a solution, including whether they should be subject to special conditions; 
• integrate existing best practice and the reasonable operational needs of the 
business; 
• put the emphasis on resolving within the business rather than through 
applications to employment tribunals; 
• consider whether other changes to the law are needed to remove any legal or 
institutional impediments to flexible working; 
• consider what further support would help employers and employees to make 
and consider cases for flexible working; and 
• consider whether extra help with the training and development of people 
working flexibly is needed. 
 
Membership of the Work and Parents Taskforce 
Professor Sir George Bain (Chairman), President and Vice-Chancellor, The Queen’s 
University of Belfast 
Fiona Cannon, Commissioner, Equal Opportunities Commission 
Kay Carberry, Head of Equal Rights, Trades Union Congress 
John Cridland, Deputy Director-General, Confederation of British Industry 
Martyn Gayle, Managing Director, Martyn Gayle at Aveda 
Michael Griffin, Director, Human Resources, Kings College Hospital Trust 
Anne Minto OBE, Director, Human Resources, Smiths Group Plc 
Sue Monk, Chief Executive, Parents at Work 
Maureen Rooney OBE, General Council, Trades Union Congress 
Simon Topman, Managing Director, J Hudson & Co (ACME Whistles) Ltd 
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Advisory Group of the Work and Parents Taskforce 
Stephanie James, British Chambers of Commerce 
Mike Emmot, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
Katja Klaason, Confederation of British Industry 
Elaine Aarons, Employment Lawyers’ Association 
Helen Lindars, Equal Opportunities Commission 
Stephen Alambritis, Federation of Small Businesses 
Gail Cartmail, Manufacturing Science and Finance Union 
Joanna Wade, Maternity Alliance 
David Coulter, National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
Lucy Anderson, Trades Union Congress 
 
Source: Work and Parents Taskforce Report 2001 
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Appendix F: Alliance for the Family 
High Profile Impulse Group 
Roland Berger, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants 
Ludwig Georg Braun, DIHK 
Dominique Döttling, Döttling & Partner Beratungsgesellschaft mbH 
Peter Hartz, Volkswagen AG 
Dieter Hundt, BDA 
Christine Licci, Citibank Privatkunden AG 
Jutta Limbach, Goethe-Institut 
Siegmar Mosdorf, CNC AG 
Hubertus Schmoldt, IG BCE 
Michael Sommer, DGB 
Warnfried Dettling, Publizist 
Hans Bertram, HU Berlin 
 
Cooperation Group 
DGB 
DIHK 
BDI 
BDA 
ZDH 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 
Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 
 
Source: Schmidt 2004 
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Appendix G: Flexible Working Arrangements  
Overtime Time worked in addition to one's regular working hours. 
Temporary 
reduced working 
hours 
Where an employee has an agreement to cut their hours for a 
set period of time (for example for a month or six months) and 
then return to their original working hours. This is sometimes 
known as V-working. 
Term-time 
working 
Where an employee only works during school term working 
times. 
Job sharing This is a type of part-time working where a full-time job is 
divided, usually between two people. The job sharers work at 
different times, although there may be a changeover period. 
Sharers each have their own contract of employment and share 
the pay and benefits of a full-time job on a pro-rata basis 
Part-time work Contractually working fewer hours than the normal full-time 
hours. 
Flexible start and 
finishing times 
Where an employee can vary their start and finish times but 
have an agreement to work a set number of hours per week or 
per month.  
Staggered working 
hours 
Staggered work hours vary the arrival and departure times of 
groups of employees within a company before and after the 
typical 8 am to 5 pm schedule. The term ‘staggered’ indicates 
that employees arrive in different shifts at different times 
within a time period. Unlike flexible start and finishing times, 
employees in a staggered work schedule may have no ability to 
choose which shift they work on. 
Time off in lieu Days granted as leave in the place of extra payments for such 
things as overtime. Also known as TOIL 
Compressed 
working week 
This means working full-time hours over fewer days in the 
working week, for example 40 hours over four days or a nine-
day fortnight. 
Shift work A period of work which is performed outside the normal spread 
of hours, particularly when a factory or business operates on a 
24 hour basis. 
Week-end working Working on Saturdays and/or Sundays 
Annualised hours Where the number of hours an employee has to work is 
calculated over a full year: for example, instead of 40 hours a 
week, employees are contracted to work 1,900 hours per year 
(after allowing for leave and other entitlements) 
 
Sources: Hooker et al 2008, p.vi; http://www.redgoldfish.co.uk/glossary.asp 
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